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Conquering the Cultural Frontier:
The New Subjectivism of the Supreme
Court in Indian Law
David H. Getchest
For a century and a half, the Supreme Court was faithful to a set of
foundation principles respecting Indian tribal sovereignty. Though the
United States can abrogate tribal powers and rights, it can only do so
by legislation. Accordingly, the Court has protected reservations as en-
claves for Indian self-government, preventing states from enforcing their
laws and taxes, and holding that even federal laws could not be applied
to Indians without congressional permission. Recently, however, the
Court has assumed the job it formerly conceded to Congress, consider-
ing and weighing cases to reach results comporting with the Justices'
subjective notions of what the Indian jurisdictional situation ought to
be. This new subjectivist approach, the author argues, severs tribal sov-
ereignty from its historical moorings, leaving lower courts without prin-
cipled, comprehensible guidance. Tribes hold distinct legal rights in
treaties and other laws. They strive to perpetuate their cultures and
land base through governance. But now they are left to the vicissitudes
of Court majorities that depend on the perceptions of culturally alien
Justices in individual cases. The author also assesses prospects for re-
turning to foundation principles. Although most of the current Court
accepts subjectivism, he concludes that a return is possible if one or
more Justices assumes intellectual leadership in Indian law cases.
INTRODUCTION
The right of Indians to tribal self-government has always been
vulnerable to abrogation by acts of Congress. But the courts have
generally served as the conscience of federal Indian law, protecting
Copyright © 1996 California Law Review, Inc.
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tribal powers and rights at least against state action, unless and until
Congress clearly states a contrary intention. The Supreme Court has
recently begun to depart from this traditional standard, abandoning
entrenched principles of Indian law in favor of an approach that bends
tribal sovereignty to fit the Court's perceptions of non-Indian interests.
In 1941 Felix S. Cohen synthesized more than a century of the law
of tribal self-government when he wrote:
The whole course of judicial decision on the nature of
Indian tribal powers is marked by adherence to three
fundamental principles: (1) An Indian tribe possesses, in the
first instance, all the powers of any sovereign state. (2) Conquest
renders the tribe subject to the legislative power of the United
States and, in substance, terminates the external powers of
sovereignty of the tribe, e.g., its power to enter into treaties with
foreign nations, but does not by itself affect the internal
sovereignty of the tribe, i.e., its powers of local self-government.
(3) These powers are subject to qualification by treaties and by
express legislation of Congress, but, save as thus expressly
qualified, full powers of internal sovereignty are vested in the
Indian tribes and in their duly constituted organs of
government.'
These foundation principles still held true when Cohen's Handbook of
Federal Indian Law was revised in 1982.2 And they guided a spate of
landmark cases in the "modem era" of federal Indian law that encour-
aged a reinvigoration of tribal governments throughout the country. 3
During this period, tribes gained political influence and economic secu-
rity as Congress and the executive also generally promoted a policy of
tribal self-determination.
To the extent that it was defined by a trend in Supreme Court juris-
prudence, however, the modem era has ended. Over the last fifteen
years, partly as a result of tribes' broader assertions of power over reser-
vation activity, non-Indian interests have been allowed to play a greater
1. FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 123 (1941) [hereinafter COHEN
(1941)].
2. Cohen's formulation was reiterated without substantial editing. FELIX S. COHEN,
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 241-42 (Rennard Strickland ed., 1982) [hereinafter COHEN
(1982)].
3. Charles Wilkinson called the period following the decision of Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217
(1959), the modem era of Indian law. CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TINIE, AND
THE LAW 1 (1987). He states:
The modem cases reflect the premise that tribes should be insulated against the
passage of time. Inevitably, there are some exceptions, but the mainstream of opinions has
built a number of rules that prevent state powers and private rights from expanding to
encroach upon tribal prerogatives except by express congressional permission.
Id. at 32. When he wrote, the Court had already begun to depart from this trend, though it was then
still reasonable to isolate those departures as aberrations.
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role in Indian country jurisdictional disputes. As these disputes have
reached the United States Supreme Court, several decisions have cur-
tailed exercises of tribal governing power that cast a cultural shadow on
non-Indian values, personal liberties, or property interests. The Court
has become the arbiter of how much governing authority tribes may
exercise, assuming a prerogative that it formerly conceded to the politi-
cal branches of government. It now gauges tribal sovereignty as a
function of changing conditions-demographic, social, political, and
economic-and the expectations they create in the minds of affected
non-Indians. In the emerging jurisprudence of Indian law, the Court
arrogates to itself the role of reviewing and weighing non-Indian inter-
ests and, ultimately, of redesigning the sovereignty of Indian tribes.
This subjectivist trend in recent Indian law decisions is brought into
sharp relief by previously confidential memoranda and draft opinions
discovered in the files of the late Justice Thurgood Marshall and retired
Justice William Brennan. Contrast Cohen's formulation of the tradi-
tional principles with Justice Antonin Scalia's 1990 description of
Supreme Court Indian law jurisprudence:
[O]pinions in this field have not posited an original state of af-
fairs that can subsequently be altered only by explicit legislation,
but have rather sought to discern what the current state of affairs
ought to be by taking into account all legislation, and the con-
gressional "expectations" that it reflects, down to the present
day.
The issue facing Scalia was whether an Indian tribe had criminal
jurisdiction over an Indian who was not a member of that tribe for a
crime committed on the reservation.' A majority of the Court voted in
conference after the oral argument to reverse a Court of Appeals deci-
sion upholding tribal jurisdiction. Justice Scalia originally voted to af-
firm. Justice Brennan, as senior dissenting Justice, assigned him the task
of writing the dissent. Scalia later changed his mind, telling Brennan " I
am sorry to desert." In the course of his "efforts to craft an opinion,"
he had gleaned from some recent decisions an approach that enabled
the Court to readjust tribal jurisdiction and sovereignty based on a snap-
shot of current conditions and the expectations of non-members. Al-
though he "would not have taken that approach as an original matter,"
he became convinced that the judicial prerogative was now "too deeply
4. Memorandum from Justice Antonin Scalia to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., (Apr. 4, 1990)
(Duro v. Reina, No. 88-6546) [hereinafter Scalia Duro Memo], in Papers of Justice Thurgood
Marshall (reproduced from the Collections of the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress) (on file
with author) [hereinafter Marshall Papers]. These remarkable papers were opened to researchers
after Justice Thurgood Marshall's death, and Justice William Brennan's papers also have been
selectively opened to serious scholars.
5. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
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imbedded in our jurisprudence to be changed."6 Hence he joined in
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion, which extended the Court's denial
of tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians in Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe7 to the more difficult question of jurisdiction
over non-member Indians.8
During the modem era, the Court regularly extended foundational
principles to contemporary contexts, affording tribes the legal security
to exercise broad sovereignty. But the Court then became susceptible to
arguments that the impacts on non-Indians were too severe, and began
aberrational departures from the presumption that tribal sovereignty
survives until curtailed by Congress. This new subjectivist approach,
candidly described by Scalia, has influenced a growing number of
Court decisions. Nevertheless, the Court has not openly rejected the tra-
ditional principles Cohen described, and the Justices continue to profess
deference to congressional authority over the scope of aboriginal pow-
ers and rights. Particularly when non-Indian interests are not seriously
threatened, the Court often recites and sometimes acts upon foundation
principles.
It is the thesis of this Article that although the most senior members
of the present Court are committed to the subjectivist approach to In-
dian sovereignty, and others are often attracted to it, traditional doctrine
can be redeemed. Most of the Court's current members have simply
not taken enough interest, and none has assumed intellectual leadership,
in the field of Indian law. All have been compliant at times, accepting
subjectivist rationales in decisions that curtail tribal sovereignty. How-
ever, the newer members of the Court are in a position to determine
whether Indian law is brought back on course with fundamental princi-
ples, or whether it will continue as a rudderless exercise in judicial sub-
jectivism.
6. Scalia Duro Memo, supra note 4.
7. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
8. The historical evidence for Justice Rehnquist's "assumption" that tribes took no jurisdiction
over non-Indians was itself thin. See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 203; see also Criminal Jurisdiction of
Indian Tribes over Non-Indians, 77 Interior Dec. 113 (1970), cited in Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 200-01 &
n.ll (opinion of Solicitor, withdrawn in 1974 but not replaced, affirming 1878 district court decision
denying Indian courts criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians).
As for Duro, the available evidence contradicts the assumption that Congress intended any
distinction among Indians based on tribal membership. Congressional statutes, for instance, did not
distinguish non-member Indians when defining federal criminal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Indian Country
Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1994) ("This section shall not extend to offenses committed by one
Indian against the person or property of another Indian .... ") (emphasis added); Major Crimes Act,
18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1994) ("Any Indian who commits against the person or property of another Indian
or other person any of the following offenses.., within the Indian country, shall be subject to the
same law and penalties as all other persons committing any of the above offenses, within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.") (emphasis added).
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I
THE "MODERN ERA": BUILDING ON FOUNDATION PRINCIPLES
A. Tribes in the Courts Historically: The Foundations
Felix Cohen wrote triumphantly of the Court as a bulwark against
state and federal incursions into the realm of tribal self-government.
The foundation principles iterated by Cohen trace back to three land-
mark opinions of Chief Justice John Marshall, Johnson v. McIntosh,9
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,'" and Worcester v. Georgia," the "Marshall
trilogy."'" Marshall agonized over how to rationalize the young United
States government's control of the Indian nations. If tribes were gov-
ernments with capacity to sign treaties and cede territory, they had the
qualities of sovereigns when Europeans arrived. Marshall conceded that
Indians were "a distinct people, divided into separate nations, independ-
ent of each other and of the rest of the world, having institutions of their
own, and governing themselves by their own laws."'3 Indeed, he went
out of his way to describe tribal sovereignty in ringing, unmistakable
terms: "national character," "right of self-government," "nations ca-
pable of maintaining the relations of peace and war," "distinct, inde-
pendent political communities," "Indian nations," "political
existence," and "pre-existing power of the nation to govern itself."'14
Marshall justified the new government's domination of these native
nations through what has become known as the "discovery doctrine.""
9. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
10. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
11. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
12. "In the Marshall Trilogy... the Supreme Court handed down opinions in 1823, 1831, and
1832 that continue to form much of the foundation of federal Indian law." DAVID H. GETCHES &
CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 37 (2d ed. 1986).
These cases are discussed in JILL NORGREN, THE CHEROKEE CASES: THE CONFRONTATION OF LAW
AND POLITICS (1996), and Joseph C. Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law, Politics, and
Morality, 21 STAN. L. REV. 500 (1969).
13. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 542-43.
14. Id. at 547-62.
15. There was an understanding among European nations that explorers had the power to claim
"discovered" territory on behalf of the countries that commissioned their voyages. Johnson, 21 U.S.
at 572-77. The concept was accepted by leading international law commentators of the time. See
ENIAMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, bk. 1, ch. 1, § 11, cited in Johnson, 21 U.S. at 568.
The discovery doctrine has been traced to the theory of universal papal jurisdiction, which holds that
the Pope is vested with supreme spiritual jurisdiction over the souls of all humankind. See Robert A.
Williams, Jr., The Medieval And Renaissance Origins of the Status of the American Indian in Western
Legal Thought, 57S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 11 (1983); see generally L.C. GREEN & OLIVE P. DICKASON,
THE LAW OF NATIONS AND THE NEW WORLD (1989). This unrestricted jurisdiction allowed the
pope to sanction and legitimate assertions of authority over aboriginal people and their lands, as he
had for the Crusades of the eleventh to thirteenth centuries. DAVID H. GETCHES ET A.., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 42-47 (3d ed. 1993). In May 1493, Pope Alexander VI
(1492-1503) issued a papal bull declaring that "whereas Columbus had come upon lands and people
'undiscovered by others ... well disposed to embrace the Christian faith,' all the lands discovered or
to be discovered in the name of the Spanish Crown in the region legally belonged to Ferdinand and
1996] 1577
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He invoked international law to confirm what the United States had pre-
sumed: that "discovering" nations got the exclusive right to purchase
"such lands as the natives were willing to sell" 6 while tribes retained the
"degree of sovereignty, as the circumstances of the [Indian] people
would allow them to exercise. "17 In Worcester v. Georgia, Marshall
held that the specific congressional power over Indian affairs expressed
in the Indian Commerce Clause embedded the right of discovery in the
Constitution. He also rationalized federal power over formerly sover-
eign governments as essential to fulfilling a "duty of protection" as-
sumed by the federal government in various treaties with the Indians. 8
By equating a "right of discovery" with conquest of the tribes, the
Marshall trilogy gave the United States, as successor to the Europeans,
all the powers of a conqueror.'9
Isabella." Williams, supra, at 33 (quoting 2 SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON, ADMIRAL OF THE OCEAN
SEA: A LIFE OF CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS 22 (1942)). This grant troubled some clerics and legal
scholars. The Dominican priest Franciscus de Victoria sought to exclude land occupied by aboriginal
peoples from the reach of the discoverers' authority: "Now the rule of the law of nations is that what
belongs to nobody is granted to the first occupant .... And so, as the object in question was not
without an owner, it does not fall under the title which we are discussing." FRANCISCUS DE
VICTORIA, DE INDIS ET DE IURE BELLI RELECTIONES 139 (Ernest Nys ed. & John Pauley Bate trans.,
Carnegie Institution of Washington 1917).
Discovery was incorporated into English jurisprudence, which distinguished hegemony over
Christian and non-Christian kingdoms:
All infidels are in law perpetui inimici, perpetual enemies (for the law presumes not
that they will be converted, that being remota potentia, a remote possibility) for between
them, as with the devils, whose subjects they be, and the Christian, there is perpetual
hostility, and can be no peace.., a Pagan cannot have or maintain any action at all [in the
King's courts].
And upon this ground there is a diversity between a conquest of a kingdom of a
Christian King, and the conquest of a kingdom of an infidel.
Calvin's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 398 (K.B. 1608).
16. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 545.
17. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 587.
18. The Court stretched historical fact when it said that the exclusive right to take
conveyances of land from the tribes, assumed by the British and inherited by the United States,
originated in the Indians' need for protection. In fact, the Indians were more numerous and stronger
in many places in the early days of colonization. The eventual threat to Indian security was from
various Europeans competing for land. The need for protection, then, was an exigency created by
colonialism itself. But Marshall turned it into as noble a principle as it could be, recharacterizing it as
a duty of protection. This obligation to the Indians has been used in later Supreme Court decisions to
define a fiduciary relationship between tribes and the United States and to support exercises of
federal power. See, e.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383-84 (1886).
19. The underlying assumption was that tribes had been effectively subjugated, and thus were
brought under the legislative power of Congress to the extent necessary to control them. Of course,
the Europeans did not "conquer" all the Indian tribes of the continent in the usual sense; the history is
one of encroachments by settlers that led to the Indians' being gradually driven out. Shoshone Tribe
v. United States, 11 Indian Cl. Comm'n 387, 416 (1962) (stating that gradual encroachment by whites
resulted in taking of Indian lands by the United States). Cf. Judith V. Royster, Mineral Development
in Indian Country: The Evolution of Tribal Control over Mineral Resources, 29 TULSA LJ. 541, 546
(1994). Many tribes more or less voluntarily consented to treaties and other agreements with the
United States (or with England or another European nation that earlier claimed territory now within
the United States). E.g., 1785 Treaty of Hopewell with the Cherokees, reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF
1578 [Vol. 84:1573
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Critics have argued that the doctrine perpetuated by the Marshall
trilogy and reported by Cohen unduly dignifies a congressional power
over Indian affairs based on a self-legitimating colonialist theory." Ul-
timately, that theory looks to a thin rationalization of European
"discovery" of the continent to justify the United States' assumption of
control over aboriginally sovereign tribes. Arguments abound over the
morality of a body of law rooted in "conquest" or "discovery" and
over the pernicious potential of plenary power of Congress to divest and
alter the powers of Indian tribes.2
Throughout the trilogy, Marshall himself exhibited a self-conscious
concern with the moral justification for a theory that allowed Europeans
to extinguish Indian land title and to curb, by their very presence, pre-
existing powers of tribal self-government?2  Whatever frailty the
UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY 6-8 (Francis Paul Prucha ed., 2d ed. 1990); Treaty of Peace
Between the French, Iroquois, and Other Nations, reprinted in THE HISTORY AND CULTURE OF
IROQUOIS DIPLOMACY 137-53 (Francis Jennings ed., 1985). The United States made treaties with
over 100 Indian nations between 1778 and 1871. ARLENE HIRSCHFELDER & MARTHA KREIPE DE
MONTAIO, THE NATIVE AMERICAN ALMANAC: A PORTRAIT OF NATIVE AMERICA TODAY 53
(1993).
20. See, e.g., RUSSEL LAWRENCE BARSH & JAMES YOUNGBLOOD HENDERSON, THE ROAD:
INDIAN TRIBES AND POLITICAL LIBERTY 47-49 (1980); Robert A. Williams, Jr., Encounters on the
Frontiers of International Human Rights Law: Redefining the Terms of Indigenous Peoples' Survival in
the World, 1990 DUKE 1UJ. 660, 672-76. Scholars have attributed the doctrine of the foundation
principles to the colonizing forces of the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries, when European
exploration of the new world was rationalized in terms of the inferior moral status of native peoples
and varnished with religious purposes. See ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN
WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST 316-17 (1990); DOCUMENTS OF
AMERICAN HISTORY 5-6 (Henry Steele Commager ed., 8th ed. 1968). These apparently corrupt
origins have led some scholars to call for "decolonizing" Indian law and repudiating the foundation
principles. See generally Robert N. Clinton, Redressing the Legacy of Conquest: A Vision Quest for a
Decolonized Federal Indian Law, 46 ARK. L REV. 77 (1993); Frank Pomnersheim, Liberation,
Dreams, and Hard Work: An Essay on Tribal Court Jurisprudence, 1992 WIS. L REV. 411.
21. See, e.g., Milner S. Ball, Constitution, Court, Indian Tribes, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1,
61; David Williams, Legitimation and Statutory Interpretation: Conquest, Consent, and Community in
Federal Indian Law, 80 VA. L. REV. 403 (1994). The debate is joined in the following
interchange: Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trail of
Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man's Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 WIs. L REV. 219
[hereinafter Williams, The Algebra of Indian Law); Robert Laurence, Learning to Live with the
Plenary Power of Congress over the Indian Nations: An Essay in Reaction to Professor Williams'
Algebra, 30 ARIz. L REV. 413 (1988); Robert A. Williams, Jr., Learning Not to Live with Eurocentric
Myopia: A Reply to Professor Laurence's Learning to Live with the Plenary Power of Congress over
the Indian Nations, 30 ARIZ. L REV. 439 (1988).
22. Marshall wrote: "The extravagant and absurd idea, that the feeble settlements made on the
sea-coast, or the companies under whom they were made, acquired legitimate power by them to
govern the people, or occupy the lands from sea to sea, did not enter the mind of any man."
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 544-45 (1832). While expressing discomfort with the
legal fictions that allowed Europeans to assert title over land occupied by aboriginal people, he
declined to "enter into the controversy, whether agriculturists, merchants and manufacturers, have a
right, on abstract principles" to make such an assertion. Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8Wheat.) 543,
588-89 (1823). He later asked:
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"discovery doctrine" suffered as a matter of natural law, however,
Marshall found its ultimate justification in positive law. As he wrote in
Johnson v. McIntosh:
However extravagant the pretension of converting the discovery
of an inhabited country into conquest may appear; if the princi-
ple has been asserted in the first instance, and afterwards sus-
tained; if a country has been acquired and held under it; if the
property of the great mass of the community originates in it, it
becomes the law of the land, and cannot be questioned.23
Getting beyond his apparent moral qualms,2 Marshall concluded fatal-
istically that "[clonquest gives a title which the courts of the conqueror
Did these adventurers, by sailing along the coast, and occasionally landing on it,
acquire for the several governments to whom they belonged, or by whom they were
commissioned, a rightful property in the soil, from the Atlantic to the Pacific; or rightful
dominion over the numerous people who occupied it? Or has nature, or the great Creator
of all things, conferred these rights over hunters and fishermen, on agriculturists and
manufacturers?
Worcester, 31 U.S. at 543.
23. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 591.
24. Some scholars question the authenticity of Marshall's professed agony over the morality of
the doctrine and its contradictions with natural law. "[T]he original legal rules and principles of
federal Indian law set down by Marshall... ensured that future acts of genocide would proceed on a
rationalized, legal basis." WILLIAMS, supra note 20, at 317. Constitutional historian G. Edward
White links Marshall's use of pejorative language, such as references to "fierce savages" in
Johnson, 21 U.S. at 590, to his rejection of Indians' natural law rights. G. EDWARD WHITE, THE
MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE: 1815-35, at 710 (1988). "Natural law, Marshall
intimated in Johnson v. McIntosh, was not designed to apply to cases involving persons whose
'character and habits' were so markedly different from 'civilized' whites." Id. at 711. White was
referring to Marshall's statement, "Although we do not mean to engage in the defence of those
principles which Europeans have applied to Indian title, they may, we think, find some excuse, if not
justification, in the character and habits of the people whose rights have been wrested from them."
Johnson, 21 U.S. at 589. White compares Marshall's refusal to enforce Indians' natural rights with
the circumscribed reading Marshall gave to rights guaranteed by the Constitution in cases involving
blacks:
Distinctions between written and unwritten rights began to creep into cases involving racial
minorities, and eventually the cases could be read as standing for two propositions: first,
that the unwritten natural rights of black slaves and Indians could not be used as sources for
their legal protection; second, that to the extent that principles of natural justice had been
incorporated into the written language of the Constitution, that language did not, in the main,
apply to slaves or Indians.
WHITE, supra, at 681.
Similarly, Jill Norgren has agreed that, with the Cherokee cases, "the Marshall Court helped to
establish the view that Indians were inferior and thus could be appropriately denied the full legal
regard of the United States that would otherwise be demanded by natural law." NORGREN, supra
note 12, at 9. She concludes that the Chief Justice "was willing to sacrifice the rights of the Cherokee
people" for political motives, and that his characterization of tribes as "domestic dependent nations"
instead of declaring them foreign nations was a "transparent ploy." Id. at 109. She deplores the
result as based on "tortured and ethnocentric legal distinctions," id. at 105, and partly because of this
decision she concludes that "federal Indian law today is deeply flawed," id. at 151. She necessarily
reports, though, that the courageous and visionary Chief John Ross of the Cherokee Nation viewed
the Cherokee Nation v. Georgia decision favorably at the time it was decided and called it the
"foundation" for asserting the Cherokee's legal rights. Id. at 110.
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cannot deny, whatever the private and speculative opinions of individu-
als may be, respecting the original justice of the claim which has been
successfully asserted."'
I do not join here in the well-developed debate over the legitimacy
of these original principles. It is too late in the day to revisit two centu-
ries of consistently and firmly reiterated precedent or to expect a basic
reformation of the historical legal relationship of the United States to
Indian tribes.26 Furthermore, I am not convinced that asking courts to
apply notions of justice or equity in individual cases will provide suffi-
cient or consistent support for tribal government.27 Indeed, the track
record of the present Court shows the unfortunate consequences of a
judicial attempt to bring Indian law in line with today's values in order
to attain what the Court perceives the "current state of affairs ought to
be."28 Entrusting courts to modernize legal principles as social values
Considering their milieu, I view the Marshall trilogy as remarkable for their limitations on state
power and recognition of tribal autonomy. It is difficult to imagine the young nation's Court being
less restrictive of Indian rights in such hotly charged cases.
25. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 588.
26. Proposals to revamp the essential relationship between the United States and Indian tribes
have consumed considerable scholarly energy. See, e.g., BARSH & HENDERSON, supra note 20, at
279-83 (advocating an amendment to the United States Constitution giving tribes a status comparable
to that of states); James A. Casey, Sovereignty by Sufferance: The Illusion of Indian Tribal
Sovereignty, 79 CORNELL L REV. 404, 436-48 (1994) (proposing free association agreements
between tribes and the United States); Steven Paul McSloy, Back to the Future: Native American
Sovereignty in the 21st Century, 20 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 217, 280-86 (1993) (arguing for
reinstituting the international status of tribes).
27. Cf. Patrick Macklem, Distributing Sovereignty: Indian Nations and Equality of Peoples, 45
STAN. L REV. 1311, 1315 (1993) (arguing for the principle of "equality of peoples" as an
appropriate basis for strengthening the commitment to Indian tribal government); Nell Jessup Newton,
Federal Power over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L REV. 195, 198 (1984)
(advocating intermediate judicial scrutiny of federal encroachments on tribal sovereignty).
28. Professor Frickey has produced a major study of interpretation in Indian law that eschews
"foundationalist approaches" as "too hollow or too abstract to accommodate our colonial heritage
with the human values of the late twentieth century." Philip P. Frickey, Congressional Intent,
Practical Reasoning, and the Dynamic Nature of Federal Indian Law, 78 CALIF. L REV. 1137, 1239
(1990). The Article argues that "practical reason," which emphasizes the contemporary context of
decisions, should replace the use of traditional principles, i.e., foundationalism. This extends to the
field of Indian law a theory that Professor Frickey, along with Professors Daniel Farber and William
Eskridge, has applied to statutory interpretation and First Amendment issues. See Daniel Farber &
Philip P. Frickey, Practical Reason and the First Amendment, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1615 (1987); William
N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV.
321 (1990).
"Practical reasoning" is described as an antiformal alternative to foundationalism, one that is
dynamic and looks to "all potentially relevant sources" for statutory meaning. Frickey, Congressional
Intent, supra, at 1208. Frickey also argues that the critical legal studies rejection of the foundation
concepts for their poisoned roots in the ideas of discovery and plenary federal power is itself
effectively bound by formal theory and is thus essentially "foundational." Id. at 1204-07. However,
Frickey concludes by recognizing some merit in "accepting foundationalist concepts for what they
can accomplish." Id. at 1239. He concedes that "Marshall's opinions reveal more hermeneutical
spirit and help establish a more normatively attractive vision of our federal Indian law tradition." Id.
at 1224.
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evolve is particularly inappropriate to Indian tribal survival, where the
subject matter is culturally estranged from the decision maker. Rather, I
believe that tribal self-governance and Indian rights are best preserved
within the established constitutional and legal order.29 My concern is
that Indian rights are losing the limited protection they had as the Court
forsakes foundation principles and expands the ambit of control over
Indian tribes to include not just congressional but also judicial power to
redefine and restrict tribal sovereignty.
Worcester lays the cornerstone for the legal system's continuing
recognition of tribal sovereignty. The battle in that case was over
whether the State of Georgia could impose its laws on the Cherokees.
Moved by federalist convictions and protective of the national control
over Indian affairs won at the Constitutional Convention, Marshall in-
sisted on the supremacy of federal over state power."0 Marshall's opin-
ion found Georgia's law void as "repugnant to the Constitution, treaties,
and laws of the United States,"31 using contemporary terms for federal
preemption. The Court's opinion stressed the continuing sovereignty
of tribes, referring no less than sixteen times to the concept of "self-
government." Reservation boundaries became a barrier to state power:
The Cherokee nation.., is a distinct community, occupy-
ing its own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in
which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and which the citi-
zens of Georgia have no right to enter, but with the assent of the
Cherokees themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and with
the acts of Congress.32
More recently, Professor Frickey has praised the three nineteenth-century foundational cases as
articulating a "complex, institutionally sensitive interpretive scheme," an approach he sees as
essential to the constitutional structure. Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism,
Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381, 417 (1993). He
even argues that errors in several recent cases can be attributed to the Court's straying from
Marshall's foundational legacy, id. at 418-26, and that the paradigm for deciding future Indian law
cases should be Marshall's approach in Worcester, id. at 427-39.
29. Cf Richard B. Collins, Indian Consent to American Government, 31 ARiz. L REV. 365,
381-82 (1989) (arguing that the Constitution's structure and procedure protect Indian rights by
placing power over tribes in the federal government and by blunting majoritarian oppression).
30. The preservation of tribal government over enclaves of Indian country was a triumph for
Marshall made possible by the presumption that the tribes' sovereignty was subject to the legislative
authority of the United States. Marshall drew support for this presumption from the Indian Commerce
Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, which ceded to the Congress "powers ... of regulating
commerce... with the Indian tribes." See Worcester, 31 U.S. at 559. The clause was intended to
resolve the contentious matter of whether the states or the federal government would exercise
governmental authority with respect to the Indian tribes. It ended the state role in Indian affairs that
existed under the Articles of Confederation. This was one of the issues whose resolution made
accord possible among the constitutional framers. See generally THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION AND THE FORMATION OF THE UNION (Winton U. Solberg ed., 2d ed. 1990).
31. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 562-63.
32. Id. at 561.
1582 [Vol. 84:1573
NEW SUBJECTIVISM IN INDIAN LAW
Worcester thus gave important definition to the doctrine of federalism,
preserving tribal sovereignty subject only to abridgment by the national
government.
Had the Worcester Court found the tribes' rights totally extin-
guished, the states where they resided likely would have ousted them
from their lands and completely obliterated their governments. Had the
Court recognized the tribes' full political independence, however, the
decision probably would have been ignored by the states. Although the
Court did not reach either of these conclusions, Marshall's solicitude for
the Cherokee Nation and the limits he placed on Georgia incited a con-
stitutional crisis that remains one of the most severe and acrimonious in
our history." Indeed, the votes and opinions of Marshall's fellow
Justices suggest that he went as far as he could in sustaining tribal self-
government without losing a majority."
Certainly tribes have not always fared well under the foundation
principles. Most notably, the treaties that remain a primary source of
Indian rights also led to substantial diminution of tribal autonomy. The
early treaties typically memorialized the "discovery" principle by
submitting the tribes' external political affairs to the United States'
control. Some Indian treaties recited this political submission in broad
terms, and others dealt crisply with specific issues, but virtually all
Indian treaties were premised on the United States' political domination
of the tribes. The treaties generally reflect a relationship of both
political and economic dependence.35
It is precisely because of the unequal bargaining power that char-
acterized treaty negotiations and the single-minded determination of the
United States to achieve its own purposes36 that the courts have long in-
sisted on construing treaties favorably to the Indians." Given the cir-
cumstances surrounding the treaties, the momentous concessions made
by the tribes, and the tribes' dependent relationship (partly a result of
the treaties themselves), it would be unjust to read the agreements as
giving up any rights beyond those ceded in clear and specific terms.
This reasoning is consistent with one of Felix Cohen's cardinal princi-
33. The outcry of the states was so heated that the executive branch took no steps to enforce
the decision for almost a year. See Burke, supra note 12, at 524-31.
34. In Cherokee, with seven Justices on the Court, Justices Johnson and Baldwin wrote
concurring opinions while Justice Story joined Justice Thompson's dissent. In Worcester, Justice
McLean concurred and Justice Baldwin dissented, though a dissenting opinion was never delivered to
the court reporter.
35. FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES: THE HISTORY OF A POLITICAL
ANOMALY 5-6, 65-66 (1994).
36. Id. Father Prucha's account of the treaty-making process documents the treaties'
importance to non-Indian political and economic interests and their essential role in implementing
government policies during the nation's first hundred years.
37. See infra notes 210-215 and accompanying text.
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ples of Indian law: great power over Indian affairs is conceded to the
federal government, but only those Indian rights expressly extinguished
are lost."
Legislation has also amputated some of the tribes' governmental
rights. For instance, punishment of major crimes on reservations was
federalized after government agents mounted a campaign against one
tribe's allegedly lenient handling of a murderous blood feud among
Sioux Indians.39 Other federal criminal laws have also displaced a
measure of tribal authority.' On the other hand, in construing such
legislation, courts have applied rules of construction favoring Indians
that were developed in treaty cases.4' While the analogy is imperfect,
federal laws, like the treaties, were not founded on a relationship of
mutuality. Rather, they have arisen in a context of enormous federal
power over Indians.
More damaging to tribal sovereignty than direct abrogation of
governmental authority has been the tribes' loss of land. Tribes have
ceded much territory to the government in treaties. Remaining tribal
lands were often distributed under statutory programs to individual
Indians and non-Indian settlers. These events have dramatically
undermined the tribes' ability to govern, by shrinking and then carving
up their land base. Placing tribes on reservations often separated them
from their livelihoods and thus from the cultural practices and traditions
that made tribal governance relevant and powerful.
The most poignant extinguishment of tribal sovereignty through
dispossession was the allotment policy of the late nineteenth century.
Tribal land holdings were parceled out to tribal members in allotments
of 160 acres, and "surplus" lands were opened to non-Indian home-
steaders. Ultimately, a majority of all Indian lands passed from native
ownership under this policy. 2 President Theodore Roosevelt ominously
called this partition of communally held lands "a mighty pulverizing
engine to break up the tribal mass."43 Except for the tragically mis-
38. COHEN (1941), supra note 1, at 123.
39. The Major Crimes Act of 1885, 18 U.S.C. § 1153, which supplanted tribal with federal
authority for the most serious crimes, followed closely on the heels of the Court's decision to deny
federal jurisdiction over a murder committed between tribal members in Ex parte Crow Dog, 109
U.S. 556 (1883).
40. See, e.g., Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1994); Indian Country Crimes Act, 18
U.S.C. § 1152 (1994); Organized Crime Control Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1994).
41 See infra note 21.
42. COHEN (1982), supra note 2, at 138. See infra text accompanying notes 223-251
(discussing allotment policy),
43. 35 CONG. REc. S90 (1901).
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guided "termination" program of the 1950s and 1960s, Congress has
not adopted a policy of land dispossession since the allotment era.44
The tribes have suffered undeniably serious losses of land and sov-
ereignty. Yet, given the apparent reach of Congress' "plenary power,"
it is remarkable that tribes have survived as well as they have. Although
the Court historically has refused to second-guess congressional deci-
sions even when they divest the Indians of rights and powers,45 the Court
has not hesitated to limit state power to curb exercises of state govern-
mental authority that threaten the integrity of tribal governments.46
Congressional deliberation has often checked the excesses of states and
has created a forum that, particularly in modern times, has given tribes
the benefits of the transparency and temperance of public political de-
bate, open to moral arguments and informed public opinion. The trust
relationship with the federal government, stemming from the federal
duty of protection, is more difficult to enforce judicially than the limits
on states' rights, but it can be asserted to challenge governmental bad
faith and mismanagement in Indian affairs.47 Moreover, Marshall's
44. The termination effort is still vivid in the memories of Indians who lived through or heard
about it. The effort aimed to end the special relationship between tribes and the federal government.
Communally held lands were typically distributed to individual tribal members, reservations
extinguished, and lands and Indians subjected to state law. Federal obligations also ceased. In the
name of freeing tribes from heavy federal supervision, some 1,362,000 acres were "liberated" from
government restrictions and from tribal governance. Charles F. Wilkinson & Eric R. Biggs, The
Evolttion of the Termination Policy, 5 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 139, 151-54 (1977). For a full description
of the termination policy, see COHEN (1982), supra note 2, at 152-80. The homogenizing ethic that
inspired the termination policy also moved Congress in 1953 to reallocate jurisdictional prerogatives
in Indian country, shifting responsibility for many criminal and civil cases from federal to state courts.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1996).
45. See, e.g., United States v. Chavez, 290 U.S. 357, 363 (1933); United States v. Candelaria,
271 U.S. 432, 439 (1926); United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 46 (1913); Tiger v. Western Inv.
Co., 221 U.S. 286,315 (1911); United States v. Holliday, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 407, 419 (1865). Early
decisions shielded such legislation from challenge with the political question doctrine. The Court no
longer regards the political question doctrine as an absolute barrier to justiciability. Constitutional
challenges to discriminatory treatment are now permitted, but the Court will not disturb a legislative
judgment if "the special treatment can be tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress' unique
obligation toward the Indians." Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 85 (1977)
(citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974)). The Court has found federal power adequate
to support congressional legislation unilaterally abrogating an Indian treaty by parcelling out tribal
land to individual tribal members and non-Indians, Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903), and
statutes that unilaterally usurp tribal jurisdiction over major crimes on reservations, United States v.
Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886). More recently, however, the Court has said that Indians may
challenge the presumption of congressional good faith (announced in Lone Wolf) in cases alleging a
Fifth Amendment taking of Indian land. See United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
46. E.g., New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 332 (1983); White Mountain
Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142-44 (1980); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959).
47. See generally Reid Peyton Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Trust
Responsibility to Indians, 27 STAN. L. REv. 1213 (1975). See also United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S.
206, 226 (1983); Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 649 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 236 (1974); Seminole Nation v. United States, 316
U.S. 286, 296 (1942) (noting "distinctive obligation of trust incumbent upon the Government in its
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landmark trilogy has supported development of a solid body of law
largely favorable to Indian tribal governments.
Since the foundation cases, the Court has repeatedly refused to
place its own limits on tribal self-government. In Worcester, Justice
McLean's concurring opinion implied that the passage of time, the
proximity to non-Indians, and other changing circumstances could
erode a tribe's sovereign status and extend state jurisdiction over the
reservation. 8 The Court, however, declined to decide that it was a judi-
cial function to readjust the sovereign status of tribes. Indeed, at least
until recently, the Court has reserved this initiative to the political
branches of government.49
B. The McBratney Exception
For almost a century and a half, Worcester's announcement of res-
ervation boundaries as barriers to state jurisdiction described the law of
the land. The most notable exception to this rule was United States v.
McBratney,50 in which the Court denied the effect of federal legislation,
apparently giving the United States district court jurisdiction to try all
murder cases arising on Indian reservations. The Court held the statute
was not intended to displace the jurisdiction over non-Indian citizens
that a state automatically acquires when it is admitted to the Union.
McBratney thus conflicts with Worcester's holding that Georgia had no
jurisdiction over the non-Indians on the Cherokee Reservation. The
dealings with these dependent and sometimes exploited people"). The potential of the trust duty to
protect Indian land and resources is lucidly developed in Mary Christina Wood, Indian Land and the
Promise of Native Sovereignty: The Trust Doctrine Revisited, 1994 UTAH L REv. 1471; Mary
Christina Wood, Protecting the Attributes of Native Sovereignty: A New Trust Paradigm for Federal
Actions Affecting Tribal Lands and Resources, 1995 UTAH L REv. 109.
48. Justice McLean's concurrence says that federal power over Indians within a state "must be
limited by circumstances," yet he reserved the question whether it was appropriate for a court to
make such a determination under the facts of that case: "The point at which this exercise of
[governing] power by a state would be proper, need not now be considered; if, indeed, it be a judicial
question." Worcester, 31 U.S. at 593. His views on the subject became clearer in a decision he
wrote as a circuit judge a few years after Worcester, upholding Ohio's assertion of jurisdiction over
the small Wyandott Reservation by applying state law, not the federal Nonintercourse Act, to a non-
Indian who stole a horse from an Indian. United States v. Cisna, 25 F. Cas. 422 (C.C. Ohio 1835) (No.
14,795). He relied on the fact that the reservation was "surrounded by a dense white population [that
had] daily intercourse with the Indians" to surmise that continued application of federal laws would
be "wholly unsuited to the condition of the Wyandott tribe." Id. at 424.
49. See United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 46 (1913) (holding that termination of
guardianship is a question for Congress, not the courts); United States v. Holliday, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.)
407, 419 (1865) (holding that "it is the rule of this court to follow the action of the executive and other
political departments of the government"). See also Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes,
425 U.S. 463, 476 (1976) (refusing to accept the proposition that a local tribe had become so
integrated with surrounding non-Indian communities that the State of Montana should be permitted to
exercise governmental power over it).
50. 104 U.S. 621 (1881). Accord Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240 (1896).
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leading treatise in Indian law suggests the McBratney Court misinter-
preted the federal statute in question. 1
Worcester and McBratney are distinguishable only if one assumes
that the murder of one white by another in McBratney was of no con-
cern to the tribe on whose reservation it took place. As such, the crime
fell outside the ambit of "Indian affairs," the field in which Congress
was legislating when it passed the federal murder statute. By contrast,
the regulation of non-Indian entry and activity in Worcester had a great
effect on the tribe, was intimately related to the regulation of Indian
commerce, and was therefore squarely within the realm of Indian
affairs. Later cases embrace this distinction, specifying that the
McBratney exception applies only to "crimes between whites and whites
which do not affect Indians.
'52
The McBratney Court was moved by the reality that non-Indians
lived and owned land on reservations as a result of federal policies. In-
exorable pressure for western lands where non-Indian homesteaders
could settle led to paring the boundaries of reservations and eventually
to opening lands within reservations for settlement by non-Indians. The
typical allotment program offered a portion of reservation land for non-
Indian ownership.53 A variety of other laws also invited non-Indians to
reside on reservations.'
Congress has enacted no broad limitation on tribal jurisdiction over
non-Indian land on reservations. Indeed, even when parcels are sold off
and occupied by non-Indians, they remain "Indian country", under
federal law and are therefore subject to tribal jurisdiction.5  It is unsur-
51. COHEN (1982), supra note 2, at 264-65.
52. New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496, 500 (1946) (emphasis added); cf. Donnelly
v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 271 (1913) (white's murder of Indian punishable under Indian Country
Crimes Act; offenses committed against Indians held to be outside the scope of the McBratney
exception).
53. See COHEN (1982), supra note 2, at 137; see also supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
54. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 687-90 (1993) (describing the Flood
Control and Cheyenne River Acts' taking of 100,000 acres of Cheyenne River Sioux reservation land
for the Oahe Dam and Reservoir Project).
55. This is made clear in 18 U.S.C. §1151 (1994), which states that:
Except as otherwise provided in sections 1154 and 1156 of this title, the term "Indian
country," as used in this chapter, means (a) all land within the limits of any Indian
reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the
issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all
dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United States whether within the
original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits
of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been
extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the same.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly indicated that "Indian country" defines the reach of a tribe's
civil as well as criminal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Sac & Fox Nation, 508 U.S.
114, 123 (1993) (invalidating state income and motor vehicle taxes on tribal members who live in
"Indian country"); Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505,
513 (1991) (invalidating state cigarette tax on tribal members who live in "Indian country");
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prising that tribal authorities should not be limited to governing tribal
lands or members. A sovereign has authority over people and territory
within its boundaries regardless of their citizenship or the land titles.56
Sovereignty comprehends powers greater than the right to exclude; one
need only be a property owner to limit entry to land. For example, even
the Elks Club can impose conditions and sanctions on members and
expel non-members from its premises; Indian tribes, however, are "a
good deal more than 'private, voluntary organizations."'"7
A further exception to the foundation principles was carved out by
a flurry of turn-of-the-century cases allowing states to tax non-Indian
property on the reservation. 8 Like McBratney, these incursions on
tribal sovereignty can be tied to the assumption that imposition of the
taxes had no direct effect on Indians or federal regulation of Indian af-
fairs. In none of the cases was there any competing tribal regulation or
tax on non-Indians, and no Indians or tribes were parties to any of the
cases.
59
In the end, then, Worcester's barrier to state jurisdiction over reser-
vation activities remained unbreached, save for this handful of cases that
purportedly did not implicate Indian interests. This is not to say that
tribal authority over non-Indians was upheld in every case where there
was an effect on Indians. Tribal justice systems rarely tried to assert
jurisdiction over non-Indians on reservations. When tribes did assert
control over non-Indian conduct, they sometimes found themselves
frustrated by their own laws, which were often drawn narrowly (with the
federal government's assistance) to apply only to Indians.' However, in
California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 208 (1987) (invalidating enforcement
of state gambling laws in "Indian country").
56. See COHEN (1982), supra note 2, at 250. Tribes have sovereign authority over all land and
all people within the reservation unless: (1) their jurisdiction has been extinguished, (2) Congress has
legislated to give the United States jurisdiction, or (3) they never had jurisdiction in the first place. Id.
57. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975) (repudiating a Court of Appeals
decision equating a tribe's power to regulate liquor to that of a private club). Justice Rehnquist wrote
that tribes possess "attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory." Id.
58. Two involved taxation of railroad rights-of-way on Indian reservations. Maricopa & P.
R.R. v. Arizona, 156 U.S. 347 (1895); Utah & N. Ry. v. Fisher, 116 U.S. 28 (1885). Two more
involved taxation of non-Indian-owned cattle. Wagoner v. Evans, 170 U.S. 588 (1898); Thomas v.
Gay, 169 U.S. 264 (1898); see also Montana Catholic Missions v. Missoula County, 200 U.S. 118
(1906) (implying state taxing authority over non-Indian cattle).
59. In Thomas, 169 U.S. at 273-74, the Court considered and rejected the argument that
because a tax on cattle grazed on a tribal reservation might affect the value of the land, the tax was
effectively a levy on the Indians. The Court found the effect on Indian interests "too remote and
indirect" for the tax to infringe tribal sovereignty. Id.
60. See, e.g., Alberty v. United States, 162 U.S. 499 (1896) (holding that Negro born in slavery,
though made a citizen of the Cherokee Nation, was not "Indian" for purposes of tribal jurisdiction).
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the only early case involving applicability of tribal law to reach the
Court, tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians was upheld.61
C. Elaboration of Foundation Concepts in the "Modern Era"
When Williams v. Lee62 inaugurated the modem era in 1959, the
foundations of Indian law were still solid; the principles announced in
Chief Justice Marshall's trilogy of cases continued to define the limits
of tribal sovereignty. Supreme Court precedent in the area was sparse,
especially with regard to jurisdiction over non-Indians, but it was clear
that the Court still viewed reservation boundaries as barriers to state
regulation, absent congressional indication to the contrary. The foun-
dation doctrine had been consistently pronounced, if not always en-
forced, for almost a century and a half. In the modem era, it was
augmented and strengthened in an extraordinary number of hard-
fought jurisdiction cases brought before the Court.63
The fact that few conflicts had reached the Supreme Court in the
preceding years obscures the extensive jurisdictional inroads states had
made on many reservations. Tribal governments were weakened first by
the loss of leaders to the war effort during the 1940s, then by the un-
supportive government policies of the termination era.,, Reservations,
with growing non-Indian communities around them and large numbers
of non-Indian residents within, were often jurisdictional vacuums that
states would fill. Tribes did not resist as states began expanding beyond
the criminal law and personal property tax exceptions the Court had
previously created for non-Indians. Congress then specifically allowed
states to take over additional criminal and civil jurisdiction under a ter-
mination-era statute, Public Law 280.65 Some states declined this invita-
tion to expand their authority because of the cost, but many selectively
accepted jurisdiction in order to meet perceived practical needs.
When farther-reaching state law enforcement finally began to en-
counter more active tribal governments, litigation ensued. In its bell-
wether Williams decision, the Court vindicated tribal sovereignty in a
modem context-a debt collection case brought by a non-Indian mer-
chant against tribal members. The Court held that tribal authorities, not
the Arizona state court, had jurisdiction over the matter. Williams con-
firmed the modem Court's adherence to foundation princi-
ples: "[e]ssentially, absent governing Acts of Congress, the question
has always been whether the state action infringed on the right of reser-
61. Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U.S. 384 (1904) (allowing tribal taxation of non-Indian-owned
cattle and horses).
62. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
63. See WILKINSON, supra note 3, at 1-3.
64. For a description of the termination policy, see supra note 44.
65. 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) (1994) (criminal); 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a) (1994) (civil).
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vation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them."'66 The
State of Arizona had not accepted jurisdiction over civil cases pursuant
to Public Law 280,7 nor was state jurisdiction permitted under any other
act of Congress. The State thus simply could not intrude upon the gov-
ernmental enclave of the Navajo Nation. Theoretically, the decision in
Williams merely reformulated established law.68 In practice, however, it
ousted de facto state court jurisdiction over reservation commercial
cases initiated by non-Indians throughout Indian country, and recog-
nized the tribes' exclusive, unextinguished jurisdiction in such matters.
A landmark 1973 case clarified the import of Williams and
reaffirmed the Court's commitment to tribal self-government. In
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission,69 perhaps the definitive
modern-era case, the Court held that Arizona could not tax income
earned wholly from reservation sources by an individual Navajo
residing on the reservation." Justice Thurgood Marshall, writing for a
unanimous Court, rejected the state court's approach that would allow
Arizona to tax an individual Indian's reservation income. Arizona and
other states had been perverting the Court's cryptic statement in
Williams prohibiting infringement of tribal sovereignty to presume that
states could exercise jurisdiction on the reservation absent evidence of a
direct clash with tribal government. The states had also been ignoring
Williams' pivotal reference to "governing Acts of Congress," a phrase
that encompasses an array of treaties and laws that typically define an
area where federal policy preempts state law.
McClanahan defined the Court's approach to Indian jurisdiction
cases as primarily one of "reliance on federal pre-emption." The
Indian sovereignty doctrine continued to play a central role: it
"provides a backdrop against which the applicable treaties and federal
statutes must be read."'" The Court would focus on the federal statutes
and treaties at issue, guided by the tradition of tribal self-government in
Indian country that creates a presumption in favor of tribal autonomy.
Thus while the treaty in McClanahan was silent as to whether the tribe
was exempt from state jurisdiction, the Court determined that "the
reservation of certain lands for the exclusive use and occupancy of the
Navajos and the exclusion of non-Navajos from the prescribed area was
meant to establish the lands as within the exclusive sovereignty of the
66. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).
67. Id. at 222-23.
68. See Utah & N. Ry. v. Fisher, 116 U.S. 28, 31 (1885) ("The authority of the Territory [of
Idaho] may rightfully extend to all matters not interfering with [Indian] protection.").
69. 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
70. See id at 179-81.
71. Id. at 172.
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Navajos."72 McClanahan elucidated that it was federal law establishing
the reservation that made state laws "repugnant" in Worcester and that
underlay the long-established rule that "Indians and Indian property on
an Indian reservation are not subject to state taxation except by virtue of
express authority conferred upon the state by act of Congress.'13
McClanahan's facts involved only Indians, but the Court charted
an approach for cases concerning non-Indians as well. The discussion
of precedent suggests that if the issue had been application of the
Arizona income tax to a non-Indian working on the reservation, the
Court would also have begun its analysis by examining treaties and stat-
utes that arguably might apply. The Indian sovereignty doctrine would
still be relevant to the interpretation of those laws. However, Marshall
acknowledged that in cases dealing "principally with situations involv-
ing non-Indians," the Court had made some departures from
Worcester's flat bar to state jurisdiction based on tribal sovereignty.
74
Since few federal statutes are explicit regarding state jurisdiction,75 a
court must analyze whether congressional intent to preempt can be
inferred from the language, legislative history, or circumstances of their
enactment. It is in this context that a court could also "take account of
the State's legitimate interests in regulating the affairs of non-
Indians." '76
D. Revitalization of Tribal Governments
McClanahan and the other modern-era cases supported a move-
ment toward revitalization of tribal governments. They came at a time
when new leadership was emerging on the reservations. Indian people
had been galvanized by their reactions to termination policy, and then
were supported by Congress and an executive branch that affirmatively
favored tribal self-government.77 Reservation Indians were aided in their
72. Id. at 174-75. The Court also found state jurisdiction to be preempted by federal law,
including the Buck Act of 1947, 4 U.S.C. §§ 105, 106(a), 109. Id. at 176-77.
73. COHEN (1941), supra note 1, at 254. Thus, Worcester is also a preemption case. There the
Court held that allowing Georgia law to control the presence of white missionaries in Cherokee
territory would be "repugnant" to treaties and federal laws preserving Cherokee self-government.
Worcester, 31 U.S. at 562. "Repugnant' was a term used by the Court in early preemption cases.
McClanahan was the first Indian case to use the term "pre-emption." 411 U.S. at 172.
74. McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 171, citing cases cited supra, notes 50, 52, 58; see also infra note
258.
75. See, e.g., Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938, 25 U.S.C. §§ 396a-g, cited in Cotton
Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 194 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("The 1938 Act
is silent on the question of state taxation."); California Cigarette Tax, CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE §
30107 (West 1979), cited in California State Bd. of Equalization v. Chemehuevi Indian Tribe, 474
U.S. 9, 10 (1985) ("California's cigarette tax statute 'does not contain any ... explicit "pass through"
language'.
76. McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 171.
77. See COHEN (1982), supra note 2, at 180-206.
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efforts at community building by federal programs undertaken as part
of President Lyndon Johnson's "Great Society. 7'  Tribal sovereignty
was given a further boost by the self-determination policy embraced by
the Nixon Administration, and by congressional legislation and policies
encouraging fuller exercise of tribal governance.79 In some areas, such
as child custody, Congress substantially expanded tribal powers.
However, the modem-era cases, from Williams (1959) through
McClanahan (1973) and on into the decisions of the early 1980s, ex-
erted the most important influence in the revival of tribal governing
powers. A host of major decisions based on foundation principles lim-
ited the scope of state law and upheld the authority of tribes to govern
activity within Indian country.8' This encouraged nascent tribal leader-
ship to assert powers of self-government to improve reservation eco-
nomic and social conditions. The Court reaffirmed what had been cast
into doubt by the practical expansion of state authority onto reserva-
tions: that reservations remained under the governance of tribes, largely
to the exclusion of state law. This was the assurance many tribes needed
to take greater control of their own destinies.
The Court's recognition of the immunity of reservation activity
from state taxes and regulation and of commensurate tribal authority
over the same subject matter supported tribal economic development
initiatives. Tribes launched programs to tax mineral production, pro-
mote tourism, sell hunting and fishing licenses, operate bingo games,
and profit from the sale of items such as cigarettes that are heavily taxed
by states off the reservation. Billions of dollars a year now flow onto
reservations thanks to judicial decisions recognizing Indian rights, espe-
78. Leadership opportunities were provided in community action programs under which people
were organized and federally funded programs carried out. Indians also became eligible under these
programs for economic assistance in the form of loans, grants, low-rent housing, job training,
education, and other services. See COHEN (1982), supra note 2, at 188-90.
79. President Nixon said in 1970: "The time has come to break decisively with the past and to
create the conditions for a new era in which the Indian future is determined by Indian acts and Indian
decisions." H.R. Doc. No. 363, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1970). Congress responded to the President's
charge with the Indian Education Act of 1972, codified in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C. (repealed
1988); the Indian Financing Act of 1974,25 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1544; the Indian Self-Determination and
Education Assistance Act of 1975, 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-450n; and the American Indian Religious
Freedom Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 1996.
80. For example, the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1994), goes
beyond affirming inherent tribal powers as recognized by the courts, see e.g., Fisher v. District Court,
424 U.S. 382 (1976), and grants tribal jurisdiction over placement of any child who resides within the
reservation or is a ward of the tribe, and requires state courts to transfer jurisdiction over any Indian
child not residing on the reservation to tribal court on petition of either parent or the tribe. Congress
has so strongly endorsed tribal authority over such cases that it has effectively displaced the best-
interests-of-the-child test prevalent in state courts. HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC
RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 20.1 (Practitioner's Edition, 2d ed. 1987).
81. See WILKINSON, supra note 3, at 89-93.
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cially rights to control and tax activities on the reservation to the exclu-
sion of state law.
As tribes were gaining in the scope of their legal authority, tribal
land ownership also grew by sixteen million acres from 1970 to 1992.2
Although tribal landholdings are still less than they were before the al-
lotment policy of the late-nineteenth century took effect, the disposses-
sion trend has been reversed. 3 Furthermore, rapid growth of tribal
populations has brought ever-growing numbers of people under tribal
governing authority.'
The growth of population and business activity on reservations has
led to a need for better administration of justice, including regulation,
civil adjudication, and taxation to support government services. Most
tribes historically maintained largely informal structures for dispute
resolution. Today, formalized adjudication predominates, and tribal
courts operate on at least 172 reservations. A vacuum created by in-
adequate federal law enforcement on reservations has increasingly been
filled by the tribes themselves.
8 6
82. See Facsimile from Stuart Ott, Office of Trust Responsibilities, Bureau of Indian Affairs,
U.S. Dep't of Interior, to the author (Apr. 4, 1995) (on file with author).
83. In 1955, total tribal holdings reached a low of 407.9 million acres. Since that time, the
amount of Indian land has fluctuated, generally rising, and now exceeds 700 million acres. See
CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 237
(101st ed. 1980).
84. Indian populations have grown dramatically since the middle of the twentieth century.
Some of this growth can be attributed to changes in blood quantum criteria defining who is a tribal
member. But most of the increase is due to high fertility, which is the norm for Indian populations
across the country. In 1992, the birth rate per 1,000 women was 75 for American Indians but 67 for
whites. See CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 74 (115th ed. 1995); see also HAROLD L HODGKINSON ET AL., THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF
AMERICAN INDIANS (1990).
85. Of the 172 tribal courts in existence today, 21 are still based on Code of Federal Regulation
(C.F.R.) guidelines. See Telephone Interview with Elbridge Coochise, President of the National
American Indian Court Judges Association (June 3, 1994). It is estimated that over $80 million would
be required to run the courts effectively: $250,000 for each court's judge, clerks, and support staff.
Prior to 1994, only $14 million was allocated to run the 172 courts. Id. Legislation passed on
December 3, 1993, earmarked $50 million annually for the courts. Indian Tribal Justice Act of 1993,
Pub. L. No. 103-176, 107 Stat. 2004. See also NATIONAL AM. INDIAN COURT JUDGES ASS'N, INDIAN
COURTS AND THE FUTURE 8 (1978).
86. "[Federal law enforcement on reservations is often selective, if not indifferent. [It]
appears to have improved little since the early 1980s, when the chairman of the United States
Commission on Civil Rights described it as being characterized by 'inaction and missed
opportunities."' Mary C. Gordon, Note, United States v. Alvarez-Machain: An Unexpected Ally for




ENCROACHMENT OF JUDICIAL SUBJECTIVISM
ON FOUNDATION PRINCIPLES
The modem era of Indian law jurisprudence has ended. The new
tendency in the Court's tests, rules, and rhetoric is to define tribal pow-
ers according to policies, values, and assumptions prevalent in non-
Indian society. Past judicial decisions led to broader exercises of tribal
governance. But as tribal assertions of jurisdiction became more exten-
sive, the Court started to retreat from its modem-era affirmations of un-
extinguished tribal powers, altering the margins of the tribes'
jurisdiction in order to preserve the values and interests of the larger
society. These judicial attempts to anticipate and alleviate cultural con-
flict have succeeded in curbing the authority of tribal institutions whose
actions appear to encroach upon the property interests or values of non-
Indians. This subjectivist trend began with cases involving non-Indian
parties or property, but the Court's search for the desirable "current
state of affairs" has not been confined to such cases. The Justices have
also begun to restate jurisdictional principles to suit non-Indian cultural
norms in cases that primarily affect Indians.
Without explicitly overruling precedent, the current Court has
failed to reconcile results with foundation principles long adhered to by
the Supreme Court itself, principles that generally require congressional
action to limit tribal sovereignty." In at least seventeen decisions since
1980, the Supreme Court has marked out the boundaries of Indian self-
government, arguably pursuing its own notion of what is desirable in-
stead of being disciplined by established tests and rules.88 These cases
have ignored guidelines for construing treaties, 9 which were designed,
87. In earlier times, even cases allowing destruction of tribal rights and powers were usually
based on deference to exercises of congressional power. See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553,
566 (1903); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 382 (1886).
88. Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 115 S. Ct. 2214 (1995); Department of Taxation &
Fin. v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., 114 S. Ct. 2028 (1994); Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399 (1994); South
Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993); County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of
Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251 (1992); Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775
(1991); Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505 (1991); Duro v.
Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990); Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990); Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989);
Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989); Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988); California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202
(1987); United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986); Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713 (1983); Montana v.
United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian
Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
89. The Court had consistently interpreted treaties liberally in favor of the Indians: "[D]oubtful
expressions are to be resolved in favor of the weak and defenseless people who are the wards of the
nation, dependent upon its protection and good faith." McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm'n, 411
U.S. 164, 174 (1973) (quoting Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930)). See also Choctaw
Nation v. United States, 119 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1886); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 582
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after all, to make reservations permanent enclaves where Indians could
exist relatively free of non-Indian control.' This subjectivist trend has
its roots in a series of cases decided between 1978 and 1989.
A. Pivotal Decisions in the Court's Retreat
from Foundation Principles
Four internally contentious decisions over an eleven-year period
mark the origins of the Court's departure from the tradition of judicial
respect for tribal sovereignty.9 This movement is what Justice Scalia
described with apparent resignation in his internal memorandum to
Justice Brennan.92 The Court's subjectivism has created a treacherous
undertow, pulling tribes into the societal mainstream and straining the
indigenous cultural bonds that hold them together as societies.93
1. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe
Oliphant ruled that tribal authorities lack jurisdiction to try and
punish non-Indians for crimes committed on reservations. The decision
represents a sharp departure from foundation principles. Until
Oliphant, the only two "inherent limitations" on tribal sovereignty that
the Court had recognized were those concerning dealings with foreign
nations and extinguishment of land titles. These two exceptions, created
(1832) ("The language used in treaties with the Indians should never be construed to their
prejudice."). Additionally, the Court construes treaties "in the sense in which they would naturally be
understood by the Indians." Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 11 (1899); see also Washington v. Wash.
State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 676 (1979); United States v. Winans,
198 U.S. 371, 380-81 (1905).
90. Treaties typically secured the tribes "a permanent home and abiding place" where they
would have "absolute and undisturbed use and occupation." promising that non-Indians would never
be permitted to settle on the reservation. See, e.g., Treaty with the Eastern Band Shoshoni and
Bannock, July 3, 1868, 15 Stat. 673, reprinted in 2 INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES 1020-23
(Charles J. Kappler ed., 1904) [hereinafter 2 INDIAN AFFAIRS] ("set apart for the absolute and
undisturbed use and occupation ... and the United States now solemnly agrees that no
persons ... shall ever be permitted to pass over, settle upon, or reside in [that territory]"); Treaty with
the Sioux and Arapaho, April 29, 1868, 15 Stat. 635, reprinted in 2 INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra, at 998-
1003 ("set apart for the absolute and undisturbed use and occupation"); Treaty with the Yakima, June
9, 1855, 12 Stat. 951, reprinted in 2 INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra, at 698-702 ("set apart.., for the
exclusive use and benefit").
91. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989);
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian
Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
92. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
93. The powerful effect of law, particularly rules of jurisdiction, on the survival and integrity of
Indian tribal cultures (as well as on our national quality of life) is richly elucidated by Professor
Pomnmersheim. FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS: AMERICAN INDIAN LAW AND
CONTEMPORARY TRIBAL LIFE (1995).
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in the early cases, were justified by the so-called "discovery doctrine. 94
The United States succeeded not only to the territory of its European
predecessors but to sovereign prerogatives defined .by this essentially
colonial theory. The discovery doctrine was necessary to nullify deal-
ings by the tribes with rival colonizing nations or subjects that could
jeopardize the Europeans' political dominion over the territory they
claimed.95 They helped secure the overriding sovereignty of the young
United States by guaranteeing that territory occupied by the tribes
would not be transferred to foreign powers.
The new "inherent limitation" on tribal sovereignty discovered in
Oliphant was ostensibly based on the nation's interest in protecting per-
sonal liberty by controlling the manner in which criminal cases are
tried. Justice Rehnquist argued for the majority that just as the United
States has a sovereign interest in "[p]rotection of territory within its ex-
ternal political boundaries," so it "has manifested an equally great so-
licitude that its citizens be protected... from unwarranted intrusions on
their personal liberty." 96 From an historical perspective, these two inter-
ests do not compare.' When Chief Justice Marshall crafted his two ex-
94. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 543-44 (1832); Johnson v. McIntosh, 21
U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 570 (1870). For a discussion of the "discovery doctrine," see supra notes 15-25
and accompanying text.
95. In adopting the discovery doctrine, Chief Justice Marshall recognized that the tribes' "rights
to complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily diminished." Johnson, 21 U.S. at
574.
96. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 209-10.
97. Certainly at the time of the Indian tribes' absorption into the United States, the national
government's solicitude for individual liberties was not so great as its concern for the conduct of
foreign relations and the integrity of its borders. In fact, state governments were wholly
unconstrained by the constitutional guarantee of due process until the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment in 1868, and the courts did not finish applying the Bill of Rights uniformly to state actions
until a century later. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (applying the Sixth Amendment's
right to jury trial in criminal cases to the states).
These incorporation cases defined whether "a particular procedure is fundamental... to an
Anglo-American regime of ordered liberty." Id. at 149 n.14. Obviously, all criminal prosecutions in
state courts were not barred whenever those tribunals declined to enforce the Bill of Rights. Even
today some protections in the first ten Amendments are not guaranteed against the states. LAURENCE
H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11-2, at 772 (2d ed. 1988) (noting that full
incorporation of the Bill of Rights has never commanded a Court majority).
Even if the national government had made more stringent demands on the states to protect
individual liberties in criminal trials, the Supreme Court had long ago mooted consideration of
incorporating constitutional rights within Indian tribunals by declaring tribal sovereignty independent
of and precedent to the United States Constitution. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896)
(holding that the Fifth Amendment does not apply to tribal governments). Though the Court has never
overruled this exemption, it later characterized Oliphant as barring "prosecut[ion of] non-Indians in
tribal courts which do not accord the full protections of the Bill of Rights." Washington v,
Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 153-54 (1980). Not until 1968
were tribal authorities made subject to many of the safeguards in the Bill of Rights by the Indian Civil
Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. § 1302.
Congress has selectively applied federal criminal laws to reservations. See, e.g., Indian Country
Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152; Major Crimes Act of 1885, 18 U.S.C. § 1153. Other laws permitted
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ceptions to tribal sovereignty, the possibility that Indians would convey
land to foreign nations or subjects formed a palpable threat to the integ-
rity of the young nation. The potential for individual violations of civil
liberties by tribes was not then and is not now a similar threat to national
security. Furthermore, the suggestion that tribal exercise of criminal
jurisdiction will subject non-Indian defendants to unfair process is un-
supported by the facts.98
The Oliphant Court justified its intrusion on tribal sovereignty as
consistent with historical expectations. Justice Rehnquist referred to a
"commonly shared presumption of Congress, the Executive Branch,
and lower federal courts that tribal courts do not have the power to try
non-Indians." 99 He cited mostly fragments of historical evidence as
support. Oliphant's only legal citations are to statutes not applicable to
the facts of the case, contradictory opinions of executive branch offi-
cers, congressional reports on tangentially related legislation, and an
1878 decision by a maverick district judge."° What is most remarkable,
though, is not the thin historical record on which the Court relied;
rather, it is the fact that conjectures about the past were used to justify a
legal principle fixing the limits of tribal sovereignty. Nowhere does the
Court explain why popular assumptions about tribes' criminal jurisdic-
tion should override the foundation principles' guarantee that Indian
autonomy will be curbed only at the direction of Congress.
Oliphant came as a surprise to many. Congress had yet to address
directly the question of tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.101
state jurisdiction over certain reservations in certain states. See 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) (1994) (listing
reservations where state authorities will have jurisdiction over criminal offenses); 28 U.S.C. §
1360(a) (1994) (same for civil actions); see also supra text accompanying note 65. At most, these
laws show Congress' capacity to respond to concerns about how justice should be administered in
Indian country.
98. In Oliphant, the record did not reflect any pattern of discrimination or abuse of the rights of
non-Indians. The majority conceded that "Indian tribal court systems have become increasingly
sophisticated and resemble in many respects their state counterparts." Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 211-12.
"[W]ith the passage of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, which extends certain basic procedural
rights to anyone tried in Indian tribal court, many of the dangers that might have accompanied the
exercise by tribal courts of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians only a few decades ago have
disappeared." Il at 212. No specific violation of that Act was alleged in Oliphant. One defendant
had been arrested for assaulting a tribal police officer; the other had ended a high-speed chase with
tribal officers by crashing into a tribal police car. Id. at 194.
99. Id. at 206.
100. Id. at 198-206. The Court's rendition of history probably is accurate in one respect: it is
doubtful that nineteenth-century Americans believed that tribes could punish non-Indians for crimes
committed in Indian country. See Richard B. Collins, Implied Limitations on the Jurisdiction of Indian
Tribes, 54 WAsH. L REv. 479, 501-02, 506 (1979) (concluding that it was probably commonly
assumed that tribes could not punish non-Indians who were on the reservation under U.S. authority or
even as intruders, except where treaties provided otherwise, but that assumption likely did not extend
to non-Indians who voluntarily joined tribal societies).
101. Congress made crimes between Indians and non-Indians subject to federal jurisdiction, but
did not address tribal jurisdiction except to exclude "any Indian committing any offense in the Indian
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Never before had the Court acted unilaterally to extend the "inherent
limitations" on tribal sovereignty staked out in the foundation cases. In
a one-paragraph dissent, Justice Marshall, joined by Chief Justice Burger
complained that only a treaty or act of Congress could divest the tribes
of a "necessary aspect of their retained sovereignty."',,
Oliphant has been widely criticized. 3 Its ruling, however, has not
been terribly disruptive of Indian governments; tribal exercises of
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians have been relatively rare and re-
cent. Since the rationale for limiting tribal sovereignty to protect the
civil liberties of non-Indians is a relatively narrow one, it appears to af-
fect only criminal punishments. Indeed, the Oliphant Court was careful
to state that its ruling restricted only tribal criminal jurisdiction,"° leav-
ing untouched the tribes' far more important civil jurisdiction over non-
Indians.
Oliphant's impact was also tempered because it came on the heels
of several Supreme Court decisions that powerfully reaffirmed the in-
herent sovereignty of Indian tribes. Fisher v. District Court,'5 a per cu-
riam opinion, resoundingly upheld tribal courts' exclusive jurisdiction
over adoption proceedings in which all of the parties are tribal members
living on the reservation. In Bryan v. Itasca County,es a unanimous
Court rejected Minnesota's attempt to impose property taxes on reser-
vation mobile homes. The state staked its position on Public Law 280's
authorization for the exercise of jurisdiction in Indian country over
"civil causes of action... and those civil laws... of general applica-
tion to private persons or private property. ' '""e The Court held that the
law was not specific enough to grant states authority to tax Indians or
Indian property on the reservation. °1 Fisher and Byan bolstered the
country who has been punished by the local law of the tribe." Indian Country Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1152 (1994). For a discussion of McBratney's limits on tribal jurisdiction over reservation crimes
among whites, see supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
102. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 212 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
103. See, e.g., Russel L. Barsh & James Y. Henderson, The Betrayal: Oliphant v. Suquamish
Indian Tribe and the Hunting of the Snark, 63 MINN . L. REV. 609, 610 (1979) (arguing that the Court
"reveals a carelessness with history, logic, precedent, and statutory construction that is not ordinarily
acceptable"); Peter C. Maxfield, Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe: The Whole is Greater than the Sum of
the Parts, 19 J. CONTEmp. L 391, 396 (1993) (characterizing the justification the Court used to reach
its result in Oliphant as "reprehensible"); Williams, The Algebra of Indian Law, supra note 21, at 273
(criticizing Oliphant's "near-theological totalization of a desacralized modem body politic"); Kevin
Meisner, Comment, Modem Problems of Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian Country, 17 AM. INDIAN L
REV. 175, 191-93 (1992) (arguing that Oliphant failed to construe statutes in favor of Indians).
104. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 196 n.7.
105. 424 U.S. 382 (1976).
106. 426 U.S. 373 (1976).
107. Id. at 377 (quoting 28 U.S.C. §1360(a)) (internal quotations omitted).
108. See id. at 381, 392-93.
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effect of the 1973 McClanahan decision," 9 illustrating that although
Worcester's categorical exclusion of state jurisdiction had been modi-
fied in some circumstances, 10 the preemption doctrine would resolve
most matters against the states.
Oliphant was further isolated by two other Indian sovereignty cases
from the 1977 term. United States v. Wheeler,"' decided just two weeks
later, was full of strong declarations of tribal sovereignty and citations to
Worcester and the work of Felix Cohen. Wheeler held that an Indian
subject to successive tribal and federal criminal prosecutions could not
claim double jeopardy because the tribe had "inherent powers of a lim-
ited sovereignty which has never been extinguished."". Wheeler was
followed by Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,"3 which underscored the
tribes' status as "separate sovereigns pre-existing the Constitution" that
had "power to make their own substantive law.' '1  That decision re-
jected an equal protection challenge to a tribal membership ordinance
curtailing benefits to children of women, but not men, who married out-
side the tribe. The Court held that gender distinctions drawn by tribal
authorities do not raise Fourteenth Amendment concerns because
"tribes have historically been regarded as unconstrained by those con-
stitutional provisions framed specifically as limitations on federal or
state authority.""' 5
In Oliphant, by contrast, the Court found the national interest in
protecting civil rights so great that tribes necessarily lost their criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians. The disparity between Oliphant and
other cases from the era appears to be the product of the Court's con-
cern for protecting non-Indian interests. When a case did not involve
the liberty or property of non-Indians, tribal sovereignty was upheld.
The Court's preoccupation with safeguarding non-Indian values seems
exaggerated, however, given Congress' plenary power over the tribes.
When in the past tribal exercises of jurisdiction have threatened non-
Indian values, Congress has responded."
6
109. 411 U.S. at 179-81 (reaffirming foundation principles in a modem context by denying states
power to tax reservation-generated income of Indians).
110. See supra Part I.B.
Ill. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
112. Id. at 322 (quoting COHEN (1941), supra note 1, at 122).
113. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
114. Id. at 55-56.
115. Id. at 56.
116. See Assimilative Crimes Act of 1948, 18 U.S.C. § 13; Major Crimes Act of 1885, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1153; Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303; Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of
1988, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721.
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2. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville
Indian Reservation
A major milestone along the path to judicial subjectivism was
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, "
7
which allowed the state to tax sales of cigarettes on the reservation to
non-members of the tribe. The case was a more significant blow to
tribal autonomy than Oliphant. It seriously undermined tribal efforts at
achieving economic self-sufficiency by curbing the burgeoning growth
of reservation businesses unburdened by state taxes.
In the 1970s, tribes throughout the country began to make use of
McClanahan's affirmation that reservation activities were not subject to
state taxation. The viability of reservation businesses had historically
been frustrated by their locations, typically far from transportation and
commercial centers, and by the absence of a trained work force. But
when the tribes established their own enterprises and took advantage of
their immunity from state tax, they began to break a near-perfect chain
of failed federal economic development efforts. Tribes imposed their
own taxes on reservation businesses, finely tuning the taxation scheme
to preserve the economic advantage of freedom from state and local
taxes. The most rewarding businesses were those whose products were
typically subject to high state taxes--cigarettes, liquor, and fireworks.
Cigarette sales were especially attractive because of potentially high vol-
umes, a large ratio of taxes to wholesale price, and relatively low regu-
latory burdens. "Smokeshops" run by enterprising tribal members
popped up on many reservations.
States reacted aggressively to recover the taxes they were losing to
the reservations' tax-exempt sales." 8 When Montana authorities arrested
an Indian smokeshop owner in 1972 on the Flathead Reservation for
selling unstamped (untaxed) cigarettes, the merchant and the tribe
brought a federal action challenging the state's jurisdiction. A unani-
mous decision by Justice Rehnquist in Moe v. Confederated Salish &
Kootenai Tribes"9 relied on McClanahan to affirm a lower court ruling
that reservation cigarette sales to Indians were not subject to state tax.
Rehnquist added a passage, however, stating that Montana could tax
sales to non-Indians. 2 ' He deferred to a presumption in the Montana
117. 447 U.S. 134(1980).
118. See, e.g., Moses v. Kinnear, 490 F.2d 21 (9th Cir. 1973); Walker River Paiute Tribe v.
Sheehan, 370 F. Supp. 816 (D. Nev. 1973); Mahoney v. State, 524 P.2d 187 (Idaho 1973); Tonasket v.
State, 525 P.2d 744 (Wash. 1974).
119. 425 U.S. 463, 480-81 (1976), aff'g 392 F. Supp. 1297 (D. Mont. 1974), and 392 F. Supp.
1325 (D. Mont. 1975).
120. See Moe, 425 U.S. at 481-83. Rehnquist went on to say that the State could require the
Indian merchant to collect the tax. He found that imposing such a duty on Indians was the only way
to ensure that a non-Indian purchaser would not "flout his legal obligation to pay the tax," id. at 482,
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law that the tax falls on the retail consumer, and thereby avoided look-
ing at the realities of the tax's impact on the tribe."' The state's juris-
diction to impose the tax came through this loophole. The issue of
taxation of reservation sales to non-Indians was of paramount impor-
tance to the parties. Opportunities for major profit-making by reserva-
tion smokeshops came from sales to non-Indians who lived on or near
the reservation or who were willing to make the trip for the lower price.
Tax-exempt sales of tobacco to Indians alone would not have justified
setting up smokeshops.
Amidst a line of cases supportive of tribal government, Moe's deci-
sion on non-Indian taxation seemed to create only a narrow and distin-
guishable exception rooted in the technical language of a state law.'
And it left open the possibility that a tribe could rebut a state law pre-
sumption that the tax falls on the consumer by producing a factual rec-
ord demonstrating the actual economic impact of a state cigarette tax on
tribal government.' Perhaps if the tribe's interest in self-government
were more substantially affected by the tax or if federal interests ex-
pressed in statutes and policies were implicated, the result in another
case might be different. Several tribes restructured their operations,
making it easier to demonstrate the impact of state taxation. A few ran
their own cigarette businesses, which would directly feel the loss of
revenues from sales to non-Indians. Others made the tribe the interme-
diary in tobacco sales, either buying the cigarettes and having merchants
sell the then-Indian-owned and -taxed cigarettes, or simply acting as a
wholesaler to individual tribal entrepreneurs.
and that it imposed but a "minimal burden" on the Indian seller, id. at 483. As to non-Indians,
Rehnquist did not attempt to apply or distinguish McClanahan or to fit the case into the exception
allowing taxation of non-Indians in Indian country only where it would not affect Indians. See
sources cited supra note 58. He cited Thomas v. Gay without discussing that factor. See Moe, 425
U.S. at 483. He did distinguish Warren Trading Post Co. v. Ariz. State Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685
(1965) (disallowing state gross receipts tax on reservation merchants), on the ground that the tax in
that case fell on sales to Indians. Moe, 425 U.S. at 482. Rehnquist also distinguished Williams v. Lee,
358 U.S. 217, 219-20 (1959) (denying state court jurisdiction over non-Indian reservation merchant's
suit against Indian debtor), as concerned only with tribal self-government, apparently presuming that
the burden of tax collection would not raise such concerns. Moe, 425 U.S. at 483.
121. See Moe, 425 U.S. at 481-82. The Court was of course free to determine for itself where
the burden of the tax fell. Cf. First Agric. Nat'l Bank v. State Tax Comm'n, 392 U.S. 339, 347 (1968)
(holding that the Court is not bound by a state's characterization of its tax).
122. An Indian law casebook from the era characterized Moe as follows: "(S]ince Williams
was decided in 1959, the Court has approved state jurisdiction in Indian country only once. That was
in the limited context of Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes .... " DAVID H. GETCHEs ET
AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 297 (1979).
123. The impropriety of the Court's uncritically relying on a state's characterization of an
economic transaction, as well as flaws in Moe's analysis of the economic impacts of the cigarette tax,
are fully discussed in Russel L. Barsh, The Omen: Three Affiliated Tribes v. Moe and the Future of
Tribal Self-Government, 5 Am. INDIAN L. REv. 1, 28-37 (1977).
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Tribes in the State of Washington had pursued schemes under
which they profited from cigarette sales, by regulating wholesale trans-
actions and taxing sales to the consumer. When the state seized cigarette
shipments destined for four reservations where they were to be sold free
of state tobacco and sales taxes, the tribes sued. 24  Lower court pro-
ceedings were stayed for several months to await the Court's decision in
Moe, which resolved most of the key questions. The parties and the
lower court then focused on whether the Colville tribes' interests were
adequately implicated in the tobacco sales to distinguish the case from
Moe. The three-judge district court found that they were, ruling that the
state taxes could not be applied to any reservation sales."
The Supreme Court reversed, rejecting the lower court's effort to
distinguish the case from Moe. It allowed the state to impose its tax
notwithstanding the existence of a lawful tribal taxing scheme applicable
to non-Indians. 126 Neither the tribal tax nor the tribe's economic stake
in tobacco sales convinced the Court that federal law preempted the tax
or that Indian self-government would be infringed.
The Colville Court did not reach its decision easily. The case was
vigorously debated in the Court's chambers from almost the opening
day of the 1979 Term until its close in June, 1980. Although six Jus-
tices signed the majority decision upholding state power to tax reserva-
tion cigarette sales, and Justice Stewart's opinion appears in partial
agreement, the Court came close to reaching the opposite result. Justice
Brennan had drafted an opinion for what was thought to be a majority
of the Court that denied the state's power to tax reservation cigarette
sales. Brennan spent several months revising his opinion to address
issues raised by ostensible allies. Meanwhile, Justices Stevens and
Rehnquist wrote separate dissents, Justice White said he would probably
join Stevens, and Justice Stewart submitted an opinion partially concur-
ring and partially dissenting.
124. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation v. Washington, 446 F. Supp. 1339 (E.D.
Wash. 1978), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
125. Id. at 1361-62, 1371. An issue on appeal became the legality of the tribal tax on non-Indian
sales. Oliphant had come down just before the district court decision, leaving open the question of
tribal civil jurisdiction over non-Indians. Extending Oliphant's denial of tribal criminal authority over
non-Indians to civil jurisdiction would have barred tribes from taxing non-Indians and required
reversal of the district court. As it turned out, the Colville Court refused to extend Oliphant, and so
the tribes won the most important legal point by having their taxes validated. See Colville, 447 U.S. at
153.
126. Colville, 447 U.S. at 158-59.
127. First Draft Opinion of Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Washington v. Confederated Tribes
of Colville Indian Reservation, No. 78-630, at 22 (Nov. 26, 1979) [hereinafter Fist Draft Colville
Opinion], in Papers of Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. (reproduced from the Collections of the
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress) (on file with author) [hereinafter Brennan Papers].
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Brennan then wrote a memorandum to his colleagues in an effort,
as he put it, "to bring things to a head."' His goal was to straighten
out collateral issues on which there were sharp differences with the dis-
senters. It appeared there still were five votes for his key holding that
the state cigarette tax could not be applied to any reservation sales. He
offered to alter the part of his decision that also invalidated a separate
state sales tax. 9
A surprise came in the response from Chief Justice Burger, who
suggested that he was no longer inclined to join the Brennan opinion.130
Brennan then asked the Chief Justice to reassign the opinion, since he
lacked five votes without Burger.' The case was assigned to Justice
White, who adopted almost verbatim the portions of Brennan's draft
opinion dealing with matters other than the cigarette tax.3 2  Justice
128. Memorandum from Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. to the Conference 1 (Jan. 14, 1980)
(Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, No. 78-630) [hereinafter
Brennan Colville Memo], in Brennan Papers, supra note 127.
129. Id. at 3. Justice Powell disagreed with that part of the opinion. The parties had not foreseen
that the sales tax might be treated differently from the cigarette tax; it had not been raised as a
separate issue on appeal. Brennan also wrote that Indians on a reservation who are not members of
the tribe should be treated the same as members for tax purposes. First Draft Colville Opinion, supra
note 127, at 25. He hinted he was willing to vary that position as well. Brennan Colville Memo, supra
note 128, at 4.
130. When Chief Justice Burger assigned the majority opinion to Justice Brennan, he indicated
that, except for a jurisdictional issue, "my vote was the same as yours," and on the jurisdictional issue,
"I'm prepared to go along." Memorandum from the Chief Justice to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr.
(Oct. 15, 1979) (Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, No. 78-630), in
Brennan Papers, supra note 127.
However, in his response to Brennan's memorandum, Burger later wrote:
Dear Bill:
In reviewing our "inventory" before taking off for the Mid-Year ABA session, I find
[this case].
I will await word from you as to anything you want me to do--other than join you!
Regards,
WEB
Memorandum from the Chief Justice to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. (Feb. 1, 1980) (Washington v.
Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, No. 78-630), in Brennan Papers, supra note 127.
131. Memorandum from Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. to the Chief Justice (Feb. 4, 1980)
(Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, No. 78-630), in Brennan Papers,
supra note 127. The letter began, "Assuming that your memorandum of last Friday constitutes a vote
against my position in the above [case], I offer the following score sheet ..... Id. Chief Justice
Burger wrote back three weeks later to confirm that "I cannot join your opinion in this case."
Memorandum from the Chief Justice to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. (Feb. 25, 1980) (Washington v.
Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, No. 78-630), in Brennan Papers, supra note 127.
132. The points on which a majority effectively adopted Brennan's draft opinion were that (1)
the Supreme Court had appellate jurisdiction over the three-judge district court decision, Colville, 447
U.S. at 145-49; First Draft Colville Opinion, supra note 127, at 7-12; (2) Washington's excise tax on
motor vehicles and mobile homes owned by tribal members was invalid, Colville, 447 U.S. at 162-64;
First Draft Colville Opinion, supra note 127, at 23-24; (3) the State's assumption of jurisdiction over
the reservations was governed by an intervening Supreme Court decision, Colville, 447 U.S. at 164;
First Draft Colville Opinion, supra note 127, at 26; and (4) tribes generally have power to impose
taxes on non-Indians within the reservation, Colville, 447 U.S. at 150-59; First Draft Colville Opinion,
supra note 127, at 15-22.
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Brennan turned the remainder of his draft into a dissent which only
Justice Marshall joined.' Justices Powell and Blackmun (who had been
wavering) switched to the majority, while Justice Stewart stuck with his
opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Justice White's majority opinion dealt with preemption in a conclu-
sory way. It took him less than a page to dismiss five federal statutes
and several treaties alleged to be in conflict with the state's taxation of
reservation sales. The gist of the decision was that the tribe should not
be able to use its sovereign status to its economic advantage: "We do
not believe that principles of federal Indian law, whether stated in terms
of pre-emption, tribal self-government, or otherwise, authorize Indian
tribes thus to market an exemption from state taxation to persons who
would normally do their business elsewhere."lM
Justice Brennan's dissent applied the preemption analysis emerging
in other cases of the era. He described the Indian sovereignty doctrine
as resulting from "an intricate web of sources including federal treaties
and statutes, the broad policies that underlie those federal enactments,
and a presumption of sovereignty or autonomy that has roots deep in
aboriginal independence."'35 The two most important federal policies
in Colville, he argued, were encouragement of tribal self-government
and stimulation of Indian economic development. He cited supportive
hortatory language in several federal statutes, indicators that the major-
ity found unpersuasive. The upshot of Brennan's argument was that
congressional policy favored treating the reservation as a kind of
"enterprise zone" free of duties imposed by the state.
Most of the dissent was devoted to demonstrating that allowing the
state to tax reservation cigarette sales would defeat federal policies. At-
tracting purchasers to typically remote reservations required charging
substantially lower prices than off-reservation businesses. Tribal dealers
would lose substantial revenues if reservation smokeshop sales were
taxed by both the state and the tribes. To eliminate the competitive dis-
advantage and allow reservation merchants to charge no more than off-
reservation sellers, the tribes would have to forgo exercising their taxing
power.
133. See Colville, 447 U.S. at 164-74 (Brennan, J., dissenting); First Draft Colville Opinion, supra
note 127, at 14-22. Subsumed within the "cigarette tax issue" were the related decisions that Indians
who are not members of the reservation tribe should be treated as non-Indians, that shipments of
untaxed cigarettes can be seized by the state on their way to the reservations, and that the state can
require Indian merchants to keep records of exempt sales to Indians. Id.
134. Colville, 447 U.S. at 155. But see John Fredericks III, State Regulation in Indian Country:
The Supreme Court's Marketing Exemptions Concept, a Judicial Sword Through the Heart of Tribal
Self-Determination, 50 MoNT. L REv. 49, 61-73 (1989) (criticizing the Court's disapproval of tribal
"marketing" of tax exemptions).
135. Colville, 447 U.S. at 167 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Stewart's concurrence also acknowledged the economic effects on
tribes. He would have held that, insofar as the tribal tax functioned the
same as the state tax, the state must credit the amount of tribal taxes paid
against its own tax.'36 Under this scenario, the tribes could tax up to the
amount of the state's levy without increasing the cost to the consumer.
Of course, the state tax would then become the minimum amount of tax
paid, whether the revenues went to the tribes or the state. The majority
brushed aside Stewart's scheme by concluding that, because the tribes
would effectively lose their ability to lower their tax below the state tax
in order to draw consumers, they would not be disadvantaged by the
absence of a credit.37 That logic, however, ignores the fact that tribes
could still offer cheaper cigarettes, despite having to apply the full tax,
by lowering their wholesale (or retail) markup and hence overall prices
charged.'38
Justice Rehnquist published a separate opinion offering a variation
on the majority's preemption analysis. 39 He agreed with the majority's
outcome but argued that statutes, cases, and historical perceptions must
establish a "tradition" of tribal immunity, with respect to the particular
subject matter, in order for the Court to find preemption. Here, he ar-
gued, the absence of any such tradition was amply demonstrated by the
1898 case of Thomas v. Gay."4 That decision allowed state taxation of
non-Indian owned cattle on leased tribal land when Indians would not
be affected. Rehnquist generalized that "the traditional cases clearly
did not find that Indian sovereign immunity was contravened by sub-
jecting tribes to the burdens inherent in state taxation of the reservation
136. Id. at 175-76 (Stewart, J., concurring). Stewart's theory would allow the state to tax
purchases by non-members within the Yakima Reservation because the tribal ordinance "functioned"
by taxing only the retailer, while state law imposed the tax on the purchaser. Stewart would
invalidate the state tax at the other three reservations, where both the tribal and state taxes fell on the
purchaser. See id.
137. Id. at 157-58. The Court recognized that non-members living on the reservation might buy
their cigarettes off the reservation in the event of double (state and tribal) taxation. But it held that
the tribes had failed to prove a tax credit would prevent such a result.
138. Tribes acting as both wholesalers and taxing entities can adjust total revenues-taxes and
profits-to keep the overall price below that charged by off-reservation businesses and thus attract
off-reservation purchasers. Moreover, tribes, taxing sales at a rate higher than they otherwise would
in order to take full advantage of a credit, could still keep prices down by subsidizing individual
sellers (e.g., by leasing land or buildings for stores at below-market rates). Even if profit margins are
low, a high volume of sales would guarantee the tribe substantial tax revenue.
139. Colville, 447 U.S. at 176-87 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The
portion of Rehnquist's opinion that constitutes a dissent does not discuss preemption. Id. at 188-90.
140. 169 U.S. 264 (1898). See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text. Rehnquist conceded
that Thomas had not always been followed: several Supreme Court cases relying on the
"instrumentality doctrine" had ruled to the contrary, forestalling full implementation of Thomas.
Rehnquist nevertheless insisted that Thomas defined the applicable tradition because the




activities of non-Indians. '4 ' This was dispositive because it indicated
that "no express immunity has been granted by Congress." '42 He
pressed his point with a vigor that seems inappropriate for a concurring
opinion until one discovers that it was originally written as a dissent
from Justice Brennan's proposed majority opinion. 43
As Rehnquist apparently realized, the majority simply did what it
thought was fair and sensible. The Court's opinion deplored the practi-
cal consequences of allowing reservation businesses to sell goods to
non-Indians tax free: "the Tribes could impose a nominal tax and
open chains of discount stores at reservation borders, selling goods of
all descriptions at deep discounts and drawing custom from surrounding
areas."'" Neither the loss of business opportunities that are fostered by
federal laws and policies nor the consequences for tribal governments
dependent on the revenues moved the Court. It declared that "[w]hile
the Tribes do have an interest in raising revenues for essential govern-
mental programs, that interest is strongest when the revenues are derived
from value generated on the reservation by activities involving the
Tribes and when the taxpayer is the recipient of tribal services."' 45 The
majority did not confront the preemptive force of federal law promot-
ing tribal economic development, and it did not deal directly with the
argument that displacement of the tribes' ability to tax retail sales inter-
fered with tribal self-government. By focusing on whether the tax was
on "value generated on the reservation," the Court implied that other
activities might still be exempt. That is, if the tribes had grown the to-
bacco or repackaged the cigarettes on the reservation, perhaps the Court
would have found that Indian sovereignty was implicated.
While the Court was considering Colville, two other cases involving
state taxation of non-Indians on reservations came before it. In White
Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, the Court barred Arizona from im-
posing its fuel and motor carrier license tax on a non-Indian logging
company operating on the reservation.'46 Central Machinery Co. v.
Arizona State Tax Commission held that a non-Indian farm machinery
dealer could not be taxed on gross receipts attributable to sales of
141. Colville, 447 U.S. at 182.
142. Id. at 185.
143. His novel approach was accepted by a majority of the Court in a case decided three years
later, but not since. In Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 734-35 (1983), the Court held that, although a
federally licensed trader on an Indian reservation is subject to tribal regulation of liquor sales under a
specific federal law, the trader also must comply with state liquor licensing and regulatory laws.
Justice O'Connor, joined by six members of the Court, held that "tradition simply has not recognized a
sovereign immunity or inherent authority in favor of liquor regulation by Indians." Id. at 722.
144. Colville, 447 U.S. at 155.
145. Id. at 156-57.
146. 448 U.S. 136, 137-38 (1980).
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tractors to a tribal enterprise. 47 For both cases, Justice Marshall wrote
straightforward majority opinions finding that state taxes had been
preempted. In White Mountain, the comprehensive federal scheme for
regulating timber harvesting and sales left no room for a state tax. In
Central Machinery, the tax was preempted by a federal statute under
which the transaction might have been regulated, although it was not in
fact regulated.
Marshall's opinion in White Mountain is the Court's clearest and
most forceful articulation of the McClanahan rule. Marshall described
federal preemption and the doctrine of tribal sovereignty as "two inde-
pendent but related barriers to the assertion of state regulatory author-
ity."48 He emphasized that, in Indian preemption analysis,
[t]he unique historical origins of tribal sovereignty make it gen-
erally unhelpful to apply to federal enactments regulating Indian
tribes those standards of pre-emption that have emerged in other
areas of the law. Tribal reservations are not States, and the dif-
ferences in the form and nature of their sovereignty make it
treacherous to import to one notions of pre-emption that are
properly applied to the other.'49
This is a direct response 50 to Rehnquist's proposed presumption against
tribal sovereignty in the absence of some active "tradition" of specific
tribal jurisdiction, expounded in his Colville concurrence.' Marshall
used the opportunity to correct misinterpretations of McClanahan by
Rehnquist and the lower courts.'52 He explained in White Mountain that
147. 448 U.S. 160, 161-63 (1980).
148. White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 142.
149. Id. at 143. Some textbooks had analyzed the Court's emerging preemption doctrine in the
same manner. See GETCHES ET AL., supra note 122, at 298-99.
150. Draft opinions in Colville had begun circulating among the Justices a few days before oral
argument in White Mountain. Rehnquist's draft was dated January 11, 1980. See Frst Draft Dissent
of Justice William H. Rehnquist, Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation,
No. 78-630, at 1 (Jan. 11, 1980), in Brennan Papers, supra note 127. White Mountain and Central
Machinery were argued on January 14, 1980.
151. Commentators have feared the misuse of presumptions under the banner of "preemption,"
see Deborah A. Geier, Essay: Power and Presumptions; Rules and Rhetoric; Institutions and Indian
Law, 1994 B.Y.U. L. REV. 451,453, and use of the preemption analysis as an assimilationist device,
see Allen C. Turner, Evolution, Assimilation, and State Control of Gambling in Indian Country: Is
Cabazon v. California an Assimilationist Wolf in Preemption Clothing?, 24 IDAHo L. REV. 317, 337-38
(1987-88).
152. A few courts had been applying preemption principles from other areas of law, the
approach eschewed in White Mountain. See Fort Mojave Tribe v. County of San Bernardino, 543
F.2d 1253, 1257 (9th Cir. 1976) ("[S]tate legislation primarily directed at non-Indian lessees of Indian
land [is not] automatically preempted by the federal government in the absence of specific
authorization."); Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 469 F. Supp. 154, 161 (D. Mont. 1979) ("Absent
a specific congressional mandate to the contrary, Montana has the power.., to tax a non-Indian
enterprise within its boundaries, even if the situs of the enterprise is within the exterior boundaries of
an Indian reservation."), rev'd on other grounds, 650 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1981); California v.
Quechan Tribe of Indians, 424 F. Supp. 969, 975 (S.D. Cal. 1977) ("[Sltate regulation ... primarily
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Indian law preemption analysis reads the language of relevant treaties
and statutes "in terms of both the broad policies that underlie them and
the notions of sovereignty that have developed from historical traditions
of tribal independence."'' This approach searches well beyond the
words of federal laws, finding preemptive force in the tradition of re-
tained tribal sovereignty.
The Court decided White Mountain and Central Machinery at the
very end of the 1980 term and just two weeks after Colville. The differ-
ent results left lawyers and scholars puzzled as to the applicable rules.
Only three Justices had voted in the majority in all three cases! The
boundaries of tribal tax immunity became fuzzy, lying somewhere be-
tween Colville and the other two cases. Still, it was not unreasonable at
the time to see White Mountain-Central Machinery as stating the general
rule and Colville, which pieced together a majority from four opinions
based on separate rationales, as an exception.
Today, however, Colville is cited more broadly, beyond the facts
and circumstances involved in the case. Its ambiguous, less-anchored
approach is better suited to legitimating the Justices' subjective judg-
ments than the cleaner preemption test of White Mountain and Central
Machinery. Moreover, even White Mountain is currently misinterpreted.
An oblique reference to "interests" has been taken as an invitation for
courts to balance interests subjectively and search for a result that ought
to obtain, without guidance from the historical tradition of tribal sover-
eignty. "
3. Montana v. United States
In Montana v. United States,5 5 the Supreme Court held that the
Crow Indian Tribe lacked authority to regulate non-members hunting
and fishing on non-Indian-owned land on its reservation. 56 During the
1970s, tribes explored new ways to improve dismal reservation econo-
mies. Some had begun charging fees to non-Indians for the privilege
of hunting and fishing on the reservation, and offering guiding services.
Sportsmen wanted richer wildlife and a new, unfamiliar experience;
many sought more liberal hunting seasons and limits than were available
directed toward non-Indians ... is not preempted.., by federal or tribal law, absent specific
congressional legislation not here present."), vacated on other grounds, 595 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1979).
153. White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 144-45. In this connection he mentioned that a "particularized
inquiry" into the nature of various "interests" would be part of the preemption analysis. Id. at 145;
see infra text accompanying notes 260-262.
154. See infra notes 265-275 for a discussion of the Court's subjective balancing in Department
of Taxation & Fin. v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., 114 S. Ct. 2028 (1994), and Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v.
Citizen Band of Potawatomi Tribe, 498 U.S. 505 (1991).
155. 450 U.S. 544(1981).
156. Id. at 566-67.
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under state law. Like reservation commercial activities,5 7 hunting and
fishing in Indian country had been declared free of state control in
modem-era Indian law cases. 8 Tribes took advantage of their status as
jurisdictional enclaves by offering lower prices and relaxed regulation-
inducements familiar in underdeveloped nations seeking to lure busi-
ness.
The Crow Tribe of Montana and the Mescalero Apache Tribe of
New Mexico both enacted wildlife management laws and began regu-
lating non-Indian sportsmen. The Crow Tribe was concerned about im-
pacts of non-Indian recreationists on reservation resources and acted to
halt their taking of fish and game.'59 Montana, however, persisted in
licensing non-Indians to hunt and fish on the Crow Reservation, leading
to a confrontation between the two governments. The Mescalero
Apache Tribe was pursuing a detailed wildlife management plan as a
part of its economic development efforts. It had built a resort and was
working with federal agencies to stock reservation streams and increase
elk herds. The State of New Mexico continued to require non-Indians
to have state licenses and to follow limits and seasons different from
tribal regulations.
The district court in Montana extended Oliphant's bar on tribal
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians to the sphere of tribal civil regu-
latory jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed."w It
addressed a different ground, finding that the tribe owned the bed and
banks of the Big Horn River and held that, as a landowner entitled to
exclude people from its property, it could also regulate those who came
to fish or hunt. The court then answered the question of tribal jurisdic-
tion over non-Indian-owned lands adjacent to the tribal river bed with a
Solomonic gesture. It declared that the tribe had authority to regulate,
but not to prohibit, non-Indian fishing and hunting.
After the Tenth Circuit in Mescalero also held for the tribe,16' the
two states sought Supreme Court review. The Court granted certiorari
in the Montana case and, pending its resolution, held the Mescalero pe-
tition.
157. See Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685, 691-92 (1965);
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217,222-23 (1959).
158. See, e.g., Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 412-13 (1968).
159. See United States v. Montana, 604 F.2d 1162, 1168 n.11A (9th Cir. 1979), rev'd on other
grounds, 450 U.S. 544 (1981). To allay these concerns, the Crow Tribal Council passed Resolution
74-05 in 1973, which prohibited hunting and fishing within the reservation by anyone other than
members of the Crow Tribe. Id. at 1164 & n.4.
160. Id. at 1164.
161. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. New Mexico, 630 F.2d 724, 734-35 (10th Cir. 1980), vacated,
450 U.S. 1036 (1981).
1996] 1609
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
The Supreme Court reversed, deciding the Crows' case in favor of
Montana. 62 It declared that tribes lose a component of their aboriginal
sovereignty when they convey land to non-Indians. In dicta, the Court
created two exceptions to this rule: (1) a tribe may retain jurisdiction
over non-Indians engaged in "consensual relationships with the tribe or
its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other ar-
rangements;"' 63 and (2) a tribe may retain "inherent power to exercise
civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its
reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the
political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the
tribe."'1( The second exception effectively left the fate of tribal sover-
eignty up to the subjective evaluations of future courts.
The Montana Court held that neither of these exceptions applied to
the Crow Tribe's hunting and fishing regulations. The tribe did not
have consensual relations with the non-Indians, and the Court could not
see how important tribal interests would be threatened by application of
Montana's rules. The Court found that in the past, the tribe had
"accommodated itself to the State's 'near exclusive' regulation"' 65 be-
cause it had not tried to forbid non-Indian hunting and fishing on res-
ervation lands at the time the Crow Allotment Act of 1920 was
approved. By rejecting the usual presumption of tribal jurisdiction in
Indian country, Montana invited courts to weigh evidence of various
interests and efforts in every case involving activities on non-Indian-
owned lands. It thus created the potential for different outcomes for
each reservation regulation and tax.
In reaching its decision, the Montana Court announced remarkable
departures from established Indian law principles. First, it ruled that title
to the river bed passed to the state on statehood. It thus narrowed crite-
ria for defining tribal rights to such property laid down only eleven
years earlier. 166 Then, the Court limited the tribe's authority to regulate
non-Indian conduct on the reservation, effectively retreating from the
162. Montana, 450 U.S. at 566-67.
163. Id. at 565.
164. Id. at 566.
165. Il; see also iL at 564-65 n.13.
166. The legal question was whether the river bed passed from the United States to the Indians
when the government entered into treaties recognizing a reservation with the Big Horn River running
through the middle of it. It is an established principle of public land law that, prior to statehood, the
United States holds the land underlying navigable rivers in trust for future states. United States v. Holt
State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 55 (1926). Upon statehood title to the river bed passes to the new state. Id.
at 59. Not long before Montana arose, the Supreme Court ruled that where the river in question was
included in an Indian reservation created by a treaty prior to statehood, the river bed belongs to the
tribe. Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 635-36 (1970). The federal government argued
that this special rule for Indian reservations applied to the Crow Reservation. The Montana Court,
however, narrowly construed Choctaw as based on a treaty promise that the Choctaw Reservation
would not be included within any state. Montana, 450 U.S. at 555 n.5.
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previous year's dictum in Colville that "Indian tribes possess a broad
measure of civil jurisdiction over the activities of non-Indians on Indian
reservation lands in which the tribes have a significant interest." 67
Montana justified its restriction of tribal rights with a citation to
Oliphant for the general proposition that "the inherent sovereign pow-
ers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of non-Indians or
non-members of the tribe.' 68
Montana's denial of tribal authority over non-members was based
on two grounds. First, the Court held that the Fort Laramie Treaty,
which established the Crow Reservation for the "absolute and undis-
turbed use and occupation" of the Indians, was implicitly abrogated by
the Crow Allotment Act,169  which alienated much of the Crow land to
non-Indians. The Court's reliance on the Act was notable, as that legis-
lation did not specifically limit or remove the tribe's authority over
hunting and fishing on allotted lands. Furthermore, Congress has gen-
erally affirmed that allotted land remains Indian country and is there-
fore subject to tribal and federal law to the exclusion of state law. 70 As
discussed below,' the Allotment Acts came about during a short-lived
period of assimilationist fervor in Congress, a policy that was repudiated
in subsequent legislation. In Montana, though, the Court gave the pol-
icy a new vitality.77
167. Colville, 447 U.S. at 152-53. This case had not yet been decided at the time of the Ninth
Circuit Montana decision.
168. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565.
169. 41 Stat. 751 (1920). See Montana, 450 U.S. at 558-59.
170. Crimes and Criminal Procedure Act of 1948, 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1994). The Supreme Court
states in several cases that Congress has accepted the Court's characterization of all land within
reservation boundaries as Indian country, thereby decoupling land ownership from the issue of
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 468 (1984).
The Court's departure from this principle may have been induced by the way Montana was
presented. The United States took up the tribe's cause and made the primary issue ownership of the
bed of the Big Horn River, which was the part of the reservation most attractive to non-Indians for
sport fishing and duck hunting. The government tied the tribe's power to regulate hunting and fishing
to the claim that the bed and banks belonged to the tribe, apparently believing that the ownership
argument was strong and would bolster the jurisdiction argument. Once the ownership issue was
decided against the Crows, the Court saw the case as involving a corridor of state land flanked by
lands owned by non-Indians who had bought allotments. The government's "fallbacek" position
asserting sovereignty principles may have seemed less convincing after the United States had staked
the case principally on tribal land ownership.
171. For a discussion of Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492
U.S. 408 (1989), and the Court's understanding of the allotment policy, see infra Part II.A.4. For
references to the allotment policy in several decisions where tribes lost sovereignty through the
reduction of reservation boundaries, see Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399 passim (1994); Montana, 450
U.S. at 559 n.9; Mescalero, 630 F.2d at 734-35; see also infra text accompanying notes 223-251. But
see Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 388-89 n.14 (1976) (noting that federal policy appears to
reject assimilationism in construing the prerogatives of tribal sovereignty).
172. The Court recognized that the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479,
explicitly ended the allotment policy, but it continued to look to the purposes of the Allotment Act to
determine the effect of alienation of reservation lands to non-Indians. Montana, 450 U.S. at 559 n.9.
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Second, the Court limited the tribe's inherent sovereignty because
"regulation of hunting and fishing by non-members of a tribe on lands
no longer owned by the tribe bears no clear relationship to tribal self-
government or internal relations.' ' 3 This was an extension of
Rehnquist's idea in Oliphant that Indian powers could be divested if
they were inconsistent with the sovereign interests of the United States.'
Oliphant had opened the way for subjective, case-by-case determina-
tions of whether a tribe retained its inherent sovereignty in particular
circumstances. The Montana Court followed its example but made no
attempt to link the denial of tribal sovereignty to a fundamental incon-
sistency with federal sovereignty.
Other cases decided at the same time as Montana produced mark-
edly different results. Incredibly, most of them were based on founda-
tion principles. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. New Mexico also involved a
tribe's regulation of hunting and fishing on its New Mexico reservation.
The case was vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of
Montana,'75 and the Tenth Circuit adhered to its earlier decision up-
holding tribal sovereignty. 6 The Supreme Court affirmed because, un-
like Montana, the case did not involve non-Indian lands on the
reservation.' 7   Justice Marshall wrote for the Court that Montana as-
sumed tribes can restrict hunting and fishing by non-members on tribal
land, a matter that was conceded by New Mexico. 78
The State of New Mexico had argued that it had concurrent juris-
diction over the non-members and that its seasons, bag limits, and gear
restrictions should prevail whenever they were more restrictive than the
tribe's. Justice Marshall recognized that concurrent state authority was
preempted by federal law and would interfere with tribal sovereignty.
Preemption came from "broad considerations" of policy favoring
tribal self-government, self-sufficiency, and economic development.'79
These goals, embodied in a host of federal statutes, would be defeated
by allowing the state to regulate. Marshall explained that the state's
parallel but inconsistent wildlife management program could not peace-
173. Montana, 450 U.S. at 564.
174. The Oliphant Court found that tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians was a threat to the
national interest in protecting the civil liberties of criminal defendants. I have argued above that
Oliphant's lowering of the threshold at which tribal powers are extinguished was a departure from
established principles of Indian law. The earliest tribal sovereignty cases taught that only those
powers that would be fundamentally inimical to the sovereignty of the United States (such as authority
to convey land to non-Indians or to maintain foreign relations) were lost by the Indians when they
were brought under the United States flag. See supra notes 99-102.
175. 450 U.S. 1036, 1036 (1981).
176. See Mescalero Apache Tribe v. New Mexico, 677 F.2d 55, 57 (10th Cir. 1982).
177. See New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 330-31 (1983).
178. Id. at 331.
179. Id. at 334-36.
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fully coexist with the tribal program because the tribal plan's success
depends on achieving "the optimal level of hunting and fishing.., not
simply a maximum level that should not be exceeded.""18
Mescalero concluded that "the Tribe's authority to control hunt-
ing and fishing preempts state jurisdiction."'8 l State law, then, was pre-
empted by tribal legislation supported by federal policy. This kind of
"tribal preemption" is what the Court denied in Colville when it held
that Montana could apply its cigarette tax to reservation sales despite the
existence of a tribal tax, a situation that would surely undermine the
tribe's cigarette business or emasculate its taxing program. Perhaps the
Justices viewed Mescalero differently because the fish and game
(though mostly stocked) were more indigenous to the reservation than
the cigarettes in Colville.'
Justice Marshall was able to command a unanimous Court in
Mescalero despite the fact that individual Justices were on record as
disagreeing with his analysis in previous preemption cases. Justice
Stewart, the author of Montana, was uncomfortable with Marshall's
presumption favoring tribal jurisdiction where no federal law dictated
otherwise. But he found that Montana's exception for "tribal authority
over matters demonstrably affecting the economic welfare of the Tribe
or the proper exercise of its self-government" applied because the
Mescalero Apaches owned the land and had a "much greater
investment and interest in wildlife" than the Crows had in Montana.
8 3
The next term, a majority of the Court joined Marshall in a deci-
sion that used the White Mountain-Central Machinery preemption ap-
proach to exempt a non-Indian contractor building a school on a
reservation from state gross receipts taxes. 4 And in another case,
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe,"t 5 Marshall commanded a majority
that allowed tribes to impose severance taxes on non-Indian mineral
producers on reservation lands. All of these decisions applied founda-
tion principles. After Montana, however, such cases became increas-
ingly rare. More and more, the Court became attracted to the subjec-
tivist approach in Indian law, culminating in a 1989 decision redefining
tribal reservation zoning rights.
180. Id. at 338-40.
181. Id. at 338.
182. See supra notes 144-145 and accompanying text.
183. Memorandum from Justice Potter Stewart to the Conference (Apr. 1, 1981) (Montana v.
United States, No. 79-1128; New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, No. 80-778), in Marshall
Papers, supra note 4.
184. Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832, 834 (1982). Justice O'Connor
replaced Justice Stewart in the October 1981 Term and joined the majority.
185. 455 U.S. 130, 136 (1982), discussed infra text accompanying notes 197-202.
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4. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima
Indian Nation
Oliphant, Colville, and Montana announced a welter of new
"rules" for reservation jurisdiction cases involving non-Indians. Others
have commented upon the disarray that the ad hoc nature of these deci-
sions created. 8' The confusion was exacerbated by Brendale v.
Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation,87 in which
the Court reached new extremes of judicial subjectivity and at the same
time produced highly impractical results. The question in Brendale was
whether the county or the tribe had zoning authority over non-Indian-
owned land on the Yakima Indian reservation. The outcome was that
about two-thirds of the reservation land, whether owned by Indians or
non-Indians, would be zoned exclusively by the tribe. Zoning authority
over the other third was split between the tribe and the county, depend-
ing on the race of the owner of the specific parcel. The decision was
not tied to any particular doctrine or rationale, but was supposed to re-
flect the realities of current demographics and land ownership. A com-
bination of divergent plurality opinions produced this helter-skelter dis-
tribution of zoning authority-a result that only two Justices favored.
Ironically, the Court had earlier emphasized the importance of
avoiding "an impractical pattern of checkerboard jurisdiction" that
"depends upon the ownership of particular parcels of land, [so that of-
ficials] operating in the area will find it necessary to search tract
books."'88 This concern was ignored in Montana, which held that tribal
authority over reservation lands owned by non-Indians would vary ac-
cording to political, economic, and social factors. Brendale added an-
other level of complexity by giving different authorities jurisdiction
over different parts of the same reservation, if a high percentage of land
was currently owned by non-Indians.
The Brendale Court produced three separate opinions, none of
which commanded a majority of the Justices. Rehnquist, Scalia, and
Kennedy joined White's opinion, which would have denied the tribe
zoning authority over all non-Indian-owned land. Marshall and
Brennan signed an opinion by Blackmun insisting on tribal power to
zone the whole reservation. Only Stevens and O'Connor explicitly
favored creating a jurisdictional checkerboard, but the Court's frag-
186. See Allison M. Dussias, Geographically-Based and Membership-Based Views of Indian
Tribal Sovereignty: The Supreme Court's Changing Vision, 55 U. PrrT. L REV. 1, 41 (1993)
("Oliphant... left confusion among federal, state and tribal officials."); Frank R. Pommersheim, The
Crucible of Sovereignty: Analyzing Issues of Tribal Jurisdiction, 31 Awiz. L RE v. 329, 334 (1989)
("The Supreme Court's recent decisions render the scope of tribal court jurisdiction ever more
uncertain.").
187. 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
188. Seymour v. Superintendent of Wash. State Penitentiary, 368 U.S. 351, 358 (1962).
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mented pluralities allowed them to get their way. With concurrence by
Blackmun, Marshall, and Brennan, they held that the tribe could zone
non-Indian land on one part of the reservation. Meanwhile, White,
Rehnquist, Scalia, and Kennedy joined them in holding that the county,
not the tribe, could zone non-Indian land on the rest of the reservation.
Brendale offers various interpretations of the Montana decision
without reaching agreement among the Justices as to which is correct.
White's version of Montana would preclude any tribal zoning of non-
Indian-owned lands on the reservation. He found that the exception to
Montana's presumption against tribal jurisdiction over non-Indian land
did not apply because no activity allowed by the state on the land would
threaten "the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or
welfare of the tribe." 89 For state jurisdiction to be pre-empted, White
would require not only that the nature of the regulated activity affect the
tribe, but that a particular activity permitted by the state "imperil" tribal
interests. In addition, a federal court could make an inquiry into the
matter only after state authorities had fully exercised jurisdiction. In
Brendale, therefore, White reduced protection for tribal government
under the Montana "exception" to the right to bring a federal lawsuit
challenging a county decision only after the tribe has unsuccessfully
appealed to the Board of Commissioners. The federal court would then
ask if identifiable activities allowed by the county on a particular parcel
imperiled tribal autonomy or welfare.
Blackmun's dissent insisted that White misread Montana when he
presumed that tribes have no civil jurisdiction over non-Indians unless
Congress consents. Even the Montana Court had recognized that
"tribes may regulate the on-reservation conduct of non-Indians when-
ever a significant tribal interest is threatened or directly affected."'9g
Here, the tribe's comprehensive reservation land use and zoning scheme
was at stake. The tribe thus faced "the loss of the general and longer
term advantages of comprehensive land management."'' White ig-
nored these issues by requiring that the "impact [on the tribe] be de-
189. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 428 (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 566, quoted more fully supra text
accompanying note 164).
190. Id. at 457 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Blackmun was moved to construe Montana narrowly
by the fact that in eight years the case had not been followed and had hardly even been cited. He
noted that Montana's rule of tribal sovereignty had been invoked only in a dissent in Merrion v.
Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 171 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting), and a dissent to a denial of
certiorari in City of Poison v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 459 U.S. 977 (1982)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Brendale, 492 U.S. at 456 n.6 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). But see Iowa
Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 18 (1987) (citing Montana); National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v.
Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 851 n.12 (1985) (same); New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache
Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 330-31 (1983) (same); cf. South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 688 (1993)
(citing Montana after Brendale).
191. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 460 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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monstrably serious" and by assuming most problems will be avoided if
local zoning officials have an opportunity to give "due regard" to
tribal interests.'92 White's interpretation of Montana thus denigrated the
important tribal interest in making the rules that govern their own reser-
vations.
Stevens, like White, cited the Allotment Act to justify his result.
Conceding that "[z]oning is the process whereby a community defines
its essential character,"'93 he nevertheless concluded that allotment ter-
minated tribal zoning authority over non-member lands in parts of the
reservation, at least where "large portions of the reservation were sold in
fee. "194 White saw the Act as divesting the tribe of that authority
throughout the entire reservation, while Blackmun's dissent followed
traditional principles by assuming tribal power endures until clearly ab-
rogated by Congress.
Stevens' formulation, which determined the outcome in Brendale,
gave no clear indication of when non-member ownership of reservation
land would become extensive enough to abrogate the tribe's inherent
authority. Stevens appears to have been striving for a result that he con-
sidered fair and reasonable under the facts. His opinion does not pre-
tend to engage in a principled exercise in statutory construction and
does not guide later courts beyond the contemporary situation of the
Yakima Reservation. In fact, Stevens presented "a patently unworkable
legal rule."' s At least at Yakima, unlike on most reservations, there was
a working definition of "opened" and "closed" portions of the reser-
vation that was employed by the parties during the litigation of the
cases. While the distinction lacked any official force, it could be used to
delineate between those areas where tribal sovereignty had been abro-
gated by the Allotment Act and those where the tribe retained jurisdic-
tion.
Brendale left the doctrine mired in profound confusion. Each of
the three opinions is dominated by bickering with the other two; 96 they
read more like briefs than judicial decisions. Neither White nor Stevens,
as authors of the respective plurality opinions, took responsibility for
synthesizing an understandable rule or principle. Perhaps the Chief
Justice should have attempted to force a reconciliation to avoid the em-
192. Id. at 431.
193. Id. at 433.
194. Id. at 437.
195. Id. at 448 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice White also warned that "the practical
consequences of Justice Stevens' approach will be severe." Id. at 425 n.8. White, however, was
principally concerned that it would "allow[] Indian tribes to obtain the power to zone by defining
areas on their reservations that contain only a 'small percentage' of fee lands." Id.
196. Of the 101 paragraphs in the three opinions, 25 quibble with other members of the Court.
Of a total of 27 footnotes, seven are used to debate other Justices' positions.
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barrassment of a public quarrel that has left those who must interpret the
decision in a quandary.
Brendale's value as precedent will be limited except in a case with
nearly identical subject matter and facts-zoning on a reservation with
similar land tenure and demographics. Otherwise, it gives litigators and
lower courts wide latitude to generate their own theories about tribal
authority. Nevertheless, Brendale remains a stunning example of the
willingness of most members of the present Supreme Court to act on
their subjective views of the merits. The three dissenters in that case,
who urged the use of foundation principles, have all retired.
B. The Other Line: Vestiges of the Foundations
Even as subjectivism became a theme in the Supreme Court's In-
dian law jurisprudence, many opinions continued to pronounce foun-
dation principles. Arguably, these principles were simply recited in
cases where they supported a result that coincided with the majority's
perception of the desirable "state of affairs." Nevertheless, several im-
portant decisions from the 1980s employed the traditional approach
and could provide a principled basis for returning Indian law to foun-
dation precepts. Indeed, because these decisions state their rationales
more clearly than the numerous subjectivist opinions, they could be in-
fluential if a future Court tries to bring doctrinal coherence to tribal
sovereignty law.
Between Montana (1981) and Brendale (1989), several major deci-
sions provided expansive views of tribal sovereignty. Two cases in-
volved regulatory jurisdiction. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe'97
affirmed tribal power to tax reservation mineral production by non-
Indian companies. And in New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe,'98
the Court found that tribal wildlife laws effectively preempted state law.
The Court also issued two opinions requiring federal judicial deference
to tribal sovereignty. In both cases, the Court held that challenges to
tribal jurisdiction over civil suits arising on reservations must first be
brought in tribal court.199 The period was also marked by an historic
ruling allowing the Oneida Indian Nation to pursue claims that title to
lands in the State of New York had been unlawfully obtained from them
197. 455 U.S. 130 (1982). See also Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 195
(1985) (taxing power of tribes upheld in Merrion does not depend on Secretary of Interior's approval
of tribal ordinance).
198. 462 U.S. 324 (1983). See supra notes 176-183 and accompanying text.
199. See Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987) (federal diversity jurisdiction only
after remedies exhausted in tribal court); National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians,
471 U.S. 845 (1985) (tribal jurisdiction over subject matter raises a federal question but must be
decided in the first instance by the tribal court).
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two centuries before.ro All five of these decisions cited to foundation
principles.
The five decisions, however, remain somewhat precarious and miti-
gated by their circumstances. Merrion is illustrative. An apparently
strong majority vote (6-3) masked underlying confusion and indecision
among the Justices. An opinion by Justice Stevens reaching the oppo-
site result was almost issued, after which several equivocal Justices joined
what was originally Justice Marshall's draft dissent.2 0' Later the Court,
per Justice Stevens, limited the great economic potential of Merrion by
200. County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226 (1985).
201. Justice Stevens circulated a draft opinion for the Court that was identical in substance to his
published dissent. First Draft Opinion of Justice John Paul Stevens, Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe,
No. 80-11 (June 1, 1981) (Amoco Prod. Co. v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, No. 80-15; Merrion v. Jicarilla
Apache Tribe, No. 80-11) [hereinafter First Draft Merrion Opinion], in Marshall Papers, supra note
4. Stevens' erstwhile majority opinion rejected the Indians' power to tax because, he argued, it was
based on tribal power to exclude non-members from the reservation, something that the tribe had
given up when it entered into the lease with the mining company. This rationale is different from the
one the Justices discussed when they voted in conference. See Memorandum from Justice John Paul
Stevens to the Conference (June 1, 1981) (Amoco Prod. Co. v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, No. 80-15;
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, No. 80-11), in Marshall Papers, supra note 4. Chief Justice Burger
and Justice Rehnquist said they would join. Because Justice Stewart recused himself, it would take
five votes to overrule the court of appeals' decision upholding the tax, but only four to affirm. See
HANNIS TAYLOR, JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
715 (1905).
Justice Marshall circulated a dissent similar to what became the majority opinion. First Draft
Dissent of Justice Thurgood Marshall, Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, No. 80-11 (June 25, 1981)
(Amoco Prod. Co. v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, No. 80-15; Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, No. 80-
11) [hereinafter First Draft Merrion Dissent], in Marshall Papers, supra note 4. Justice Brennan said
he would join. Although Justice White viewed the tribe's power to exclude non-Indians as the basis
for its taxing power, he accepted Marshall's conclusion. Justices Blackmun and Powell wanted the
tribal tax reviewed for compliance with interstate commerce clause restraints and voted to vacate
and remand. This left the case one vote short of the four needed to affirm. Then, in the waning days
of the term, Blackmun submitted a brief dissent accepting Marshall's argument that because Congress
had created a mechanism for federal administrative approval of the tribal taxing ordinance, the
Commerce Clause was not an obstacle and the tax was valid. With Blackmun and Powell, there
would be five votes to affirm. However, there was not enough time left in the term to rework the
opinions.
When the new term began, the case was reargued before a new Court, Justice Stewart having
been replaced by Justice O'Connor. The majority opinion was assigned to Justice Marshall. The day
the draft was circulated, Brennan joined. After making changes to acconmmodate them, Marshall
secured the votes of Blackmun and Powell. See Memorandum from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to
Justice Thurgood Marshall (Jan. 11, 1982) (Amoco Prod. Co. v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, No. 80-15;
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, No. 80-11) (demanding specific changes as a condition for joining
Marshall's opinion), in Marshall Papers, supra note 4; Memorandum from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
to Justice Thurgood Marshall (Jan. 11, 1982) (Amoco Prod. Co. v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, No. 80-15;
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, No. 80-11) (same), in Marshall Papers, supra note 4. Justice
O'Connor also joined Marshall's opinion. After toying with joining the dissent, White joined too.
Memorandum from Justice Byron R. White to Justice Thurgood Marshall (Jan. 5, 1982) (Amoco Prod.
Co. v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, No. 80-15; Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, No. 80-11), in Marshall
Papers, supra note 4. Justice Stevens wrote a dissent joined by Rehnquist and Burger.
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allowing the state, as well as the tribe, to tax reservation mineral produc-
tion.2"
It should also be pointed out that there were other decisions from
this era whose outcomes favored tribal sovereignty but were not based
on foundation principles. The best example is California v. Cabazon
Band of Mission Indians, 3 a landmark case allowing a tribal casino to
operate on a California reservation despite contrary state and local laws.
Justice White's majority opinion (6-3) might have relied on foundation
principles, but instead employed a balancing test.2" Federal interests,
which are considered parallel to tribal interests, were deemed heavy
enough to outweigh state interests. Because California permitted some
types of gambling, its public policy would not be undermined by tri-
bally sponsored gambling, even if the particular type did not comply
with state law. But in dicta Cabazon notes that if gambling offended
non-Indian values deeply enough, jurisdiction to control gambling on
202. See Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989). Oil companies
challenged state taxation of oil and gas production on the Jicarilla Apache Reservation. The New
Mexico Court of Appeals held against the companies, upholding the constitutionality of the state tax.
Cotton Petroleum v. State, 745 P.2d 1170 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987). Justice Stevens' opinion recast the
question raised as "whether Congress has acted to grant the Tribe such immunity." Cotton, 490 U.S.
at 175. He thus turned the Court's Indian preemption analysis on its head by starting with a
presumption against the preemption of state law; this is the approach normally reserved for federal-
state preemption cases.
Even with a presumption in favor of state taxation, Stevens' opinion had to go through some
contortions to uphold New Mexico's tax. Just four years earlier, the Court had barred state taxation
of tribal royalties under oil and gas leases issued to non-Indian companies. Montana v. Blackfeet
Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759 (1985). That case held that a 1938 Indian mineral leasing law had
effectively repealed a 1924 Act allowing the states to tax reservation oil and gas. The tribe's
royalties from reservation production of oil and gas were therefore exempt from state taxation.
Justice Stevens, who dissented in Blackfeet Tribe, distinguished it in Cotton as involving direct taxes on
tribes, which would require clear congressional consent, and then decided that other state taxation of
reservation activities should be permitted unless preempted by Congress. Taxes on royalties were
found to be more direct than the taxes imposed on lessee oil companies. Cotton, 490 U.S. at 183 n.14.
The 1938 Act, repealing the 1927 Act's authorization of state taxation, did not provide any evidence
of clear congressional consent to direct state taxation of Indians. Nor, however, did it expressly
preclude other, less direct state taxes. Justice Stevens seized on this absence of express preemption
of state law as to "indirect" taxes to manuever past the Blackfeet Tribe decision's bar on Montana's
oil and gas royalty tax and to allow New Mexico's taxation of oil companies' reservation activities,
regardless of the economic impacts on the tribe.
Professor Clinton has argued that Cotton's rejection of a Commerce Clause barrier to the
exercise of state jurisdiction in Indian country flies in the face of the framers' understanding of the
clause. Robert N. Clinton, The Dormant Indian Commerce Clause, 27 CONN. L REv. 1055, 1221-22
(1995).
203. 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
204. It appears from Justice Marshall's notes that only Justice Stevens voted to reverse at
conference. After a draft opinion was circulated on Feb. 3, 1987, Justice O'Connor wrote: "Please
join me in your dissent. I tentatively voted the other way at Conference, but I am persuaded you are
right." Memorandum from Justice Sandra Day O'Connor to Justice John Paul Stevens (Feb. 12, 1987)
(California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, No. 85-1708), in Marshall Papers, supra note 4.
Justice Scalia also ultimately joined Stevens.
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
the reservation would pass to the state."5 Cabazon ultimately succumbs
to a subjectivist approach, concluding that tribal immunity from state
law would be permitted because, on balance, reservation gambling
would not be overly offensive to California.2" Nevertheless, by allowing
Indians to host gambling operations free of state control, the case has
done more for some tribal economies than all the federal government's
Native American development programs since the nation's founding.
C. The New Rules of Judicial Subjectivism
While subjectivism has not totally eclipsed foundation principles, it
has required the institution of certain new rules. Three themes mark the
subjectivist era. First, the Court has retreated from established canons of
construction that were protective of Indian rights. Second, some
Justices, recognizing that definitions of tribal sovereignty should be tied
to congressional action or policy, have begun looking to nineteenth-
century policies of allotment and assimilation as the benchmark for
defining appropriate limits on Indian autonomy. And third, the Court
has assumed the prerogative of balancing various non-Indian interests in
order to prune tribal sovereignty to the Court's own notion of what it
ought to look like.
1. Retreat from the Established Canons of Construction
Special rules for construing laws and treaties affecting Indians have
evolved through 150 years of Supreme Court jurisprudence.2°7 The
rules counsel that ambiguities will be resolved in favor of Indians"0 8 and
that tribal sovereignty may only be abrogated with a clear statement of
congressional intent.2" The canons of construction were first applied in
treaty cases, where tribal bargaining power was limited and language
205. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 216, 220-22.
206. See infra text accompanying notes 252-275. Cabazon delves into the state's public policy
ostensibly because California is a Public Law 280 state. In 1953, Congress granted California and
certain other states authority to enforce state criminal laws on reservations, but not jurisdiction over
civil regulatory matters. See 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) (1994) (criminal); 28 U.S.C. § 1360(b) (1994)
(civil); see also Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976). The Supreme Court had drawn a
distinction between regulations that are regulatory and those that are prohibitory. The latter are
considered within Public Law 280's grant of jurisdiction to the states because a prohibitory regulation
is analogous to a crime. A similar distinction has been used to determine which state regulations are
"crimes" within the Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1994), a general law of the United
States made applicable to Indian country under 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1994). United States v. Marcyes,
557 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir. 1977) (finding that a state law intended to prohibit, not regulate, fireworks
was tantamount to a criminal law).
207. See COHEN (1982), supra note 2, at 221-22.
208. See, e.g., Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576 (1908); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S.
515, 582 (1832).
209. See COHEN (1982), supra note 2, at 222-25; GETCHES ET AL., supra note 15, at 345-48; see
also infra note 240 and accompanying text.
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barriers abounded.1 ° The Court extended the rule to cover statutes,211 in
recognition of the fiduciary relationship of the United States to the
tribes.
212
The Court has always assumed that Congress may do virtually
anything it wants to alter tribal powers and rights, even abrogate Indian
treaties unilaterally. 213 However, because this power is rooted in a trust
relationship, Congress is presumed to act in the best interests of the
tribes. 214 A federal law will thus be understood to diminish tribal powers
or immunity only if Congress' intent to do so is "clear and plain.
215
Hence, the general rule is against the implied abrogation of Indian
rights.
While the Court may continue to cite the canons, it is difficult to
attribute any significance to them in many recent cases.216 When con-
struing legislation opening Indian country to non-Indian occupancy,
the Court has generally resisted diminishing reservation boundaries ab-
sent clear evidence that Congress intended to divest the tribe not only of
parcels of land but the power to govern the area.217 The Court now dis-
210. See, e.g., Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 630-31 (1970) ("The Indian Nations
did not seek out the United States and agree upon an exchange of lands in an arm's-length
transaction. Rather, treaties were imposed upon them and they had no choice but to consent."); Jones
v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 11 (1899):
[Tihe negotiations for the treaty are conducted, on the part of the United States, an
enlightened and powerful nation, by representatives skilled in diplomacy, masters of a
written language, understanding the modes and forms of creating the various technical
estates known to their law... [and] that the Indians, on the other hand, are a weak and
dependent people, who have no written language.., and whose only knowledge of the
terms in which the treaty is framed is that imparted to them by the interpreter employed by
the United States ....
211. See, e.g., Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985); Bryan v. Itasca
County, 426 U.S. 373, 392 (1976); McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 174 (1973);
Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 675 (1912).
212. See, e.g., County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 247 (1985) (canons
"are rooted in the unique trust relationship between the United States and the Indians"); Carpenter v.
Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930) ("Doubtful expressions are to be resolved in favor of the weak and
defenseless people who are the wards of the nation, dependent upon its protection and good faith.").
213. See Lone Wolf v. I-itchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903) ("Plenary authority over the tribal
relations of the Indians has been exercised by Congress from the beginning, and the power has
always been deemed a political one, not subject to be controlled by the judicial department of the
government."); see also supra note 45 and accompanying text.
214. See, e.g., United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738 (1986).
215. Id; see also Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 412-13 (1968)
(holding that the intention to abrogate or modify a treaty should not be 'lightly imputed" to the
Congress); United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R., 314 U.S. 339, 353-54 (1941) (requiring clear
congressional intent to abrogate Indian title to ancestral lands); cf. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 221
(1958) (requiring clear statement of congressional intent to allow state civil or criminal jurisdiction
over non-Indian reservation activity).
216. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993); see also Lauren Natasha Soll, The
Only Good Indian Reservation Is a Diminished Reservation? The New and Diluted Canons of
Construction in Indian Law, 41 FED. B. NEws & 1 544 (1994).
217. See Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 505 (1973) (ruling that congressional intent to terminate
the existence of a reservation must "be expressed on the face of the Act or be clear from the
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misses the canons by declaring that no true ambiguity exists. For in-
stance, Hagen v. Utah2" held that the Ute Indian reservation had been
extinguished by statutes that opened some of it up to allotment. Hagen
involved a 1902 Act that required tribal consent before allotments could
be made, with the unallotted land to "be restored to the public do-
main.2 9 When consent was not forthcoming, Congress passed another
Act in 1905 allowing allotments to be made without it. This later Act
also eliminated the language restoring unallotted lands to the public
domain.
The Hagen Court held that the vague phrase in the first Act about
restoration to the public domain expressed congressional intent to dis-
establish the reservation." Next, it found that the 1905 Act not only
effectuated allotment without Indian consent, but it also meant to restore
unalloted lands to the public domain, a matter on which it was silent.22'
After drawing these inferences-that restoration was tantamount to dis-
establishment and that the 1905 Act also removed the requirement of
Indian consent to restoration-the Court found there was insufficient
ambiguity to warrant applying the canons of construction.222 Thus, the
Utes' reservation was extinguished.
2. Nineteenth-Century Allotment Policy as the Touchstone for
Congressional Intent
In many of its recent cases, the Court has used the short-lived al-
lotment policy as the touchstone for deciding how much governmental
authority the tribes should exercise.' The idea of carving up tribal
lands into parcels owned by individual Indians originated in treaties. 224
It became government policy in the late nineteenth century, when as-
similationist fervor and non-Indian hunger for reservation lands reached
surrounding circumstances and legislative history"); see also DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420
U.S. 425, 444 (1975).
218. 510 U.S. 399 (1994).
219. Hagen, 510 U.S. at 403-04.
220. The majority read past cases as requiring a finding of diminishment wherever there is
restoration language in subsequent legislation. Id. at 411-12. The dissent challenged the majority's
interpretation of precedent. Id. at 428-29 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
221. The Hagen dissent emphasized that Congress considered and rejected a proposal to include
language in the subsequent act restoring the land to the public domain. Id. at 438-39. This and other
criticisms of the Court's analysis are discussed in Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27
ARiz. ST. L.J. 1 (1995).
222. Hagen, 510 U.S. at 420-21. Other courts grappling with the meaning of the two statutes
found the issue less clear-cut. See, e.g., Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Co. v. Yazzie, 909 F.2d
1387 (10th Cir. 1990); Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 773 F.2d 1087 (10th Cir. 1985); State v. Perank, 858
P.2d 927 (Utah 1992).
223. In a thorough study of the Court's treatment of the allotment policy, Professor Royster
argues that "[o]ver the last two decades, under the activating hand of the Supreme Court, the policy
has sprung back to life." Royster, supra note 221, at 20.
224. See CoHtoN (1982), supra note 2, at 127-38.
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a crescendo. Allotment would enable the government to inculcate in
Indians the "habits of industry and civilization" that grow out of own-
ing private property and pursuing the Jeffersonian ideal of the yeoman
farmer. It would also free up tribal lands not allotted to individual
Indians for white settlement, and remove control of land from tribal
governments that were considered subversive of progressive government
policies. 25 Part of the plan was to introduce non-Indians to the reserva-
tions, where they would serve as examples, inspiring the Indians to pro-
gress along the path to civilization. Within a generation or two the tribes
would fade, the reservations would vanish, and Indians would be assimi-
lated into the larger community.226
The policy failed. Indians did not reject their cultural roots, even
as many became landowners. The tribes struggled but survived, and
reservations remained, albeit with large numbers of non-Indian occu-
pants.227 These new arrivals had taken up homesteads on the surplus
lands or had purchased parcels from. Indian allottees. The announced
goals of the Allotment Act were not realized, but an enormous amount
of land passed into non-Indian hands.228
Congress expressly repudiated the allotment policy in 1934. The
Indian Reorganization Act,' 9 which aimed at restoring autochthonous
governing powers, outlawed further allotments and reinforced federal
trust protection of reservation lands.?0 For at least twenty years now,
federal policy as expressed in congressional legislation and executive
actions has been to support tribal self-determination. 2 1 Although the
Court has acknowledged this new policy, 232 the Justices increasingly cite
allotment-era policies in cases involving tribal sovereignty. Such cases
have involved reservation diminishment, the scope of tribal authority in
Indian country, and reservation Indians' immunity from state laws. The
Hagen case discussed in the preceding subsection illustrates this phe-
nomenon in a diminishment context.
In Montana v. United States, the Court took pains to effectuate
what it thought Congress had envisioned for tribal jurisdiction over the
225. See DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY, supra note 19, at 123-35.
226. See Readjustment of Indian Affairs: Hearings on H.R. 7902 Before the House Comm. on
Indian Affairs, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 428-89 (report of Delos S. Otis on the history of the allotment
policy); see also supra text accompanying note 43.
227. See STEPHEN CORNELL, THE RETURN OF THE NATIVE 80-82 (1988).
228. See supra text accompanying note 42.
229. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1994).
230. See generally Comment, Tribal Self-Government and the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934,
70 MICH. L. REV. 955 (1972).
231. See, e.g., Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, 25 U.S.C. §
450; Indian Financing Act of 1974, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1454; see also supra text accompanying notes
77-85.
232. See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 217 (1987); New Mexico
v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 334-35 (1983).
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reservations when it passed the Allotment Acts. Going deep into the
legislative history, Justice Stewart's majority opinion gave currency to
the goal of "eventual assimilation of the Indian population." 3  He
cited nineteenth-century reports, cases, and legislative history 1 4 to show
that it would go against the contemporary federal policy to allow the
Crow Tribe to control hunting and fishing on non-Indian lands within
their reservation:
[T]he allotment policy was designed to eventually eliminate
tribal relations .... [T]he "civilization" of the Indian popula-
tion was to be accomplished, in part, by the dissolution of tribal
relations ....
There is simply no suggestion in the legislative history that
Congress intended that the non-Indians who would settle upon
alienated allotted lands would be subject to tribal regulatory
authority. 35
Just thirteen years earlier, in Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United
States,"3 6 the Court had specifically rejected using implications drawn
from repudiated legislation as "a backhanded way of abrogating the
hunting and fishing rights of ... Indians."'37 Although the entire
Menominee Reservation had been abolished under the Termination Act
of 1954,28 the Court held that Indian hunting and fishing rights were
preserved on former reservation lands by an 1854 treaty.2 39 The Court
applied an established principle of Indian law that "the intention to ab-
rogate or modify a treaty is not to be lightly imputed to the
Congress."2' Justice Stewart dissented in Menominee, arguing that the
Termination Act implicitly abrogated treaty rights.24" ' He did not even
cite the case in his majority opinion in Montana.
In Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian
Nation,2 the opinions of Justices White and Stevens also breathed new
life into the Allotment Act. White cited Montana as controlling, quoting
233. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 559 n.9 (1981).
234. The Court's use of history has been aptly criticized elsewhere. See, e.g., Robert N. Clinton,
The Curse of Relevance: An Essay on the Relationship of Historical Research to Federal Indian
Litigation, 28 AsIz. L REv. 29 (1986).
235. Montana, 450 U.S. at 560 n.9.
236. 391 U.S. 404 (1968).
237. Id. at 412.
238. 25 U.S.C. §§ 891-902 (repealed 1973).
239. The 1854 Treaty of Wolf River did not expressly establish those rights; it stated only that the
lands were "to be held as Indian lands are held." Menominee, 391 U.S. at 405-06. That the Indians
had a "way of life which included hunting and fishing" was enough for the Court to infer that the
Indians' rights were undiminished by the treaty. Id.
240. Id. at 413 (quoting Pigeon River Improvement, Slide & Boom Co. v. Charles W. Cox, Ltd.,
291 U.S. 138, 160 (1934)).
241. Id. at 416 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
242. 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
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the proposition that "[ilt defies common sense to suppose that Congress
would intend that non-Indians purchasing allotted lands would become
subject to tribal jurisdiction when an avowed purpose of the allotment
policy was the ultimate destruction of tribal government." '243 In a sepa-
rate opinion, Stevens wrote that the Allotment Act "to some extent re-
worked fundamental notions of Indian sovereignty."'2' He found that
the tribe's authority over the reservation was abrogated because it was
"improbable that Congress envisioned that the Tribe would retain its
interest in regulating the use of vast ranges of land sold in fee to non-
members who lack any voice in setting tribal policy. ' '"45 Though White
and Stevens disagreed on the Allotment Act's effect in Brendale, both
considered it the Court's mission to realize the goals of that congres-
sionally rejected century-old policy.
The allotment policy was reinvigorated to extend state power over
Indians in County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the
Yakima Indian Nation.246 Although Congress had allowed only a narrow
class of allotments to be taxed, the Court held that all Indian-owned al-
lotments in fee on the reservation were subject to state taxation.247 The
state's taxing authority was expressly limited to allotments patented in
fee to Indians found "competent and capable" under section 6 of the
Act.24 The Act said nothing about whether allotments routinely pat-
ented in fee to Indians at the expiration of a statutory trust period under
section 5 were also taxable. The Court read the limited consent to taxa-
tion broadly so as to implement the general assimilationist purpose of
the Allotment Act.
In the 1976 case of Bryan v. Itasca County,249 the Court rejected the
present compulsion to resuscitate the old policy of allotment, holding
that "courts 'are not obliged in ambiguous instances to strain to im-
plement [an assimilationist] policy Congress has now rejected, particu-
larly where to do so will interfere with the present congressional
approach to what is, after all, an ongoing relationship."' 0  In Bryan,
the Court narrowly read a statute allowing certain states to assert civil
jurisdiction in Indian country. It moderated the clearly assimilationist
243. Id. at 423 (citing Montana, 450 U.S. at 559-60 n.9).
244. Id. at 436; see also supra notes 193-194.
245. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 437. However, Stevens also found it "inconceivable that Congress
would have intended that the sale of a few lots would divest the Tribe of the power to determine the
character of the tribal community." Id.
246. 502 U.S. 251 (1992).
247. See id. at 266-69.
248. Id. at 258 n.1.
249. 426 U.S. 373 (1976).




purpose of the statute with the self-determination goals of an amend-
ment that was not directly involved in the case."
Courts are not, of course, so bound by today's self-determination
policy that they can ignore the words of an assimilationist statute still on
the books. But when the statute is not dispositive because it fails to ad-
dress the situation in question, as in Yakima, the Court should look to
the larger context of federal law to define concepts like tribal sover-
eignty, Indian immunity, and the trust relationship. It is inappropriate
for the Court to animate a rejected policy, simply because the case may
involve one or more provisions passed in the former era. Yet that is
what the Court has been doing, filling gaps in legislation and construing
tribal sovereign powers in accordance with allotment-era goals merely
because some or all of a reservation has been allotted.
3. Fabrication of a "Balancing of Interests" Test
Some scholars have tried to synthesize the Court's recent Indian
law jurisprudence into a test that "balances" the interests of state, fed-
eral, and tribal governments." Indeed, a few of the Court's most recent
decisions explicitly refer to an interest-balancing approach, citing the
McClanahan line of cases. 3 At best, this reflects a misunderstanding of
the cases cited. At worst, it is disingenuous. The established role of
Indian law preemption analysis is not to collect ingredients for ad hoc
judicial balancing, but to ensure that interpretations of congressional
intent comport with a legal tradition that perpetuates tribal self-
government.
The confusion about balancing interests traces back to Justice
Marshall's opinion for the Court in McClanahan. In the decision,
which barred states from taxing the income of reservation Indians,
Marshall summarized Supreme Court jurisprudence, recognizing that it
had modified the absolute bar on state authority in Indian country only
to the extent necessary "to take account of the State's legitimate
interests in regulating the affairs of non-Indians."' He cited Williams
251. See id. at 386-87. The amendment, in Tide IV of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25
U.S.C. §§ 1301-1341, required that tribes consent to any additional extensions of state jurisdiction
over Indian country under Public Law 280.
252. See, e.g., Jordan Burch, How Much Diversity Is the United States Really Willing to Accept?,
20 OHio N.U. L REv. 957, 964-69 (1994); William W. Fisher, III, The Jurisprudence of Justice
Marshall, 6 HARV. BLAcKLETrER J. 131, 136-37 (1989); Judith V. Royster & Rory SnowArrow
Fausett, Control of the Reservation Environment: Tribal Primacy, Federal Delegation, and the Limits
of State Intrusion, 64 WASH. L REV. 581, 649-57 (1989).
253. See, e.g., Department of Taxation & F'm. v. Milhelm Attea & Bros, 114 S. Ct. 2028, 2035
(1994); County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251,
257 (1992).
254. McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 171.
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v. Lee,"5 which prevented a state court from hearing a non-Indian's
action to collect a debt incurred by a tribal member on the reservation.
There, the Court asked "whether the state action infringed on the right
of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them.
''256
In both McClanahan and Williams, the state had an "interest" in
asserting its jurisdiction. However, Marshall explained that because
tribal governance of Indian conduct or property was affected, applica-
tion of state law interfered with tribal self-government and the state's
interests-vigorously asserted in McClanahan-would not be consid-
ered. 5s McClanahan made clear that state interests would only be a
factor in determining whether Congress intended to preempt state law in
cases involving non-Indians."5 Marshall never said that weighing or
balancing state interests against tribal interests was appropriate, nor did
he suggest even a consideration of state interests in cases involving
Indians and their property. His dictum was simply that the cases
allowing state jurisdiction can be explained as ones in which state
interests in controlling non-Indian conduct or property were so great
that the usual presumption of preemption of state law in Indian country
could be overcome "up to the point where tribal self-government would
be affected. '' 259
In White Mountain, Justice Marshall's majority opinion blurred
McClanahan's mention of interests, generalizing that cases involving
non-Indians call for "a particularized inquiry into the nature of state,
federal, and tribal interests at stake, an inquiry designed to determine
whether, in the specific context, the exercise of state authority would
violate federal law."2" This statement of the test may have been an at-
255. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
256. McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 172 (quoting Williams, 358 U.S. at 220).
257. Id. at 180-81.
258. "It must be remembered that cases applying the Williams test have dealt principally with
situations involving non-Indians. In these situations, both the tribe and the State could fairly claim an
interest in asserting their respective jurisdictions. The Williams test was designed to resolve this
conflict by providing that the State could protect its interest up to the point where tribal self-
government would be affected." Id. at 179 (citations omitted).
The cases relied on in Williams and McClanahan only support consideration of non-Indian
interests in situations that do not involve Indian conduct. The cases allow: (1) a State to try a non-
Indian for murdering another non-Indian on a reservation, see New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin, 326
U.S. 496 (1946); Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240 (1896); United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S.
621 (1881); (2) Indians to sue non-Indians in state court, see United States v. Candelaria, 271 U.S.
432 (1926); Felix v. Patrick, 145 U.S. 317 (1892); and (3) a State to tax non-Indian property on a
reservation, see Utah & N. Ry. v. Fisher, 116 U.S. 28 (1885). See also McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 171;
Williams, 358 U.S. at 219-20. An example of state court jurisdiction over non-Indians that Williams
and McClanahan overlooked is state service of process to non-Indians in Indian country. See
Langford v. Monteith, 102 U.S. 145 (1880); see also supra text accompanying note 66.
259. McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 179.
260. White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 145.
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tempt to win over members of the Court who wanted greater freedom to
shape outcomes.
Perhaps Marshall should have anticipated that in the hands of oth-
ers, his device for statutory interpretation would become a judicial
"balancing of interests" test. Several members of the Court have ex-
pressed uneasiness with "Indian rights" and seem to favor assimilating
tribes into the mainstream. 261  These Justices have used White
Mountain's "particularized inquiry" to balance interests and reach
outcomes consistent with their own notions of how much tribal
autonomy there ought to be.262
The idea that White Mountain invites interest balancing appears in
Justice Stewart's dissent in Central Machinery, which was joined by
Powell, Stevens, and Rehnquist. Stewart criticized the majority for not
following the "settled teaching of the Court's [Indian law] deci-
sions ... that every relevant state interest is to be given weight. '263 He
insisted that "limits inherent in the principles of federal pre-
emption... [necessitate] a careful inquiry into pertinent federal, tribal,
and state interests, without which a rational accommodation of those in-
terests is not possible.
''2
1
This point of view was elevated to doctrine in 1994 in Department
of Taxation & Finance v. Milhelm Attea & Bros. 265 That decision repre-
sents the first time the Court expressly resolved a case through interest
balancing. Milhelm allowed New York to tax purchases of cigarettes by
tribal retailers that exceeded the state's estimate of reservation Indians'
own "probable demand" for cigarettes. New York's scheme was a re-
sponse to the state's continuing difficulties in enforcing its tax on reser-
vation cigarette sales to non-Indians. Some Indian smokeshops
continued to thrive in New York and elsewhere, largely because state
taxes were not collected. Moe and Colville allowed states to require
Indian sellers to collect the taxes and report sales according to the race
and tribal affiliation of purchasers.266 However, in 1991, the Supreme
261. See, e.g., Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 455 (1988);
Oregon Dep't of Fish & Wildlife v. Klamath Indian Tribe, 473 U.S. 753, 774 (1985); Washington v.
Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 699 n.3 (1979); see also
supra text accompanying note 187 (discussing Brendale).
262. In White Mountain, Justice Stevens considered the financial burden imposed on the Indians
by state taxation of tribal contractors and concluded that "these relatively trivial taxes" were
"unlikely to have a serious adverse impact on the tribal business." 448 U.S. at 159 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). The Colville majority took a similar approach, relying on a finding that retail sales of
cigarettes to outsiders are not "activities in which the Tribes have a significant interest." 447 U.S. at
155.
263. Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 448 U.S. 160, 170 (1980) (Stewart,
J., dissenting).
264. Id.
265. 114 S.Ct. 2028 (1994).
266. See supra notes 120, 126.
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Court clarified that a state could not proceed by suing tribes for
damages because Indian tribes were immune from suit.26 7  Instead, the
Court suggested other means by which the tax might be collected: the
state could sue individual tribal officers, shipments of untaxed cigarettes
might be seized en route to the reservation, or taxes might be assessed
directly against wholesalers who sell to reservation dealers.2 61 The Court
also noted that states could negotiate cooperative tax collection
agreements with tribes. 9  It concluded by pointing out that if states
"find that none of these alternatives produce the revenues to which they
are entitled, they may of course seek appropriate legislation from
Congress.""
These options did not satisfy the states. Rather than seek redress
from Congress, they began to pursue collection methods that involved
more extensive assertions of jurisdiction in Indian country. New York's
scheme was the most aggressive. By imposing quotas on every sale and
delivery of untaxed goods shipped to the reservation based on the
state's determination of the "probable demand" for cigarettes by
Indians, it could effectively control tribal trade. Yet the Supreme Court
reversed a New York Court of Appeals decision that found that the
scheme conflicted with the federal trader statutes.
The Court invoked no principle for its extension of state jurisdic-
tion over reservation Indians in Milhelm.7 It simply stated that the
267. See Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 509-
514 (1991).
268. Id. at 514. If the particular tribe exercised civil jurisdiction over such matters, suits against
individual officers would have to be litigated in tribal courts. See National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v.
Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 857 (1985).
269. The Supreme Court has suggested that state tax collection agreements with tribes are
permitted under 25 U.S.C. § 476. Potawatomi, 498 U.S. at 514. Agreements between tribes and states
could be made on a number of subjects. See James A. Casey, Note, Sovereignty by Sufferance: The
Illusion of Indian Tribal Sovereignty, 79 CORNELL L REv. 404, 447 (1994).
270. Potawatomi, 498 U.S. at 514.
271. See Joanne Furio, Shinnecocks Face Tax on Cigarettes, N.Y. TIMES, March 5, 1989, § 12LI,
at 11. Collecting the sales tax in advance from the wholesalers would simply cause the tribe to buy
from out-of-state wholesalers beyond the reach of the state's taxing authority. Imposing the tax on all
sales made by in-state wholesalers would lead out-of-state retailers to buy cigarettes from untaxed
wholesalers in other states. Seizing untaxed cigarettes en route to the reservation is problematic
because some of the cigarettes may be destined for non-taxable sales to Indians. Seizures from non-
Indian purchasers leaving the reservation would be costly and politically unpopular.
272. Department of Taxation & Fin. v. Milhelm Attea & Bros, 114 S. Ct. 2028, 2033 (1994).
273. The Court opined that Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 380 U.S.
685 (1965), considered to be the bedrock case of the modem era in Indian law, had been
"undermined" by recent decisions. 114 S.Ct. at 2034 (citing Central Machinery, 448 U.S. at 172
(Powell, J., dissenting)). The Central Machinery decision actually reaffirmed Warren Trading Post,
strongly proclaiming that Congress had so fully regulated Indian trading that there was no room for
state regulation of reservation sales to Indians. The Powell dissent to which Milhelm referred argued
that Warren had been undermined by Moe and Colville, both of which allowed states to require
Indian retailers to collect taxes on sales to non-Indians. Moe and Colville, to be sure, are a departure
from the previously established principle that any burden on licensed Indian traders not authorized by
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"'balance of state, federal, and tribal interests' in this area thus leaves
more room for state regulation than in others."'274 The decision effec-
tively sanctioned state regulation of commerce with Indian tribes, a
matter historically and constitutionally reserved to Congress.275
In 1995, the Court went even further. Il Oklahoma Tax
Commission v. Chickasaw Nation,27 the Court characterized its approach
to state regulation of Indian activities in Indian country as "balancing
interests." Never before had the Court allowed consideration of state
interests-and certainly not a balancing of interests-in a case involving
Indian activity on the reservation."' Balancing social values and
political effects on Indians and non-Indians to reach an "acceptable"
result may indeed be what has influenced many Justices to vote as they
have, as I posit in this Article. It is not, however, what the opinions have
proclaimed. Now the Court seems ready to institutionalize a subjective
approach by explicitly adopting a balancing test. Some Justices are
even willing to balance interests in situations where state jurisdiction
should simply be out of the question, such as the regulation of Indians
in Indian country.
III
A NEW SUPREME COURT AND THE FUTURE OF INDIAN LAW
During their time on the Court, Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Blackmun were generally loyal to the tradition of respecting tribal rights
and sovereignty as subject only to congressional modification."8
Justices Marshall and Brennan wrote a disproportionately large number
of the key Indian decisions of the modem era, including about a third
of all Indian decisions between 1973 and 1983.279 Justice Blackmun
usually joined with Marshall and Brennan on sovereignty-related
Congress is prohibited. However, at least the imposition on Indians in those cases could be
rationalized as a "minimal burden." See Moe, 425 U.S. at 483.
Milhelm's departure from Warren Trading Post is much more substantial. The majority also
sought the support of Moe and Colville, but this time the Court recast Colville as authorizing a
"comprehensive ... enforcement scheme that required tribal retailers... to keep extensive records."
Milhelm, 114 S. Ct. at 2034-35. Milhelm represented the two cases as legitimizing a far more
intrusive regulation than the "minimal burden" first contemplated in Moe.
274. Milhelm, 114 S. Ct. at 2035-36 (quoting Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 720 (1983)).
275. See Warren Trading Post, 380 U.S. at 686.
276. 115 S. Ct 2214 (1995).
277. See id. at 2220 (citing Cabazon, 480 U.S. 202, 216-17 (1987); Moe, 425 U.S. 463, 483
(1976)).
278. All three have on occasion voted to deny tribal sovereignty: Blackmun joined majorities in
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 192 (1978), and Colville, 447 U.S. at 137; Brennan,
Blackmun, and Marshall all joined Justice Rehnquist's unanimous opinion for the court in Moe, 425
U.S. at 465.
279. Marshall wrote ten and Brennan wrote seven of the Court's 47 Indian law opinions from
that period.
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cases."' Blackmun, however, wrote very few Indian law opinions in his
twenty-four year career"' and voted with the majority in Duro to deny
tribal jurisdiction over non-members. Then, upon the departure of his
foundationalist colleagues, he became a frequent dissenter against the
emerging subjectivist trend, writing strong opinions in cases where the
majority ignored foundation principles.2 2
Now that Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun have all left the Court,
only Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Stevens have demonstrated any
serious interest in Indian cases. Neither adheres to the traditional view
that the judiciary should leave modifications of tribal sovereignty to
Congress. Indeed, both have taken a subjectivist approach, rolling back
Indian sovereignty if they believe it portends cultural conflict.
Four other Justices gravitate to a "sensible" outcome that dimin-
ishes tribal sovereignty whenever non-Indian activities, social values, or
property interests are sufficiently impacted. These Justices vary in the
degree of cultural abrasion they will tolerate, but all are content to recite
subjectivist grounds for their decisions, showing no allegiance to foun-
dation principles. Three of the four newest Justices have not clearly re-
vealed their direction in Indian cases. None appears particularly
committed to or interested in articulating a coherent doctrine in the
field, though each has the potential to take a leadership role. One or
more of the new Justices-or future appointees-could steer doctrine
back on track using foundation principles by taking responsibility, as
Justice Thurgood Marshall did, for writing a large number of opinions
based on consistent principles whenever a majority supports the out-
come.
A review of the record of individual Justices on the current Court is
useful in assessing the prospects of a revival of foundation principles in
Indian law.
280. Blackmun disagreed with Marshall in several Indian cases. See, e.g., Colville, 447 U.S. at
134; Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game, 433 U.S. 165 (1977); Rosebud Sioux Tribe v.
Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977); Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800
(1976); DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975).
Blackmun also disagreed with Brennan in several cases. See e.g., Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676
(1990); Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng'g, 476 U.S. 877 (1986); South Carolina v. Catawba
Indian Tribe, Inc., 476 U.S. 498 (1986); Oregon Dept. of Fish & Wildlife v. Klamath Indian Tribe,
473 U.S. 753 (1985); Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S.
463 (1979); DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 425; Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973).
281. Justice Blackmun wrote five majority opinions, eight dissents, and five concurrences. His
most important dissents were County of Yakima v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of Yakima Indian
Nation, 502 U.S. 251 (1992), Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989), and Rice
v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713 (1983). His most important majority opinions were United States v. John, 437
U.S. 634 (1978), Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974), and Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974).
282. See, e.g., Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 422-42 (1994); South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S.
679, 698-704 (1993); County of Yakima, 502 U.S. at 270-278. But see Department of Taxation & Fm.
v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., 114 S. Ct. 2028 (1994) (joining a unanimous Court).
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A. The Justices
1. Chief Justice Rehnquist
Of all the sitting Justices, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist has
had the greatest influence on Indian law. His impact is more profound
than even his seniority on the Court would suggest.183 In 1974, two
years after he was appointed to the Court, Justice Rehnquist began tak-
ing an active role in Indian cases, writing eight majority opinions and
four dissents in the following eight years. Although some attribute his
presence in the field in those years to his relatively junior status and a
fabled unpopularity of Indian cases among the Court's members,M  the
degree of vigor with which he has asserted his views in Indian law belies
a perfunctory or obligatory exercise. His spirited opinions arguing for
an historical review of facts to guide construction of Indian statutes have
283. See generally Ralph W. Johnson & Berrie Martinis, Chief Justice Rehnquist and the Indian
Cases, 16 PUB. LAND L. REV. 1, 24 (1995) ("Rehnquist's ideas about Indian law, coupled with his
position as Chief Justice, have had grave implications for Indian sovereignty and welfare....
Rehnquist is advocating and implementing a judicial termination policy.").
284. Woodward and Armstrong believe that "Rehnquist had nothing but contempt for Indian
cases." BOB WOODWARD & Scorr ARMSTRONG, Tim BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT
412 (1979). They surmise that, as a westerner, he was naturally viewed by the others as a logical
replacement for William 0. Douglas, the Court's in-house Indian law expert. They accurately noted
that in Moe, he "turned an opinion that was in favor of the Indians into an opinion that indicated that
in most cases they would lose." Id.
Woodward and Armstrong imply that Douglas was friendlier to Indians, stating that Rehnquist's
opinion "wiped away decades of Douglas's opinions." Id. In reality, though, Douglas favored
Indians only when their interests overlapped with other, higher concerns of his such as civil rights.
He sharply curbed Indian rights, going against established doctrine, when he feared that tribal
sovereignty would clash with his preference for wildlife conservation. In Puyallup Tribe v.
Department of Game, 391 U.S. 392 (1968), he allowed Indian treaty fishing rights to be subjected to
state regulation when a state court decided its laws were "reasonable and necessary" for
conservation. Id. at 401. Earlier case law had protected treaty fishing from state control. One critic
of Douglas' extension of state jurisdiction declared that "[n]o valid basis for the existence of such
state power can be found." Ralph W. Johnson, The States Versus Indian Off-Reservation Fishing: A
United States Supreme Court Error, 47 WASH. L REV. 207, 208 (1972).
Although Douglas wrote some opinions that favored tribal sovereignty (e.g., his dissent in
Mescalero), nothing in his jurisprudence suggests a pro-Indian bias. He initially voted to deny tribes
power to regulate reservation liquor licensing in Mazurie, only later reluctantly joining in Rehnquist's
opinion favoring the tribe. See Memorandum from Justice William 0. Douglas to Justice William H.
Rehnquist (Dec. 21, 1974) (United States v. Mazurie, No. 73-1018), in Marshall Papers, supra note 4.
Furthermore, his privately expressed views suggest some discomfort with Indian sovereignty. After
seeing Marshall's draft opinion in McClanahan, Douglas implored his colleague to remove part of the
basic discussion of tribal powers, now found in 411 U.S. at 171-73, "because the word 'Indian' is an
elusive term .... In my State a person is a Yakima Indian if he has 1/64 [degree Indian blood], and
most of the tribe now have blue eyes and golden hair." Memorandum from Justice William 0.
Douglas to Justice Thurgood Marshall (Feb. 7, 1973) (McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, No. 71-
834), in Marshall Papers, supra note 4.
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been especially significant. Such opinions include Oliphant"' and his
dissents in Central Machinery. 6 and Ramah.8"
Rehnquist designed a kind of subjectivism not embraced by other
Justices in their opinions. His theory was based on a unique view of
how to apply McClanahan's preemption test. Justice Marshall estab-
lished in that case that the "Indian sovereignty doctrine" remained the
"backdrop" in analyzing whether Indian treaties and federal statutes
preempted state law.218  Rehnquist first laid out his own version of this
"tradition of sovereignty" in a separate opinion in Colville."9
In Colville, Rehnquist maintained that if the Court would simply
look to historical perceptions of taxing power on reservations there
would be "no need ... to balance the state and tribal interests in enact-
ing particular forms of taxation in order to determine their validity. 290
He urged that early notions of tribal powers and immunities as reflected
in historical records, generally reporting the perceptions of non-Indians,
should determine the outcomes. Thus, unless a review of historical in-
formation showed actual tribal exercise of the specific type of jurisdic-
tion, Rehnquist would require an act of Congress to preempt state law.
In a situation like Colville, "[w]hen tradition did not recognize a sover-
eign immunity in favor of the Indians, this Court [sh]ould recognize
one only if Congress expressly conferred one."291 Requiring that stat-
285. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
286. Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 448 U.S. 160, 166-70 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
287. Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832, 847-57 (1982)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
288. McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 172.
289. In earlier cases Rehnquist used a preemption analysis essentially like Marshall's in
McClanahan. His unanimous opinion in Moe, 425 U.S. 463 (1976), had upheld immunity of Indians
from state tobacco taxes but allowed the state to tax reservation sales to non-Indians. Furthermore,
the first Indian opinion he authored, United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975), was a
straightforward statement of preemption doctrine that acknowledged the propriety of federal
delegation of liquor licensing authority to tribes, even over non-Indians, in part because "Indian tribes
are unique aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their
territory." Id. at 557. He did not seem in doubt about what Marshall and the Court meant in
McClanahan. This may be explained by the fact that McClanahan was Rehnquist's introduction to
Indian law as a new Justice on the Court.
in the 1977 Term, Justice Rehnquist starting using historical events and non-Indian perceptions as
determinants of the boundaries of tribal sovereignty. His opinion in Oliphant relied primarily upon a
"commonly shared presumption" of government entities, 435 U.S. at 206, and that it would be
"inconsistent with their status for tribes to exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians." Id. at 208.
Then, in Colville, Rehnquist tried his novel interpretation of the tradition of sovereignty. 447 U.S. at
134.
290. 443 U.S. at 177.
291. Id. at 179 (emphasis in original). As discussed supra note 143 and accompanying text,
Rehnquist's separate opinion in Colville was originally written as a dissent from Justice Brennan's
draft majority opinion favoring broad tribal tax immunity. See First Draft Colville Opinion, supra note
127. Rehnquist reworked his old dissenting opinion to challenge Justice White's majority opinion
(whose result he accepted) for its failure to apply his idiosyncratic view of the tradition-of-
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utes and treaties expressly rebut limitations on tribal sovereignty implied
from historical practice and perceptions would, in his view, eliminate the
need for considering various governmental interests, making matters
simpler.292
Searching for historical evidence of limits on Indian sovereignty to
chart the contours of modem Indian sovereignty was, in essence, the
way the Court reached its result in Oliphant. Rehnquist, the author of
Oliphant, did not cite it in his Colville concurrence. But both opinions
indulged in a search for historical indicators as to how Indian sover-
eignty should be treated, rather than a search for congressional limita-
tions. In Oliphant, "shared assumptions" by government officials
about the nature of tribal powers provided a basis for finding an inher-
ent limitation on tribal powers that supposedly had existed ever since the
founding of the nation.
Now, Rehnquist appears to be content to join in subjectivist opin-
ions that balance interests. Since he became Chief Justice in 1986, he
has relied on Justices Stevens and O'Connor to write most Indian opin-
ions for the majority (four each). Rehnquist himself has only written
two majority opinions in the last ten years. 93 Rehnquist seems to have
given up on swaying others to his novel version of the preemption ap-
proach, and his dissents are fewer, as they are in all fields. Apparently
he is exercising the statesmanship he considers appropriate for a Chief
Justice. His greatest influence in future Indian cases will likely be
through the assignment of opinions to be written by Associate Justices.
2. Justice Stevens
Justice John Paul Stevens came on the Court in 1975. Before 1985,
he authored only three Indian law majority opinions, albeit important
ones. 294  Within the next ten years he wrote another seven majority
sovereignty component of the preemption analysis. Rehnquist found no "tradition" to support
immunity from state tax because an old case, Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264 (1898), allowed a state to
tax cattle grazed by a non-Indian on a reservation. Colville, 447 U.S. at 183-84.
292. Colville, 447 U.S. at 176. Notwithstanding his professed distaste for a "balancing"
approach, he joined a dissenting opinion in Central Machinery about two weeks after Colville,
insisting that the majority had not given enough weight to state interests in taxing a reservation
transaction as required by McClanahan and other cases. Central Machinery, 448 U.S. at 170.
293. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996); Oklahoma Tax Comm'n. v. Citizen
Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505 (1991). Seminole involved the tribal right to sue states
under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. Although it involved an Indian tribe and parsed an Indian
statute, the majority and two dissenting opinions were preoccupied with the broader constitutional
question of the circumstances under which Congress can legislate a waiver of a state's immunity
from suit.
294. Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658
(1979); Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game, 433 U.S. 165 (1977). The Marshall Papers
reveal that he was also the author of the per curiam opinion in Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382
(1976) (affirming tribal sovereignty over a child placement case). At that time, he had been seated
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opinions, exerting significant influence on the Court's current Indian
law jurisprudence. Stevens has put his own brand on Indian law, argu-
ing continually against the sovereignty and special status of tribal gov-
ernments.295 In a series of cases, Stevens and Rehnquist took turns
expressing their minority view that the preemption analysis should not
begin with a presumption in favor of preempting state law in Indian
country. Dissenting in White Mountain, Stevens cited the "general
rule" against finding preemption in state taxation cases,296 and in his
dissent in Merrion he expounded upon the limited power of Indian
tribes to enact legislation affecting non-members. 297  Though he was not
successful in swaying the majority to his view in cases involving only
Indians, in Cotton Petroleum he was able to espouse his view in a major-
ity opinion for a case involving non-Indians.29
More than any other member of the Court, Stevens has followed a
subjectivist approach to tribal jurisdiction questions, typified by his
opinions in Cotton Petroleum, Brendale,' Milhelm,r ° and several of his
dissents.30' His approach exemplifies what Justice Scalia meant when he
described the Court's Indian law jurisprudence as an attempt "to dis-
cern what the current state of affairs ought to be."302 He has no alle-
giance to the foundation principles drawn from two centuries of the
Court's Indian law decisions. Synthesized, those principles say that
tribes have sovereignty in Indian country except to the extent Congress,
by treaty or statute, modifies their powers or alters the tribe's relation-
on the Court for less than two months. Memorandum from Justice Thurgood Marshall to Justice John
Paul Stevens (Feb. 19, 1976) (Fisher v. District Court, No. 75-5366), in Marshall Papers, supra note 4.
During this same period Stevens wrote one concurrence, see Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544,
567 (1981), and four dissents, see County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226 (1985);
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker,
448 U.S. 136 (1980); Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73 (1977).
295. Professor Tsosie criticizes Stevens' "restrictive analysis of tribal sovereignty." Rebecca
Tsosie, Separate Sovereigns, Civil Rights, and the Sacred Text: The Legacy of Justice Thurgood
Marshall's Indian Law Jurisprudence, 26 Aiuz. ST. L.J. 495, 511-13 (1994).
296. White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 159.
297. Merrion, 455 U.S. at 159-90. In Ramah, he joined Rehnquist in deploring the majority's
result that accorded a tribe "greater tax immunity than it accorded... the United States." 458 U.S. at
847.
298. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 187 (1989).
299. 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
300. 512 U.S. 61(1994).
301. See Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989) (arguing that
parents domiciled on a reservation should be able to avail themselves of state adoption procedures);
California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987) (Indian-managed gambling
operations are subject to state law absent explicit evidence of congressional intent to exempt the
activity); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982) (tribal powers to tax non-members
on reservations are limited); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980) (state
taxes of activities by non-members on reservation are not preempted absent explicit congressional
intent to the contrary).
302. See Scalia Duro Memo, supra note 4.
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ship to the United States government. As discussed above,3° an ad hoc
judicial weighing of demographic facts to design an Indian policy each
time a case reaches the Court creates serious practical problems for
those who must execute and enforce the law. 304 No case better exempli-
fies this problem than the jurisdictional crazy-quilt created by Brendale
where Stevens' preferred result became the rule.
30 5
Justice Stevens' inclination toward subjectivism may be reconciled
with his approach to other legal issues. He reportedly sees the Court as
having a "broad mandate to promote freedom, equal opportu-
nity,. . . and to hold the government to a high standard of fairness in
dealing with citizens. 30 6 His concern with government accountability
and procedural fairness also explains almost all of those exceptional
cases in which his opinions are apparently sympathetic to the positions
of Indian litigants.3°
303. See supra text accompanying notes 186-188.
304. See supra text accompanying notes 189-192. But see Peter W. Sly, EPA and Indian
Reservations: Justice Stevens' Factual Approach, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,429 (Oct.
1990) (lauding Stevens' "new factual approach to Indian law and policy" as one "that better fits the
complex facts of Indian reservations than a uniform application of [other] doctrine").
305. See supra Part II.A.4.
306. Stuart Taylor, Jr., The Last Moderate, AM. LAW., June 1990, at 48, 52. He is reportedly so
independent in his approach as to be considered "idiosyncratic' BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE
UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF THE REHNQUIST COURT 12 (1996).
307. In cases where considerations of procedural fairness are involved, such as in the denial of
an opportunity to bring historic claims, Stevens favors giving tribes an opportunity to litigate. In
Delaware Tribal Business Committee v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73 (1977); Stevens' dissent expresses
concern about the injustice of excluding a portion of a tribe from the payment of a claims award
based on apparent drafting errors by Congress. Id. at 91 (Stevens, J., dissenting). An internal memo
called the exclusion of the Kansas Delawares "a manifest injustice." Memorandum from Justice
John Paul Stevens to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. (Jan. 6, 1976) (Delaware Tribal Bus. Comm. v.
Weeks, Nos. 75-1301, 75-1335, 75-1495), in Brennan Papers, supra note 127. See also Arizona v.
San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the McCarran
Amendment does not limit federal court jurisdiction over water rights adjudications); United States v.
Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206 (1983) (supporting right of Indian tribes to sue United States for breaches of
trust in managing forest resources); Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605 (1983) (supporting right of
Indian tribes to intervene in water rights case); United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371
(1980) (granting Congress the power to waive the res judicata effect of a prior judicial decision
rejecting the validity of a legal claim by the Sioux against the United States). He also dissented from
the Court's decision that Congress lacked power to waive state immunity from suit to allow tribal suits
challenging a state's lack of good faith in negotiating a compact under the Indian Gaming Regulatory
Act, but he treated the issue as essentially a non-Indian law question. See Seminole Tribe of Florida
v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1133 (1996).
With the exception of the procedural fairness cases, Stevens' votes in the 71 Indian law
decisions since he joined the Court are nearly identical to Chief Justice Rehnquist's. Stevens has
disagreed in one case, where he considered Rehnquist (and the majority) to be too generous in
recognizing tribal self-government. See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S.
202, 226 (1987). In only three of the non-procedural fairness cases did he take a more generous
position toward tribal self-government than Rehnquist. See Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw
Nation, 115 S. Ct. 2214 (1995) (joined dissent favoring state income tax exemption for tribal members
earning income from the tribe on the reservation); Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of
Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989) (voting for dividing reservation zoning jurisdiction
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Stevens' apparently benign approach, however, does not portend
results that are generally favorable to Indian rights and autonomy.
While the goals of equality and fairness may appear to be noble, they
can produce perverse results when the rights and prerogatives of Indian
tribes that are secured by treaties and legal traditions older than the na-
tion are examined. Freed of their historical inertia, these tribal rights
and immunities can appear to be "special" treatment, leading to at-
tempts to reorient them to the dominant society's current notion of
fairness as arbitrated by a majority of a particular Supreme Court. As
recent subjectivist opinions including Stevens' own amply demonstrate,
old Indian rights and tribal self-government itself can be viewed as
anomalous or inequitable when viewed without the full benefit of their
historical basis.
A major treaty fishing rights decision authored by Stevens,
Washington Fishing,38 was ostensibly a victory for the tribes. Although
it affirmed several tribes' rights to take up to half of the harvestable fish
in the streams draining into Washington's Puget Sound, Stevens actually
saw his opinion as curbing and modifying the rights announced by the
courts below. His goal was to broker among his colleagues a reasonably
fair result for both Indians and non-Indians. As the Supreme Court's
term was drawing to a close in June 1979, it appeared that the
Washington treaty fishing rights case was headed for reargument.
Members of a slim majority who had voted to affirm the lower court's
allocation of the right to take up to fifty percent of the fish available at
their usual and accustomed fishing places began wavering. They were
uncomfortable with both the practical implications of Indians taking so
many fish and the lack of a legal principle to support a "50-50"
allocation of fish. Some proposed that the Court hear reargument that
focused on whether the Court should overrule precedent that compelled
an allocation of the right to catch fish rather than the right of access to
the rivers, with no assurance of the right to catch fish."°
between the county and the tribe according to population distribution); Washington v. Washington
State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979) (Rehnquist dissents from
Stevens' approval of an equal sharing of fish between treaty tribes and non-Indians as discriminatory
against non-Indians).
308. 443 U.S. 658 (1979).
309. Justice White was troubled by the percentage division and was becoming persuaded by
Justice Powell's dissenting opinion, which argued, as the state had urged, that it was enough for the
tribes to have a right of equal access to their customary off-reservation fishing places and to be free
of state regulation as guaranteed in earlier decisions. White proposed reargument because Justice
Powell's position required partially overruling recent Supreme Court caselaw indicating that the
treaties also secured the tribes a portion of the fishery and not just a right of access. See Department
of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S. 44 (1973). Memorandum from Justice Byron R. White to Justice
John Paul Stevens (June 15, 1979) (Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing
Vessel Ass'n, Nos. 77-983, 78-119, 78-139), in Marshall Papers, supra note 4. When Chief Justice
Burger joined in that proposal, the five-member majority was in doubt. Memorandum from the Chief
1996] 1637
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84:1573
At this point, Stevens broke the impasse. He wrote lengthy internal
memoranda to persuade his fellow Justices that the lower court's alloca-
tion was essentially fair because it would be more limited in practice
than it appeared. Prior to the lower court decision, treaty Indians had
only been able to take a small fraction of the fish-not even enough for
subsistence.310 According to Stevens' calculations, the lower court's
ruling would actually provide tribes, even with large numbers of mem-
bers, with only "between 15 and 20%" of the fish, not fifty percent.3 1
His solution to the possibility that some Indians, especially in small
tribes, could use the percentage entitlement to get rich was to impose a
further restriction that "'reasonable livelihood needs'-rather than the
50% ceiling-should provide the primary standard for measuring the
Indians' share of the fish."3 2 In the third draft of his opinion, he
added language to stress that the right of tribes stopped when they
reached a "moderate" living standard, an idea not offered by any party
or suggested in any of the briefs. He also elaborated on the reduced
percentages of the fishery the tribes were likely to take, though the cal-
culations he added to the opinion to garner support had to be modified
Justice to the Conference (June 18, 1979) (Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger
Fishing Vessel Ass'n, Nos. 77-983, 78-119, 78-139) [hereinafter Burger Washington Fishing Memo to
the Conference] (mentioning that he "join[ed] Byron [White] in opting for a re-argument"), in
Marshall Papers, supra note 4.
Stevens argued that the Court should not propose reargument on whether to overrule Puyallup II
when none of the parties or amici had suggested it. Memorandum from Justice John Paul Stevens to
Justice Byron R. White (June 18, 1979) (Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger
Fishing Vessel Ass'n, Nos. 77-983, 78-119, 78-139) [hereinafter Stevens Washington Fishing Memo
to White], in Marshall Papers, supra note 4. Blackmun also weighed in against reargument.
Memorandum from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to the Conference (June 19, 1979) (Washington State
Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, Nos. 77-983, 78-119, 78-139), in Marshall Papers, supra
note 4. A few days later, after Stevens' compromise proposal described in the next paragraph of
text, Burger changed his mind on reargument, laying the matter to rest for lack of support.
Memorandum from the Chief Justice to the Conference (June 22, 1979) (Washington State
Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, Nos. 77-983, 78-119, 78-139), in Marshall Papers, supra
note 4.
310. Stevens was concerned that mere access to the fishery-the solution urged by the state and
accepted by Powell's dissent-would not meet the needs of the tribe. "[T]he Indians were catching
only about 2 to 3 1/2% of the [fish in] the runs whereas the District Court found that their subsistence
and ceremonial needs in later years required about 5%." Stevens Washington Fishing Memo to
White, supra note 309, at 1-2 (citations omitted).
311. See Memorandum from Justice John Paul Stevens to Justice Potter Stewart (June 1, 1979)
(Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, Nos. 77-983, 78-119,
and 78-139), in Marshall Papers, supra note 4. The calculation was based in part on Stevens'
speculation that the tribes were substantially certain not to prevail on their claim to a right to take a
share of hatchery-bred fish, as opposed to native stocks, thus reducing the fish available to them from
some runs by about half. Id. In fact, the tribes eventually won confirmation of their right to take a
share of hatchery-propagated fish. United States v. Washington, 759 F.2d 1353, 1360 (9th Cir. 1985).
312. Memorandum from Justice John Paul Stevens to the Conference (June 18, 1979)
(Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, Nos. 77-983, 78-119,
78-139) [hereinafter Stevens Washington Fishing Memo to the Conference], in Marshall Papers,
supra note 4.
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on a motion by the state which pointed out there was no evidence on the
record to support the figures. 13 Stevens' qualifcation, which Chief
Justice Burger characterized Stevens' approach as "an 'arbitration'
holding," enabled him to secure a majority vote.
314
Justice Stevens' lack of concern with tying decisions to established
principle is illustrated by Brendale, in which he states that reservation
zoning jurisdiction should depend on the degree of non-Indian pres-
ence in particular areas.315 His 1994 opinion in Milhelm exemplified his
continuing commitment to the subjectivist course.316 Without dissent,
Stevens relied explicitly on interest balancing to extend state jurisdiction
over reservation Indians, a first for the Supreme Court. When Justice
Stevens is assigned opinions in Indian jurisdiction cases, he can be ex-
pected to further the subjectivist approach and to draw the less-experi-
enced and less-interested members of the Court to his positions.
3. Justice O'Connor
Justice O'Connor remains somewhat independent on Indian issues,
as is true of her position in other fields .31  Her decision in Rice v.
Rehner"' suggests that she is not dedicated to foundation principles.
Indeed, Rice is the lone example of a majority opinion that expressly
accepts Rehnquist's idiosyncratic version of a "tradition of sover-
eignty. '  Six Justices joined in holding that California could impose
its liquor licensing laws on a federally licensed Indian trader operating a
store on the reservation. O'Connor began:
313. The Court granted the State's motion for modification of the opinion by changing footnote
16, which had been added by Stevens in the last days of the term to draw a majority vote.
Washington v. United States, 444 U.S. 816 (1979). An explanation concerning how, at most, "the
Indians' take would only amount to about 20%," see Stevens Washington Fishing Memo to the
Conference, supra note 312, was removed because it was not supported by the record. The footnote
now says only that a "factual dispute exists on the question of what percentage of the fish" are
subject to the Court's allocation on which the Supreme Court is "unable to express any view."
Washington Fishing, 443 U.S. at 671 n.16.
314. Burger Washington Fishing Memo to the Conference, supra note 309.
315. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 433-48
(1989); see supra Part II.A.4.
316. See Department of Taxation & Fin. v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., 114 S. Ct. 2028 (1994); supra
notes 265-275 and accompanying text.
317. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Is The Rehnquist Court Really That Conservative?: An Analysis of
the 1991-92 Term, 26 CREiGHTON L REV. 987, 987 (1993); Charles Jordan Tabb, The Bankruptcy
Reform Act in the Supreme Court, 49 U. PrrT. L REV. 477, 482 (1988) (noting "the growing
independence of Justice O'Connor from the conservative bloc of the Court").
318. 463 U.S. 713 (1983). One scholar writes that in Rice Justice O'Connor "severed the
Court's ties to the canon of inherent tribal sovereignty." Karl J. Kramer, Comment, The Most
Dangerous Branch: An Institutional Approach to Understanding the Role of the Judiciary in American
Indian Jurisdictional Determinations, 1986 Wis. L REV. 989, 1028.




We first determine the nature of the "backdrop" of tribal sover-
eignty that will inform our pre-emption analysis. The
"backdrop" in this case concerns the licensing and distribution
of alcoholic beverages, and we must determine whether there is a
tradition of tribal sovereign immunity that may be repealed only
by an explicit directive from Congress.320
She found that tribes historically had not engaged in liquor regula-
tion and therefore concluded that "there is no tradition of sovereign
immunity that favors the Indians in this respect."32' Justice Blackmun,
in a dissent joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, interpreted the
federal liquor law as clearly preempting the liquor laws of California
from applying directly to the Indian trader. Blackmun characterized
O'Connor's opinion as "argu[ing] to a result that it strongly feels is
desirable and good. But that, however strong the feelings may be, is
activism in which this Court should not indulge." '322
O'Connor also wrote an opinion, which was never issued, that
would have altered established Supreme Court Indian water rights doc-
trine and potentially undermined many tribal claims to water rights on
reservations. An eighty-year-old decision had held that water rights
were impliedly reserved whenever an Indian reservation was set up, in
order to provide for future needs of the tribes.323 Accordingly, the
Wyoming Supreme Court awarded the tribes of the Wind River
Reservation reserved water rights for projected future demands for
irrigating the "practicably irrigable acreage on the reservation,''324 a
formula approved by the United States Supreme Court in the famous
Arizona v. California litigation.3" The Wyoming decree included acre-
age to be irrigated by future water projects whose engineering and eco-
nomic feasibility had been demonstrated. 26 O'Connor disapproved of
this approach. Her draft opinion in Wyoming v. United States rejected
the Indians' rights to water for future projects, saying that greater
"pragmatism" was required out of "[slensitivity to the impact on [non-
320. Rice, 463 U.S. at 720 (emphasis added).
321. Id. at 725. O'Connor did not rely entirely on Rehnquist's history-based tradition of
sovereignty. She also considered the relative interests of the tribe and the State in regulating liquor
that were implicitly recognized by statute. Id. at 723-24. However, Congress did so in the context of
delegating to tribes the authority to lift a blanket prohibition on liquor sales on their reservations. Yet
she surmises that preemption of state law could not apply so long as a liquor transaction is "in
conformity both with the laws of the State... and with an ordinance duly adopted by the tribe having
jurisdiction over such area of Indian country." Id. at 716 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1161) (internal
quotations omitted).
322. Id. at 744.
323. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908).
324. In re Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River Sys., 753 P.2d 76, 101 (Wyo. 1988), aff'd
sub noa. Wyoming v. United States, 492 U.S. 406 (1989).
325. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
326. See Big Horn River Sys., 753 P.2d at 101-02.
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Indian] prior appropriators."32 7 A majority of the Court subscribed to
the opinion, reversing the lower court and curtailing the quantity of wa-
ter rights reserved to the Wind River Indian Reservation. O'Connor,
however, suddenly recused herself from the case the day before the
opinion was to be released, leaving the eight remaining members of the
Court equally divided. Consequently, the decision is simply reported as
an affirmance of the State court without opinion. 2
Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in Hagen v. Utah plumbed
nineteenth-century policies of allotment and assimilation to find that
arguably ambiguous statutes had terminated tribal jurisdiction over a
reservation in Utah.329 Yet only a year before, she had written for a
unanimous court in the Sac & Fox case that Indian country in
Oklahoma extended not only to reservation lands but also to allotments
327. Second Draft Opinion of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, Wyoming v. United States, No. 88-
309, at 17 (June 12, 1989) [hereinafter Second Draft Wyoming Opinion], in Marshall Papers, supra
note 4. Justice White circulated a concurring opinion stressing the inequity of allowing the tribes
extensive rights that they may never need to develop and gratuitously commented that "specific
attributes of [reserved rights] have never been authoritatively decided," such as whether the rights
might be subject to forfeiture if not used for their adjudicated purpose within a certain time or
whether they might be sold or leased for use on or off the reservation. First Draft Concurrence of
Justice Byron White, Wyoming v. United States, No. 88-309, at 2 (June 13, 1989), in Marshall Papers,
supra note 4.
328. The decision was scheduled to be announced on June 23, 1989. See Memorandum from the
Chief Justice to the Conference (June 15, 1989) (Wyoming v. United States, No. 88-309), in Marshall
Papers, supra note 4. Justice Brennan completed a lengthy dissenting opinion in which Marshall and
Blackmun joined. See First Draft Dissent of Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Wyoming v. United
States, No. 88-309 (June 16, 1989) [hereinafter First Draft Wyoming Dissent], in Marshall Papers,
supra note 4; Memorandum from Justice Thurgood Marshall to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. (June
20, 1989) (Wyoming v. United States, No. 88-309), in Marshall Papers, supra note 4; Memorandum
from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. (June 22, 1989) (Wyoming v.
United States, No. 88-309), in Marshall Papers, supra note 4. The dissent argued that the "defect"
found by the majority in the practicably irrigable acreage standard was really a concern that too few
Indians would get too much water. "The Court's 'sensitivity' to the interests of one group appears to
be matched by a suspicion that the other is getting more than it deserves." First Draft Wyoming
Dissent, supra, at 13. Brennan contended that "'[s]ensitivity' to the interest of one of the two groups
is an illegitimate thumb on the scales," and then reviewed the evidence to show that the Court's
"factual assumption" that the lower court's application of the standard "provides the Tribes with
more water than they need is ... outrageously wrong." Id. Stevens circulated a one paragraph
dissent noting that the Wyoming Supreme Court did not address whether future irrigation projects
would be built, inferring that Wyoming had not pressed the issue below, and thus maintained that the
matter should not be remanded. First Draft Dissent of Justice John Paul Stevens, Wyoming v. United
States, No. 88-309 (June 22, 1989), in Marshall Papers, supra note 4. This made the vote 5-4.
O'Connor then circulated a memorandum on June 22 stating that she believed she should
disqualify herself from the case because her family's ranching corporation "ha[d] been named in a
river water suit brought by an Indian tribe affecting the Gila River [in Arizona], which adjoins a
portion of the ranch." Memorandum from Justice Sandra Day O'Connor to the Conference (June 22,
1989) (Wyoming v. United States, No. 88-309), in Marshall Papers, supra note 4.
329. See Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 414-17 (1994). For a discussion of the case, see supra
notes 216-222 and accompanying text. For a discussion of nineteenth-century allotment policy, see
supra notes 223-251and accompanying text.
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outside reservations.33 ° The latter case reads like a traditional Indian law
decision and applies the preemption analysis of McClanahan and White
Mountain. O'Connor, like most members of the Court, proves herself
capable of employing foundation principles to justify an outcome that
fits her views of what ought to be; however, she does not hesitate to in-
voke a subjectivist approach and disregard foundation principles if nec-
essary to produce a desired result contradicting those principles.
Justice O'Connor's willingness to measure the rights of Indian
tribes with special sensitivity to the values and equities of non-Indian
society indicates that she, like Rehnquist and Stevens, belongs in the
subjectivist camp in Indian cases. For example, although O'Connor
based her decision in Rice on the lack of a tradition of tribal immunity
from state licensing and distribution of liquor, the strength of
California's interest in regulating liquor was also a key factor for her.3 '
Furthermore, her draft opinion in Wyoming revealed a desire to redefine
Indian rights according to the equities of non-Indians rather than
adhering to precedent and principle.332 She was willing to embrace
foundation principles in Sac & Fox, but, as Hagen proves, only if these
principles would not disturb a result subjectively reached.
4. Justice Scalia
Justice Scalia has candidly summarized his view of the Supreme
Court's approach to Indian law as a search for "what the current state
of affairs ought to be." '333 The license for judicial policy-making that
Scalia infers and accepts would seem more historically valid if one
looked only as far as cases that were decided during Scalia's brief time
on the Court prior to Duro, such as Brendale and Cotton Petroleum.34
330. See Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Sac & Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114, 123 (1993).
331. See Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 724 (1983); supra note 321.
332. See Second Draft Wyoming Opinion, supra note 327.
333. Scalia Duro Memo, supra note 4 (emphasis added).
334. In his nearly three terms on the Court prior to Duro, Scalia had voted with the majority in
seven of eight Indian cases decided by the Court. See Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of
Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989) (joining Justice White's plurality on the "open" portion of
the reservation and dissenting on the "closed" portion); Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v.
Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989); Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989);
Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Graham, 489 U.S. 838 (1989); Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988); Montana v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 484 U.S. 1039 (1988);
Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987). When Duro came up, Scalia had just written his
first Indian law opinion, Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990),
which was essentially a First Amendment decision in the context of the Indian peyote religion. The
decision drew widespread negative commentary for abandoning the compelling interest test for free
exercise of religion cases. See Robert N. Anderson, Just Say No to Judicial Review: The Impact of
Oregon v. Smith on the Free Exercise Clause, 76 IOWA L REV. 805, 815-23 (1991); Thomas F.
LaMacchia, Note, Reverse Accommodation of Religion, 81 GEo. L.J. 117, 123-26 (1992); Kristie
Pospisil, Note, Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith: What Remains of
Religious Accommodation Under the Free Exercise Clause?, 52 LA. L REV. 231, 249 (1991). In
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That does not excuse, however, his failure to search more deeply for the
enduring foundation principles of Indian law.
The admission by Scalia also seems inconsistent with his purported
judicial philosophy. The straightforward quote stands in sharp contrast
with his professed view, expressed in an interview the same year, that "a
judge's task is 'not to determine what seems like good policy at the pre-
sent time, but to ascertain the meaning of the text." 335  Categorizations
of Scalia as a textualist or a traditionalist are, indeed, doubtful. Some
scholars have speculated that for Scalia, holding true to a particular
method is not as important as his substantive agenda.3 36 Others say that
he considers methods subordinate to an overall judicial philosophy that
favors enunciation of clear rules.337 In Indian law, however, Scalia ap-
pears to have no "agenda" and he seems content to allow cases to be
decided on what ought to be today's policy.
Justice Scalia demonstrated this tendency in his only Indian juris-
diction majority opinion since joining the Court. In County of Yakima
v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation,33 he drew
extended inferences from scant legislative history to interpret a statute,
which was silent on taxation, as allowing state taxation of Indian-owned
allotments within a reservation.39 The decision rested largely on suppo-
sitions about nineteenth-century congressional intent.' In another case
that confronted directly the nature of tribal sovereignty, Scalia ignored
foundation principles and the text of the Eleventh Amendment to hold
that states are immune from suit by tribes." Notwithstanding his pro-
1993, Congress reversed the rationale, restoring the compelling interest test by statute. See Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993,42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994).
335. George Kannar, The Constitutional Catechism ofAntonin Scalia, 99 YALE L. 1297, 1303
(1990) (quoting Scalia), quoted in Michael J. Gerhardt, A Tale of Two Textualists: A Critical
Comparison of Justices Black and Scalia, 74 B.U. L REV. 25, 30 (1994). One commentator argues
that Scalia's "attacks on judicial activism and subjectivism" are essentially disingenuous because he is
constantly making choices among interpretations, rules, and definitions that turn his decisions into
subjective exercises. Bradley C. Karkkainen, "Plain Meaning": Justice Scalia's Jurisprudence of
Strict Statutory Construction, 17 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 401,476 (1994).
336. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Tradition, Precedent, and Justice Scalia, 12 CARDOZO L REV.
1699, 1700-01 (1991).
337. See, e.g., Karkkainen, supra note 335, at 476; Eric J. Segall, Justice Scalia, Critical Legal
Studies, and the Rule of Law, 62 Geo. WASH. L REV. 991, 1034-35 (1994).
338. 502 U.S. 251 (1992).
339. See id. at 258-64.
340. See id. at 253-56.
341. See Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775 (1991). The Eleventh
Amendment expressly immunizes states from suits "by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONsT. amend XI. In two previous situations (involving non-
foreign sovereigns) the Court has limited state immunity where suit is not explicitly barred by the text.
See United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 136-38 (1965) (states subject to suits by the United
States); North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 372-74 (1923) (states subject to suits by sister
states). In two other cases (involving foreign states and private individuals) the Court has extended
state immunity beyond the words of the Amendment. See Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292
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claimed distaste for judical policy making, Scalia appears content to join
the subjectivist camp when it comes to issues of Indian law.
5. Justice Kennedy
Justice Anthony Kennedy is a probable ally of Justices Rehnquist,
Stevens, O'Connor, and Scalia in Indian jurisdiction and sovereignty
cases. This generalization is supported by his single, but significant,
Indian sovereignty opinion. In Duro v. Reina,42 the Court cited insub-
stantial authority for denying the tribal court's jurisdiction over crimes
committed by non-member Indians on a reservation. 43 Kennedy's
opinion worried about the fate of outsiders in a tribal court system,
given "the special nature of the [Indian] tribunals" with their "unique
customs, languages, and usages."3" The holding left a serious law en-
forcement gap on many reservations, a problem so significant that Duro
was quickly reversed by an act of Congress. 45
Since taking his seat on the Court in 1988, Kennedy has always
voted with Chief Justice Rehnquist in Indian jurisdiction cases and has
invariably joined every opinion that denied tribal sovereignty. This in-
cludes Justice White's opinion in Brendale, which would have denied
tribal zoning jurisdiction anywhere on the Yakima Reservation.4 6
Kennedy's departures from Scalia, especially in First Amendment cases,
have led some commentators to perceive a streak of independence and
moderation. 7 They cite his opinions affirming the right of Krishnas to
U.S. 313, 330 (1934) (states immune from suits by foreign states as well as their citizens without the
state's consent); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 4-6 (1890) (states immune from suits in federal courts
by its own citizenry on a federal question). Scalia relied on the "presupposition of our constitutional
structure" reflected in the Amendment to find an implied immunity of states from suits by tribes.
Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 779; see also Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996) (holding that
Congress lacks constitutional power under the Commerce Clause to override state immunity from suit
by an Indian tribe). In Blatchford, Scalia apparently assumed that tribal governments, in their
relations with states, would be regarded by the Framers as being equivalent to individual citizens or
foreign nations rather than treating them as domestic sovereigns such as states or the federal
government. See 501 U.S. at 779-82. Compare this reasoning with Chief Justice Marshall's decision
and rationale in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831) (tribes are domestic dependent
nations, not foreign states).
342. 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
343. See id. at 684-92.
344. Id. at 693.
345. See Act of Nov. 5, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-511, § 8077(b) (amending Indian Civil Rights Act,
25 U.S.C. § 1301(2)).
346. See Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408
(1989) (plurality opinion). Kennedy also joined, along with Rehnquist, in Stevens' dissent in
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 54 (1989), favoring a narrow
interpretation of tribal jurisdiction under the Indian Child Welfare Act.
347. See Lawrence Friedman, The Limitations of Labeling: Justice Anthony M. Kennedy and the
First Amendment, 20 OHIo N.U. L REv. 225, 226 (1993); Christopher E. Smith, Supreme Court
Surprise: Justice Anthony Kennedy's Move Toward Moderation, 45 OKLA. L REV. 459, 460 (1992);
Richard C. Reuben, Man in the Middle, CAL. LAW., Oct. 1992, at 34.
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distribute materials in airports and prohibiting prayer in schools. 4
Despite this purported independence in First Amendment cases,
Kennedy voted with Scalia to conclude that disfavoring a minority
Indian religion (peyotism) was an "unavoidable consequence" of our
system of democratic government. 49 Kennedy certainly will not moti-
vate the Court to return to foundation principles. He has displayed a
profound disinterest in Indian law and should be counted as likely to
vote with the other subjectivist Justices.
6. Justice Souter
In a relatively short tenure, spanning ten Indian law cases, Justice
Souter has demonstrated some tendency to adhere to foundation princi-
ples of Indian law. He was the only member of the Court to join strong
Blackmun dissents from the subjectivist approaches of the Court in
Hagen and Bourland, and he joined Justice Breyer's dissent in
Chickasaw." Yet he was content to be part of the majority in Yakima,
where the Court breathed life into the Allotment Act and allowed state
taxation of reservation lands owned by Indians,35 and the unanimous
decision in Milhelm, which extended state regulation over tribal tobacco
trading.52 Nevertheless, he has not yet written an opinion of his own in
an Indian case353 and had no experience in Indian cases as a state
supreme court justice. It may be too early to generalize about Souter,
but his diligence and intellect may yet incline him to lead the Court in
future cases.
7. Justice Thomas
Justice Thomas decided no Indian cases in his brief, eighteen-
month judicial career prior to being appointed to the Supreme Court.
In his lengthy and celebrated confirmation hearings, he was not asked
348. See Friedman, supra note 347, at 259 (citing International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness
v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992)). But cf Rosenberger v. Rector &
Visitors of Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995) (majority opinion by Kennedy holding that state
university funding of Christian magazine did not constitute establishment of religion in violation of
First Amendment).
349. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
350. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 115 S. Ct. 2214, 2225 (1995) (Breyer, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
351. County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251
(1992).
352. Department of Taxation & Fin. v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., 114 S. Ct. 2028 (1994); cf.
Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779-82 (1991) (relying on sovereign immunity
of states to deny tribes the right to sue a state without that state's consent).
353. Souter did write a dissent in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1145 (1996). It was
a lengthy, scholarly study of the constitutional power of Congress, arguing that a statute allowing a
tribe to sue a state should be upheld. Traditional Indian law principles were not involved, but Souter
included a strong explanation of the foundations of state sovereignty. Id. at 1169-73.
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any questions about Indian law.3" Justice Thomas is depicted by some
commentators as perhaps "one of the most conservative justices of the
late-twentieth century"355 and, more harshly, as a heartless, knee-jerk
conservative.356 But political classifications are unhelpful; indeed,
keeping faith with foundation principles in Indian law is essentially con-
servative. Dean Soifer has criticized Thomas for his only Indian-related
Supreme Court opinion, South Dakota v. Bourland,357 alleging that it is
hypocritical to profess conservative principles and then find tribal
sovereignty over hunting and fishing regulation to be abrogated
implicitly by an act of Congress silent on the subject.358 Bourland
denied the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe jurisdiction over lands within
the reservation based on a construction of the Flood Control Act of
1944, a statute authorizing the taking of lands within the reservation for
a federal reservoir.3 9 Thomas' opinion presumed that Congress' failure
to reserve explicitly more of the tribe's aboriginal sovereignty when
taking the lands "suggests that the Indians would otherwise be treated
like the public at large."3"u Furthermore, in a footnote offering an
expansive interpretation of Montana, Thomas blatantly announced that
"tribal sovereignty over non-members 'cannot survive without express
congressional delegation' ... and is therefore not inherent.
'36
1
Thomas should be included among the subjectivists. One need not
rely on popular generalizations that simply presume he will always vote
with Justice Scalia.3 62  His positions in Bourland and the other five
Indian cases decided since he joined the Court are evidence of his
subjectivism.
354. John E. Thorson, Proceedings of the Symposium on Settlement of Indian Water Rights
Claims, 22 ENVTL. L. 1009, 1012 (1992).
355. Julian Abele Cook, Jr., Thurgood Marshall and Clarence Thomas: A Glance at Their
Philosophies, 73 MICH. B.J. 298, 302 (1994) (citing Jeffrey Toobin, The Burden of Clarence Thomas,
NEw You.KER, Sept. 27, 1993, at 41).
356. Catharine Pierce Wells, Clarence Thomas: The Invisible Man, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 117, 145-
46 (1993).
357. 508 U.S. 679 (1993).
358. Aviam Soifer, Objects in Mirror Are Closer Than They Appear, 28 GA. L REV. 533, 535
(1994). Dean Soifer takes both Scalia and Thomas to task for insisting "that there must be strict
judicial fidelity to legal texts. Yet when we turn to majority opinions written by Scalia and Thomas
respectively, we will see that these judges simply wave away directly relevant texts and language,
claiming that they must do so in the service of history." Id.
359. See Bourland, 508 U.S. at 689-90.
360. Id. at 693-94.
361. Id. at 695 n.15 (citing Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981)).
362. Judge Cook points out that Thomas has voted with Scalia in 79 to 89% of the cases during
his first two years on the court. Cook, supra note 355, at 298. Dean Soifer refers to Thomas as
Scalia's "acolyte." Soifer, supra note 358, at 535.
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8. Justice Ginsburg
Justice Ginsburg has been on the Supreme Court for only three
decisions involving Indian jurisdictional issues: Milhelm, Hagen, and
Chickasaw. She joined the unanimous court in Milhelm, and in Hagen
sided with the majority in a case where only Justices Souter and
Blackmun dissented. Chickasaw is her only Supreme Court opinion on
Indian sovereignty. It properly held that the Chickasaw tribe was not
subject to a state tax on motor fuels sold at tribal stores and, on a closer
issue, rejected a claim of immunity from state income tax by a tribal
member employed by the tribe on the reservation but living off the res-
ervation.363 Though both results could be based on established prin-
ciples, the Chickasaw opinion inaccurately restated applicable rules and
never discussed preemption. Besides showing some technical confusion
about the meaning and applicability of the term "legal incidence" in
taxation cases, 64 she incorrectly stated dicta to the effect that state regu-
lation cases not involving taxation, and taxation cases involving non-
Indians, are to be decided by a balancing test.365 As the final subsection
in the preceding Part of this Article argues, it is incorrect to see pre-
emption analysis as a "balancing inquiry," though it may be under-
standable that one would draw the conclusion from a cursory reading of
recent cases.
The second issue before the Court in Chickasaw was whether the
state could tax income earned by Indians living off the reservation from
tribal employment on the reservation, a matter of first impression. In
deciding this issue, Justice Ginsburg conspicuously avoided the well-
established preemption analysis of McClanahan.66 The Court might
have decided that state taxes under such circumstances are generally
preempted. Alternatively, the Court could have based a decision more
363. See Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 115 S. Ct. 2214 (1995).
364. In Chickasaw, the fuel tax issue was resolved by stating the well-established rule barring
taxation of Indians and Indian tribes within Indian country. Justice Ginsburg added, however, that the
tax here was barred because "its legal incidence falls on a Tribe." Id. at 2217. While reaching the
correct result, the opinion stated a rationale that is actually the converse of a rule applicable to
taxation of non-Indians within an Indian reservation. The rule is that states may impose taxes in
Indian country where the legal incidence falls on non-Indians; if the tax impacts tribal government or
federal policies, the tax is to be preempted. See, e.g., Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., Inc. v. Bureau of
Revenue, 458 U.S. 832, 837-38 (1982); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136,
144-45 (1980). The Chickasaw Court had to determine only that the tax was imposed on the tribe.
Technically the "legal incidence" cannot fall on any entity that is immune from taxation (such as a
tribe or Indians within Indian country). In other cases, the Court has said that the "legal incidence"
of a tax is on the first activity "which may constitutionally be subjected to it." Colville, 447 U.S. at
142 n.9; see also California State Bd. of Equalization v. Chemehuevi Indian Tribe, 474 U.S. 9, 11
(1985). Thus, it makes no sense to speak of the legal incidence being on the tribe since the tribe is
immune.
365. See Chickasaw, 115 S. Ct. at2220.
366. See id. at 2222-24.
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narrowly on the language of the Chickasaw treaty, which arguably was
sufficiently protective of the tribe's immunity from state jurisdiction to
be preemptive. If not, it should have based any decision denying tax
immunity on an analysis concluding the laws in question did not sup-
port it. But to uphold or deny the imposition of the tax would seem to
require the preemption analysis routinely used by the Court in the mod-
em era, especially in tax cases.367 Instead, Ginsburg simply rejected the
claimed tax immunity because the Indian employee lived off the reser-
vation. She sought a bright-line test to separate taxability from non-
taxability. This is not the same subjectivism indulged by her fellow
Justices, but neither is it consistent with well-established Indian law
jurisprudence. Implied preemption is not as vague and malleable as a
subjective evaluation of each case to determine what the current state of
affairs ought to be, but neither is it as simple as a bright-line rule.
Despite her opinion in Chickasaw, Justice Ginsburg may be capable
of leading the Court back to basic principles. While Ginsburg wrote no
opinions on Indian law in her eleven years as a District of Columbia
Circuit Court judge, she joined in one opinion that reflected a strong
understanding of the nature and importance of tribal sovereignty. 68
During her confirmation hearings she was grilled repeatedly by Senator
Pressler of South Dakota about her views on Indian law. She consis-
tently responded by saying that she would do her best to apply the poli-
cies set by Congress with respect to tribal governance.369 She also stated,
"The courts do not have any law creation role to play. This is not a
common law area. This is an area for Congress to control.""37 Perhaps
Ginsburg will rediscover the foundation principles that have guided
Indian law in the past.
9. Justice Breyer
Justice Breyer, the newest member of the Court, encountered a few
Indian cases in his tenure on the First Circuit Court of Appeals. For
367. See, e.g., Ramah, 458 U.S. at 836-47; Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n,
448 U.S. 160, 165-66 (1980); White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 141-52; McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax
Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 173-81 (1973).
368. See Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1439, 1440 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (reversing
Bureau of Indian Affairs' denial of funds for a tribal court and law enforcement program). The
Muscogee decision stated that "[i]nherent in self-government is the power to make laws and to create
mechanisms to enforce them. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that [federal law] conferred all
powers associated with self-government, limited of course by statutes of general applicability." Id. at
1445 (citation omitted). One Ginsburg lower court opinion discusses an Indian case in the course of
considering and denying a claim to the religious use of marijuana. Olsen v. DEA, 878 F.2d 1458,
1464-65 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (distinguishing exemption for peyote use by the Native American Church).
369. See Confirmation of Ruth Bader Ginsburg as Supreme Court Justice: Hearing of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. (1993).
370. Id.
1648 [Vol. 84:1573
NEW SUBJECTIVISM IN INDIAN LAW
twenty years, that court has faced a series of land claims by vestigial
groups of Indians in New England challenging titles to land going back
some 200 years. 7 Conveyances made to states or private individuals by
Indians are subject to the requirement of United States government ap-
proval under the Indian Nonintercourse Act, which emanated from the
first Congress. 72 Tribes have sought to void present titles by showing
that the Indian title to the same lands was extinguished in violation of
the Act.
The Mashpee Tribe has pursued such a claim for many years. In
one First Circuit opinion, the court applied an early Supreme Court case
and affirmed a jury verdict that found the Mashpees did not fulfill the
criteria needed for tribal existence.3  Because of the obvious problem
of a modern, non-Indian jury being entrusted with a fundamental cul-
tural decision about historical tribal existence, there was considerable
scholarly criticism of the decision.374 Breyer did not sit on that case, but
he participated in related decisions and wrote a 1987 opinion involving
the Mashpees as well as other groups.375 The claim to tribal status in the
latter case was based on documents from which one might infer that the
federal government historically treated the Mashpees and other groups
claiming land as tribes.3 76 Breyer, however, found the reports mention-
ing the Indians to be unavailing in proving tribal status through gov-
ernment recognition. 7 He thus affirmed the trial court's view of the
evidence.
38
More revealing of Breyer's approach to Indian cases may be an
earlier decision in which he denied Indian claims to land on the Gay
Head Peninsula.3 79 The Indians sought to invalidate Massachusetts stat-
utes that permitted certain conveyances of Indian land. Breyer correctly
stated that because the Indian Nonintercourse Act by its terms applied
only to conveyances by tribes, individual land claims could not be
brought under it. But his opinion also inferred that, but for the Act,
Indian land title would be subject to state law.380  Later cases proved
371. The first such case was Joint Tribal Council of Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d
370 (Ist Cir. 1975).
372. See 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1994). This is a substantial reenactment of legislation dating to 1790, 1
Stat. 137.
373. See Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp., 592 F.2d 575, 587-88 (Ist Cir. 1979) (relying on,
but refusing to adopt, the criteria of Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261,266 (1901)).
374. See, e.g., MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE 355 (1990); Gerald Torres &
Kathryn Milun, Translating Yonnondio by Precedent and Evidence: The Mashpee Indian Case, 1990
DuKE L.J. 625,629.
375. See Mashpee Tribe v. Secretary of the Interior, 820 F.2d 480 (1st Cir. 1987).
376. See id. at 483.
377. See id. at 483-84.
378. See id. at 485.
379. See James v. Watt, 716 F.2d 71 (1st Cir. 1983).
380. See id. at 76.
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much of Breyer's analysis on this point to be wrong. 8' In fact, the Act
merely implemented the principle of inalienability of Indian land
without participation by the sovereign, a principle that can be traced to
the colonial relationship with the Indians. That principle was embodied
in the Commerce Clause, describing the constitutional relationship
among the nation, the tribes, and the states, and granting Congress
authority over Indian affairs to the exclusion of the states.382 While state
law has operated in some situations in Indian country where Indians are
not affected, control of Indian land title has never been a state
prerogative.
Breyer compounded his error in the Gay Head case by overstating
the nature of state legislative power in Indian affairs. He concluded that
the Massachusetts laws allowing transfer of Indian lands should be
evaluated by an "interest balancing" approach to preemption, which he
attributed to cases like McClanahan, White Mountain, and Mescalero.8 3
The case of the Gay Head Indians was Breyer's first opinion in the field,
and one of only three he wrote as a court of appeals judge.384 Troubling
as it may be for its flaws, the opinion was written more than a decade
before his appointment to the Supreme Court and may not reflect how
he will deal with Indian cases in the future.
In his confirmation hearings Breyer was questioned by Senator
Pressler about his knowledge and views on Indian law.385 While care-
fully avoiding the Senator's attempts to engage him in discussions of
cases likely to come before the Court, he was conversant with key prin-
ciples, some traceable to courses he taught at Harvard Law School, and
some doubtless the result of good preparation. He talked about the
history and meaning of Worcester.3 6 He also opined on the authority of
381. See County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 234-38 (1985) (with adoption
of Constitution, Indian land transactions became the exclusive right of the United States government).
Under the Articles of Confederation, a different policy was in place; only during that period did the
national government lack the exclusive right to extinguish Indian title. See Oneida Indian Nation v.
New York, 860 F.2d 1145, 1154 (2d Cir. 1988).
382. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
383. See Watt, 716 F.2d at 73-74. Breyer wrote, "Supreme Court decisions since Chief Justice
Marshall's time have generally rejected the concept that the Clause automatically and necessarily
preempts all state laws dealing with Indians. Instead, these decisions have tended to expand the area
in which states may legislate." Id. at 73. The erroneous characterization of recent Supreme Court
cases as instituting a balancing test is discussed supra Part II.C.3.
384. The third and final Indian decision Breyer wrote as a circuit judge shows a consciousness
of the nature of tribal sovereignty, upholding a tribe's immunity from suit by interpreting the Rhode
Island Indian Claims Act narrowly. See Narragansett Tribe v. Guilbert, 989 F.2d 484, 1993 U.S. App.
LEXIS 6018, at *3-*4 (1st Cir. 1993) (unpublished table decision) ("[T]he Rhode Island Indian
Claims Settlement Act subjected the Tribe's lands, but not the Tribe itself, 'to the civil and criminal
laws and jurisdiction of the State of Rhode Island."') (citation omitted).
385. See Supreme Court Confirmation Hearing for Judge Stephen G. Breyer: Hearing of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
386. See id.
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Congress to abrogate treaties, but observed that it is the Court's task to
enforce treaties in the absence of clear evidence of congressional intent
to abrogate.3 He showed sensitivity to the difficulty of jurisdiction
cases involving "basic rights" of non-Indians while at the same time
recognizing that "you have to respect very much the sovereignty of the
tribe.""38 Breyer expressed a preference that such matters be "worked
out through Congress" or in negotiations with tribes, which he referred
to as sovereigns at several points.3"9 His other comments showed faith
that tribal court procedures could be fair enough to remove non-Indian
objections to tribal jurisdiction.
Most significant may be Breyer's 1995 dissenting opinion in
Chickasaw,"° where he analyzed the treaty in question and found that it
prevented state taxation of wages paid by the tribe to a tribal member
who worked on the reservation but lived outside the reservation bounda-
ries.391 In the treaty, the federal government had promised that no
"State shall ever have a right to pass laws for the government of the
[Chickasaw Nation] and their descendants;... but the U.S. shall forever
secure said [Chickasaw Nation] from, and against, all [such] laws." '392
Viewing the historical purpose of the treaty as protecting tribal govern-
ment, he observed that the state tax "likely affects significantly and di-
rectly the way in which the Tribe conducts its affairs in areas subject to
tribal jurisdiction." '393
Unlike Ginsburg, who wrote for the majority in Chickasaw, Breyer
apparently recognized that the Court needed to look to Indian preemp-
tion principles, a task that entails parsing relevant treaties and laws. He
did, however, suggest that the "well-established principles of tax law"
generally would permit the state tax and that the treaty provided an ex-
ception.394 Unfortunately, Breyer failed to recognize the presumption






390. Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 115 S. Ct. 2214, 2225 (1995) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
391. See id. at 2225-26 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
392. Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek of 1830, Art. IV, 7 Stat. 333, 334, extended to Chickasaw
Nation by Treaty of Jan. 17, 1837, Art. I, 11 Stat. 573, quoted in Chickasaw, 115 S. Ct. at 2224-25.
393. Chickasaw, 115 S. Ct. at 2225 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
394, Id. at 2226.
395. See Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 765 (1985) ("[T]he Court
consistently has held that it will find the Indians' exemption from state taxes lifted only when
Congress has made its intention to do so unmistakably clear."). Since Breyer construed the tax in
Chickasaw as affecting on-reservation activities, the presumption allowing state law in absence of an
express federal law to the contrary should not apply. See Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S.
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There is no reason to assume that Breyer will fall into the subjec-
tivist camp and there is some hope that he will make the effort to dis-
cover and apply foundation principles in Indian law.
B. Content Versus Outcome
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Stevens, the senior members of
the Court, are the two Justices who have shown special interest in Indian
cases, writing large numbers of opinions. Stevens is the leader of the
subjectivist camp and is willing to make policy choices in Indian juris-
diction cases with little more support than his perception of the
"balance of interests." Rehnquist prefers to rely on historical percep-
tions and expectations concerning jurisdiction. However, both the avail-
able historical record, typically written by non-Indians, and his
interpretation of it are essentially subjective and culturally skewed.
Indian sovereignty decisions by either Stevens or Rehnquist are
almost certain to capture the votes of the other and of Justices Scalia,
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas. They all have shown an inclination
to vote for practical-sounding, plausible outcomes that are strongly in-
fluenced by the cultural values of non-Indians. More often than not,
these Justices vote to rein in tribal sovereignty. It is reasonable to expect
that they will continue to be motivated by subjective judgments about
what the outcome "ought" to be. Thus, at least until one or more of
them leaves, there is a strong, six-member subjectivist majority on the
present Court.
Nonetheless, the existence of a subjectivist majority is not necessar-
ily fatal to foundation principles. Only Justice Stevens appears to be so
dedicated to the subjectivist view that he openly advocates in his opin-
ions that the Court shape and balance policy considerations. The rest
may be content to base their votes on traditional (or other) grounds so
long as the rationale supports the desired outcome. Therefore, it may
not always be necessary to command a majority as to the reasoning of a
decision. If an outcome is supported by a majority, the writer can often
attract a majority to join an opinion based on foundation principles.
Any hope that foundation principles can be resuscitated depends
on the newer members of the Court-Justices Souter, Ginsberg, Breyer,
and future appointees. To invoke these principles, they must take suffi-
cient interest and at least one of them must assert intellectual leadership
in Indian cases. If they understand that the Court's subjectivist misad-
venture is very recent and that the last decade's garbled precedent is
really quite shallow, one or more of them could play a pivotal role in
restoring Indian law to its 200-year-old course. The new Justices could
145, 148 (1973) (state taxation of activities carried on within a reservation is "not permissible absent
congressional consent").
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provide doctrinal consistency to the field if they began writing most of
the decisions and applying foundation principles.
A knowledgeable expert on Indian law within the Court can be per-
suasive in drawing votes in close cases where subjective judgments are
uncertain. Justice Thurgood Marshall became something of a specialist
in Indian law, and his colleagues seemed glad for his leadership, content
to let him perform an unpopular duty.396 They quibbled with his ap-
proaches from time to time, but he generally attracted majorities to his
opinions. These majorities sometimes included reluctant brethren who
concurred in an outcome supported by opinions that were thoughtful
and well-rooted in precedent. If the junior Justices can revive the
Marshall approach, they are likely to bring an often moderate "swing"
voter, for instance Justice O'Connor, into their fold. Justice Scalia, too,
may be susceptible to well-reasoned opinions based on foundation prin-
ciples. If one accepts the reluctance of his concession to "the current
state of affairs," ultimately he might be convinced that judicial subjec-
tivism is not, after all, "too deeply imbedded in our jurisprudence to be
changed," '397 and he may gravitate to the more genuinely conservative
foundational approach.
The prospect of the Court returning to the foundations of Indian
law depends to a major extent, however, on the tenure of the Court's two
oldest and longest-sitting members, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Stevens. The background and interests of their successors, and the tim-
ing of their selection, will be critical.
The Chief Justice, of course, assigns opinions to be written by a
member of the Court voting in the majority. Rehnquist's unease with
tribalism, particularly as it affects non-Indians, could have special force
if he chose to assign opinions to himself or Justice Stevens. So long as
he sits, this practice could frustrate any attempt by newer Justices to take
a leadership role in Indian cases. Since becoming Chief Justice, how-
ever, Rehnquist has shown little personal interest in writing Indian law
opinions.3
The lack of interest by most Justices besides Stevens may lead
Rehnquist, like many of his predecessors, to assign Indian cases dispro-
portionately to the junior members of the Court. If he has become less
zealous in his desire to reshape doctrine in the field, perhaps he will do
396. Professor Tsosie has written that "Justice Marshall's opinions ... have largely defined the
status of Indian nations in the modem era." Tsosie, supra note 295, at 496. See generally Robert
Laurence, Thurgood Marshall's Indian Law Opinions, 27 How. L.J. 3 (1984) (reviewing 15 Marshall
decisions from 1970-83).
397. Scalia has occasionally gone out of his way to recite the ideal of judicial separation from
policy concerns in his dicta. See, e.g., County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima
Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251,265 (1992).
398. See supra text accompanying note 293.
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so even if the newer Justices are inclined to support their majority
opinions with foundation principles. If Rehnquist (or the Justice ap-
pointed to replace him as Chief Justice upon his retirement) assigns
Indian cases to Justices committed to returning the Court to a principled
line of doctrine in the field, it could make a remarkable difference. The
Court's subjectivist misadventures in Indian law may be historically
cabined as aberrations, and the course of Indian law could resume its
traditional course.
CONCLUSION
Bedrock principles of Indian law, applied continuously from the
nation's founding until recently, left Indian country largely to tribal
governance, except to the extent that Congress expressly extended fed-
eral or state jurisdiction or limited tribal powers. Supreme Court deci-
sions have begun to depart from these foundation principles. Those
decisions have been based essentially on the Justices' subjective judg-
ments about how they ought to allocate sovereign authority over non-
Indians in Indian country in order to avoid cultural clashes. This sub-
jectivist approach has now attracted the majority of the present Court
away from the weight of precedent in Indian law. Contrary to Justice
Scalia's perception, confided to his colleagues shortly after he joined
the Court, subjectivism is not "too deeply imbedded... to be
changed," at least not yet. The Court probably could return to a foun-
dational approach without significant overruling of recently created
precedent. As more Indian decisions follow the subjectivist approach,
however, it will become increasingly difficult to resurrect foundation
principles. If so, Scalia's candid statement could prove prescient.
No one has yet emerged among the newer members of the Court,
however, to carry forward the legacy of foundation principles of Indian
law. There is some indication that leadership could come from Justice
Souter, Justice Breyer, or possibly Justice Ginsburg. If sufficiently
strong, this leadership could put Indian law back on track, albeit with
majorities composed of Justices who are persuaded less by traditional
rationales than by outcomes that satisfy their subjectivist notions of
"what ought to be."
This Article criticizes the present, ostensibly conservative, Court for
its subjectivism. The foundation principles of Indian law demand resis-
tance to the temptation of judicial activism. A return to foundation
principles, furthermore, would spare tribes the subjective judgments of
courts by requiring congressional action, with the scrutiny of the politi-
cal process and the tribes' full participation, before modifying their
rights as sovereigns. Indian rights do not depend on sympathy for the
plight or historical mistreatment of Native Americans. Self-
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determination for tribes is rooted in ancient laws and treaties, and is
protected against incursions except those that Congress deliberately al-
lows. Well-meaning judicial attempts to balance and accommodate in-
terests of Indians and non-Indians not only are inconsistent with the
limited role of courts, as sanctioned by the foundation principles of
Indian law, but are inevitably culturally charged. It is always difficult
for a governmental institution to make a truly balanced and fair
determination of the best interests of peoples from another culture.
Therefore, when such decisions must be made they deserve the highest
degree of deliberation, public scrutiny, and clarity available in the
political system. That is why the Court, which deals with Indian cases
only in fact-specific contexts and without political accountability,
should yield to the political branches.

